Kapur, J. - (1.) THIS is a rule directed against an order of the appellate authority Mr. J.S. Bedi, Dist. J. Ambala, holding that the rent had been paid in accordance with the provisions of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act of 1949 and that the premises were not needed for the personal occupation of the landlord.
(2.) ON 04-08-1949 the landlord gave notice to the tenants for vacating the premises and on the 5th of August they made an application for reduction of rent which was later on reduced from Rs. 125/- to Rs. 20/- on the ground that Rs. 20/- was the standard rent of the premises. On 10-08-1949 the landlord applied to the Rent Controller for the eviction of the tenants and the Rent Controller held that proper amount of rent had been tendered to accordance with the provisions of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act but the landlord did require the premises 'bona fide' for his personal occupation and he ordered eviction. An appeal was taken to the appellate authority - in this case the Dist. J. Ambala - who agreed with the Rent Controller on the first point but reversed the finding of the Rent Controller on the second ground holding that this part of the application of the landlord was not 'bona fide' meaning thereby that the landlord did not require the premises for his personal occupation. The rule was issued on 06-12-1950 by my learned brother Khosla, J. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that this Court cannot interfere with the orders of the appellate authority because the appellate authority is not a Court within the meaning of that word as used in the Civil P.C. but I am asked by Mr. Tek Chand, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, to interfere with the order of the appellate authority under Article 227 of the Constitution. Besides relying on three Judgments of the Madras High Court counsel for the Petitioner strongly relied on a judgment of the Calcutta High Court Bimala Prosad Ray v. State of West Bengal : A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 258. The learned Chief Justice there defined the powers given under Article 227 of the Constitution in the following words : The power of superintendence is again given to this Court and other High Courts by Article 227 of the Constitution and it is to be observed that the provisions in Sub -section (2) of Section 224 restricting the powers of this Court find no place in Article 227 of the Constitution. The powers of superintendence given to the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution are somewhat similar to the powers given to High Courts by the Govt. of India Act, 1915, which were, as I have said, later restricted by Sub -section (2) of Section 224, Govt. of India Act, 1935. It seems to me that it was the intention of the Constituent Assembly to restore the law to what it was before the Govt, of India Act, 1935 was enacted. That is the only inference which can be drawn from the omission of the provisions of Sub -section (2) of Section 224, Govt. of India Act, 1935, from Article 227 of the Constitution. That being so, it appears to me that this Court is bound to hold that it has the same powers of judicial interference as it had before the Govt. of, India Act, 1935, was enacted if not greater powers. It must be held therefore that Article 227 of the Constitution gives this Court a right in appropriate cases to interfere judicially with orders of Courts and tribunals made amenable to its jurisdiction by that Article. In a previous para the learned Chief Justice said: A power of superintendence would not normally involve a power of judicial interference, but I think it is too late to contend that the power of superintendence such as that given by Article 227 of the Constitution does not involve a power to interfere judicially in appropriate cases.
(3.) THE Calcutta High Court has in previous cases interpreted the word "superintendence." In Sukh Lal v. Tara Chand Ta, 33 Cal 68, which was a Full Bench judgment, it was observed by Maclean, C.J., at p. 77: The power of interference, which we possess in relation to cases under Section 146, Criminal P.C. is only under Section 15, Charter Act, which, in giving this Court a general power of superintendence over the Subordinate Courts, vests in it a power somewhat analogous to that of the King's Bench Division in the Supreme Court in England to interfere by 'mandamus', and in our opinion the power, which is discretionary, ought in relation to cases under Section 145 to be exercised with every caution.;