R.S. Narula, J. - (1.) WAZIR Chand petitioner, a displaced person, is an allottee of agricultural land measuring 42 Standard Acres, and 2 3/4 Units in district Bhatinda since 1954, on the basis of a verified claim in respect of agricultural land. He is settled in the rural area of Bhatinda on that land. It is not disputed that under rule 57 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 (hereinafter called the Compensation Rules), he is entitled to the allotment of a house of grade 'G' in addition to his land allotment. The plot measuring 5,400 square feet (plot No. 45) was allotted to the petitioner under that rule. After making the allotment it was found that several other previous lawful allottees were in possession of a substantial portion of the plot and an area of 3,431 square feet only was available for the petitioner. In lieu of the Area of house No. 45 of which possession could not be delivered to the petitioner, the Rehabilitation Authorities allotted him two other houses, namely house No. 29 measuring 1,260 square feet and house No. 57 measuring 709 square feet by order, dated August 1, 1967. Out of those two houses possession of house No. 57 could not again be delivered to the petitioner as it was found to be in the lawful occupation of another previous allottee. He was accordingly given a part of house No. 37 (709 square feet) by order dated October 31, 1968, in lieu of an equivalent area in house No. 57 which had been allotted to him earlier. We are, however not directly concerned with the allotment of house No. 57 and subsequent allotment of part of house No. 37 to the petitioner as that part of allotment was never questioned before the Rehabilitation Authorities at any stage, and has not been questioned before me by any one. The real dispute relates to house No. 29. Respondent No. 2 is stated to have filed an appeal against the allotment of the house to the petitioner before the authorised Settlement Commissioner. The appeal was dismissed as barred by time. Against that order respondent No. 2 preferred a revision petition before the Chief Settlement Commissioner. That revision petition was allowed by the impugned order on February 15, 1971 (Annexure 'A'). The order of the authorised Settlement Commissioner and that of the Naib Tehsildar (Sales) allotting not only house No. 29, but also allotting house No. 57 to the petitioner was set aside on two grounds, namely (i) that under rule 57 an allottee is entitled to allotment of a house appurtenant to his land allotment 'but in case possession of some portion of the allotted house cannot be delivered to him, he is not entitled to secure additional allotment of a house or a taur in lieu of the same"; and (ii) the appeal of the petitioner had been wrongly held to be barred by time as the allotment of the houses in question had been made to the petitioner in ex -parte proceedings against respondent No. 2, and the limitation was, therefore, to run from the date of the respondents knowledge of the order of allotment. It is this order of Shri R.S. Dass Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, dated February 15, 1971 (Annexure 'A'), which has been impugned in the present writ petition.
(2.) RESPONDENT No. 1 the Chief Settlement Commissioner, has not entered appearance to support his order or to contest the petition. Kirpal Ram respondent No. has put in appearance and though he has not filed any written statement controverting any of the allegations made in the writ petition, he has orally contested the claim of the petitioner. In these circumstances I have to assume all the facts stated in the writ petition to be correct, and all the admitted facts stated in the impugned order to be correct. Mr. Hari Chand Garg, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, has argued that the impugned order suffers from glaring and apparent errors of law on both the grounds on which the relief has been granted to the second respondent. It is plain that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary in the relevant statute or the relevant rules, limitation for filing an appeal runs from the date of the order sought to be appealed against irrespective of whether the order has been passed in contested proceedings or ex -parte. Merely because the order of allotment was ex -parte would not make the limitation for appeal against that order to run from the date of knowledge of the person aggrieved by such allotment. It is, however, a different matter that an application of such aggrieved person for condoning the delay or extending the period for filing the appeal on the ground of his not being aware of the ex -parte order any earlier, is certainly entitled to be considered and decided on merits. Another way of looking into the matter might be that the application of respondent No. 2 could be considered as one for setting aside the ex -parte allotment and not as an appeal against that order. That could not, however, be done in the instant case as an application for setting aside the ex -parte order of allotment had to be made to the authority who had made the allotment, and not to the higher authority. Sections 22 and 23 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (44 of 1954) which provide for appeals prescribe the period of limitation "from the date of the order" and not, in any circumstances, from the date of knowledge of the order. Error of law in the impugned order in respect of the question of limitation is, therefore, apparent on its face.
(3.) I also feel that the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the second point is, not sustainable in the eye of law. Once it is held that the petitioner was entitled to allotment of a house having certain area and being of certain value, his claim would not be satisfied by merely making a paper allotment to him. It has been observed in the impugned order that when the petitioner could get possession of only 3431 square feet out of an area of 5,400 square feet allotted to him in house No. 45, he "preferred an application, dated the 16th July, 1966, to the Additional Settlement Officer (Sales) for delivery of the possession of the remaining area." It is further stated in the impugned order that instead of delivering the possession of the remaining area of the house, i.e. 1979 square feet, the office of the Naib -Tehsildar (Sales) -cum -Man -aging Officer, Bhatinda, put up a proposal for the allotment of houses Nos. 26, 29 and 57, to him which were unallotted till then, and that this proposal was accepted by the Naib -Tehsildar (Sales), who vide his order, dated August 1, 1967, allotted house No. 29 measuring 1260 square feet, and house No. 57 measuring 709 square feet to the petitioner. In this situation it was not the petitioner's fault that the remaining area of the originally allotted house was not given to him and in lieu thereof some other area was allotted to him. The petitioner would in fact have been happy if the whole area was given to him at the place of his original allotment. It is some what strange that neither the petitioner nor the impugned order discloses any interest of respondent No. 2 in house No. 29. I asked the Learned Counsel to read to me the grounds of the appeal which had been preferred by respondent No. 2. Mr. R.S. Amol, counsel for respondent No. 2, read out the same to me. The only basis of the claim for contesting the allotment of that house to the petitioner contained in the memorandum of appeal was that respondent No. 2 had been allegedly in possession of the house in question for about twenty years. Even in the grounds of appeal read to me it has not been disclosed as to whether he had been in possession as an allottee, or as a tenant, or as a tenant of some allottee, or as a trespasser. In these circumstances, the Chief Settlement Commissioner should have further gone into the matter of the claim of the second respondent and should have decided whether respondent No. 2 had a legal right to retain house No. 29 or not. If he had found that respondent No. 2 had such a right, he should have given a direction to the authorities below to give an equivalent alternative area to the petitioner according to his entitlement and not to non -suit him altogether. In any case, I have not been able to find any justification for setting aside the allotment of house No. 57 in lieu where of in fact the petitioner had subsequently been given a part of house No. 37, regarding which no one has raised any objection.;