CHOWDHRY, J. - (1.) THE petitioner Lajja Ram was convicted by a second Class Magistrate under Section 353, I.P.C. and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/ -. On appeal the District Magistrate altered the offence to one under Section 186, I.P.C. and reduced the fine to Rs. 25/ -. He then went up in revision to the Sessions Judge, but the revision was dismissed. The sole point urged before me, as it was before the learned Sessions Judge, was that as there was no complaint in this case as defined in Section 4 (1) (h), Criminal Procedure Code, the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to convict the petitioner for an offence punishable under Section 186, I.P.C.
(2.) THERE was a preliminary objection taken by the learned Government Advocate that the revision should be thrown out as being a belated one. It appears from the office report, which is not questioned, that the revision was filed on the 90th day. There is, however, no limitation prescribed for the filing of criminal revisions. Since however it is desirable that revision petitions should be instituted without undue delay. High Courts have laid down various period of time for judging whether a criminal revision has been filed without undue delay. For instance the practice in the Calcutta High Court is to allow 60 days to an accused for making an application for revision : 'Raj Chandra v. Emperor', AIR 1917 Cal 680. In Oudh the reasonable time for filing an appeal has been held to be the time granted by the statute for admitting appeals : 'Shah Naim Ata v. Emperor', AIR 1930 Oudh 401. In Allahabad High Court a criminal revision filed beyond 90 days is generally rejected on the ground of laches : 'Emperor v. Kesri Chand', AIR 1945 All 207. No practice has grown up there, nor is there any precedent of this Court on the point. Considering the long distances through difficult terrain which the litigants have to traverse in this State, it will be the practice of this Court in future not to entertain criminal revisions generally if filed beyond 90 days from the order complained of. I therefore hold that the present petition of revision cannot be thrown out merely on the ground of delay.
(3.) COMING to the aforesaid legal ground on which alone this petition has been argued before me, it appears that the petitioner was convicted by the appellate Court under Section 186, I.P.C. for obstructing certain officials of the opium department in the discharge of their public functions on the police submitting charge -sheet to the Magistrate on foot of a report lodged by the Deputy Superintendent of Opium. It was argued that as no complaint was made by the Deputy Superintendent of Opium to the Magistrate concerned, the entire trial was illegal. The offence in question is one of those mentioned in Section 195 (1) (a), Criminal Procedure Code, which runs as follows : "No Court shall take cognisance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate." Generally speaking a Magistrate takes cognisance of offence upon a complaint, upon report in writing from a police officer or upon information from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, as provided by Section 190, Criminal Procedure Code There are however certain offences in respect of which it has been provided that their cognisance cannot be taken except on a complaint, and that by a particular person. These offences and the particular persons entitled to file complaints in respect of thereof are mentioned in Sections 195, 196, 196A, 198 and 199, Criminal Procedure Code These provisions may therefore be said to form exceptions to the general rule contained in Section 190, Criminal Procedure Code And, so far as an offence under Section 186, Penal Code, is concerned, there are three pre -requisites to its cognisance being taken by a Court under the above cited provision of Section 195 (1) (a). These pre -requisites are : (1) that there should be a complaint, (2) that the complaint should be in writing and (3) that it should be of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. It is further noteworthy that these provisions are mandatory, so that it has been held that no Court has jurisdiction to take cognisance of any of the offences mentioned therein without the prescribed complaint. plaint. In 'RE C. P. JAGANNATHACHAR', AIR 1942 Mad 326. In the case of the aforesaid offences, therefore, convictions have been set aside either because there was no complaint, which means complaint as defined in Section 4 (1) (h), Criminal Procedure Code, or because the complaint was not by the prescribed person or authority. There is plenty of authority in support of both the positions, but only a few of them may be noted here. The following are cases in which convictions were set aside for want of complaints by the prescribed persons or authorities : 'Kailas Kurmi v. Emperor', 30 Cal 285; 'Ravanappa v. Emperor', AIR 1932 Mad 253; 'Jagdamba Parasad v. Emperor', AIR 1933 All 626; 'Ram Singh v. Emperor', AIR 1935 Patna 214; 'Ram Rakha v. Emperor', AIR 1937 Lah 624; 'Ram Parsad v. Emperor', AIR 1940 Oudh 424; 'Sheomangan Singh v. Emperor', AIR 1942 Oudh 425; 'Sudarsan v. Emperor', AIR 1947 Patna 64; 'Santi Lal v. Emperor', AIR 1948 Cal 103 and 'In Re Chinnayya Goundan', AIR 1948 Mad 474. The same result followed in the following cases because there was no complaint as defined in Section 4 (1) (h); 'Tara Prosad v. Emperor', 30 Cal 910 (FB); 'Arumuga Mudaliar v. Emperor', AIR 1923 Mad 59; 'Baldeo Singh v. Emperor', AIR 1926 All 566; 'Lakhan v. Emperor', AIR 1936 All 788 and Haidar Ali v. Emperor', AIR 1940 All 201.;