Gopal Singh, J. - (1.) THIS regular first appeal has been filed by Jarnail Singh and others plaintiffs against Intzamia Committee Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass and others defendants. It is directed against the judgment of Shri Des Raj Dhamija, Senior Subordinate Judge, Ludhiana dated November 28, 1958 refusing to grant relief to the plaintiffs for rendition of accounts. The defendants -respondents have also filed cross -objections as trustees in charge of the said institution against the decree for relief of removal of the defendants granted to the plaintiffs.
(2.) THE dispute pertains to the religious institution described in the plaint as Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass in village Guram in the district of Ludhiana. There is attached to the institution agricultural land measuring about 340 bighas Till 1930, the institution was being managed by Mahants. The last Mahant of the institution was Harnarm Dass. He was a man of bad character. The inhabitants of the village were not satisfied with his management. A claim as to the institution being a Sikh Gurdwara came up for disposal before the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal By judgment dated December 29, 1933, the institution was declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara. In the meantime, Harnam Dass left the institution. The inhabitants of the village constituted a managing committee of the institution. Although, the judgment of the Tribunal was on appeal reversed by the High Court, by its judgment dated February 27, 1935, Harnam Dass did not succeed in being restored as Mahant in spite of attempts made by him by means of two civil suits. The said managing committee continued in management of the institution. Nahar Singh was the first President of that managing committee. He was succeeded by Pakhar Singh. Rur Singh defendant No. 2 followed Pakhar Singh. The institution was being run as Gurdwara. The Managing Committee, defendant No. 1 and others impleaded as defendants including Rur Singh; defendant No. 2 as President of the Committee, have been in charge as trustees of the institution since 1947. The plaintiffs, who are worshippers in the institution filed suit on March 27, 1957 on the ground that the defendants had been making attempts to convert the institution from Dharamshala into a Sikh Gurdwara, that they have been misappropriating the income of the institution both from donations and agricultural land attached to it, that they are not maintaining proper accounts of the income and expenses of the institution nor are they getting them audited, that they have been asserting a title adverse to that of the institution and that considering their criminal activities and on account of their acts of misfeasance and mal -feasance, they are not fit persons to continue as trustees of the institution. In the suit, it was prayed that the defendants be removed from the management and trustship of the institution and the properties attached thereto, that the defendants but ordered to render accounts of all the income and expenditure of the institution, that a scheme be settled for better management of the institution and that new trustees be appointed for its management. In their written statement, the defendants pleaded that since the year 1932, the institution ceased to be Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass, that since then it was known as Gurdwara Baba Deep Singh Shaheed and that the institution was a Gurdwara and not a Dharamshala and the agricultural land was attached to the said Gurdwara. They denied that the institution known as Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass was a trust created for public purposes of a religious or charitable nature. The defendants also denied that they had either mismanaged the affairs of the institution or had ever misappropriated any of its funds. They asserted that regular accounts of the income and expenditure of the institution had been maintained by them. They, however, conceded that the same had not been audited. The defendants stated that since 1932, defendant No. 1 continued to be in adverse possession of the property of the institution, which had ever -since been maintained as a Sikh Gurdwara. The above pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues: - (1) Whether Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass was a public and religious institution and what were its objects? (2) Whether the property in dispute appertains to the aforesaid religious institution? (3) Whether the members of the Intzamia Committee, defendant No. 1 entered in the management of the property in dispute as its trustees? (4) If issue No. 3 is found in the affirmative, whether the defendants can legally set up the plea of adverse possession? (5) If issue No. 4 is found in the affirmative, whether the defendants' title to the suit property has become absolute by adverse possession. (6) If issue No. 3 is found in the negative, whether the defendants have acquired absolute title over the property in dispute by adverse possession? (7) Whether the defendants are guilty of malversation and as such liable to account for the income of the institution? (7 -A) Whether the defendants have committed breach of trust or are guilty of mismanagement as alleged in para 9 of the plaint? (8) What should be the scheme?
(3.) THE trial Court found on issue No. 1 that the institution was a public and religious institution and it was being run for religious and charitable purposes. The trial Court held under issue No. 2 that the property in dispute was the property of the institution. On issue No. 3, it found that the members of the managing committee entered in the management of the institution including its property as its trustees. Under issue No. 4, the finding given by the trial Court is that the defendants cannot legally set up plea of possession adverse to that of the institution. The answers to issues Nos. 5 and 6 have been given in the negative. Issues Nos. 7 and 7 -A were discussed together. It was held that the defendants were not guilty of malversation of the funds of the trust but their assertion of a hostile title against the institution amounts to breach of trust and consequently they are liable to removal. The trial Court, however, found that the prayer of the plaintiffs for rendition of the accounts could not be granted.;