K. Kannan, J. - (1.) 1 The writ petition challenges the order of the Financial Commissioner and Government setting aside the auction held in favour of the petitioner's father exercising the power under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Act, 1954'). The property of 5 kanal 6 marlas had been put up for auction under the Act, 1954 on 27.06.1969 for Rs.2,000/ -. The petitioner's father paid Rs.400/ -at the fall of hammer and paid the balance on 11.08.1969, after the auction was confirmed on 17.07.1969. It appears that the actions of a particular Managing Officer Sh. Karta Krishan were reappraised and the auction conducted that resulted in the sale to the petitioner's father also came under the scanner of the Government. It appears that in a subsequent review of old cases, it was found that the sale price appeared low but acting on the report of the Supervisor that it was a barani land, the sale was recommended to be finalized by the proceedings dated 21.02.1970. 2. Notwithstanding the initial attempt to review the decision, the Chief Settlement Commissioner undertook a suo moto inquiry and found that the property was originally assessed at a reserved price of Rs.9,400/ -but it was over -written with the figure of Rs.3,150/ -in a different ink and property was sold at Rs.2,000/ -which according to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, was the result of a gross fraud played by the Department headed by Sh. Karta Krishan. The Chief Settlement Commissioner observed that the property was only 25 to 30 karams away from the abadi and the area at the spot was quite even and properly levelled; there were no pits in the land. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, therefore, reviewed the auction and in exercise of the powers under Section 24, set aside the auction and directed the refund of the amount after payment of 20 times of land revenue from the period when the land remained in possession of the petitioner. This order was passed on 31.01.1973 and on further appeal to the Government by the allottee, the Government affirmed the decision by order dated 23.07.1973. 3. The order of the year 1973 is challenged by his son in the year 1987 through a writ petition. The justification for the delay by the petitioner was that the order had not been communicated at all to his father till 28.07.1974, just before his death by murder. The property had been shown in the village revenue records in the occupation of the petitioner as a tenant -at -will and the entry about the rent showed that it was without payment of rent "Qabza Wa Parta Bashahra Malkan". 4. As the first objection by the State, the writ petition is grossly belated and even the ground alleged for the delay that the father did not know about proceedings, was not correct. The State would contend that the order was passed by the Government in the presence of the counsel for the petitioner on 23.07.1973 and he had himself not challenged the proceedings during his life time. The State also defended its action by the justifiable circumstances set out in the impugned orders themselves. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Sh. Goel would rely on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in "The Estates Development Ltd. (In liquidation) through its Official Liquidator v. Union of India and others, : AIR 1970 SC 1978" that quashed the decision of the State in cancelling the allotment under Act, 1954 where Hon'ble the Supreme Court found fault with a cancellation when there was no fraud or any mistake on the part of the allottee in the manner of securing the allotment. The learned counsel would contend that there was no fraud or misrepresentation by the petitioner's father and, therefore, it could not have been set aside at all. The Supreme Court was considering a case of allotment made to a Company on the assumption that the Company had some property in the place now in Pakistan as the basis of making an allotment. There were no other grounds made for setting aside the allotment and the Court was considering the issue of the tenability of the cancellation in the light of Section 24(2). There is no discussion anywhere of the provision relating to Section 24(1) in the said judgment. Section 24(2) is prefaced with the "without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power under sub -section (1) ..." Clause (1) is general in its import that allows for the Chief Settlement Commissioner to call for records of the proceedings of Officers under him for satisfying himself about the legality and propriety of any order. It is precisely within the realm of examination of such legality and propriety that the Chief Settlement Commissioner observed, which the State affirmed that there was a fraud practiced by the Head of the Department in making corrections in the entries to deliberately undervalue the property and offer it for sale for a very low price. When the authority was finding fault with its own Officer as having committee gross impropriety, there was sufficient justification for the State to annul the same, notwithstanding the fact that the allottee had no part to play. Section 24(2) of the Act must be seen as a subset of the larger area of operation, which Section 24(1) provides for. I do not, therefore, find any defect about the order itself. 6. The issue of delay is truly formidable against the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a judgment of this Court in "Prithu and another v. The Financial Commissioner (T) Punjab and others,, 1975 PLJ 29" that held that when a writ petition is admitted, it cannot be thrown out on the ground that discretion should not be exercised to undo manifest injustice on a mere technical plea of laches. We have come a long way from the year 1975 when the Courts were prepared to keep aside mere technical pleas. These are days of a huge influx of cases with a sizable burden of the load of litigations. We have not a device to tackle the huge load. A person that comes to Court must come with alacrity without any undue delay. I am not able to subscribe to the same theory of what has been preferred in the above judgment. However, I see certain merit in the contention that the allottee himself was not at fault. The petitioner could not have been just as well deluded in to thinking that he was being shown as a tenant -at -will in the Jamabandi and he could have had no apprehension of being thrown out of property. Even while affirming the order of the authority, I would find that the petitioner would be entitled to the first preference for staking a claim to the property, if an assessment of value of the property is made and it is offered to the petitioner for purchase before putting it up in auction. The issue may be considered from the point of view of the fact that the petitioner has been in long possession of the property from the year 1969 after payment of some consideration though in the view that I have taken, it was not an appropriate consideration. The amount paid with interest @ 9% per annum could be given credit to at the time of redetermination of price for sale to the petitioner on preference. The decision shall be taken by the respondents within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. Till such time as the decision is made and the petitioner has an opportunity to either accept or reject that offer, his possession shall not be disturbed. If the petitioner, however, is not willing to purchase the property at the price offered, the petitioner could have no further claims over the property and the Government will be at liberty to secure an ejectment in accordance with law. 7. The writ petition is disposed of, subject to the above.;