Adarsh Kumar Goel, ACJ. - (1.) THIS appeal has been preferred against the order of learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of the respondents against order of resumption dated 3.7.1992, inter -alia, on the ground that the only President of the appellant Committee could exercise such powers and not any other authorized officer. The site in question was allotted to the predecessor of the writ petitioners on 23.11.1989 by the appellant committee. The allottee failed to deposit the required amount as per terms of the allotment. The site was transferred to the writ petitioners on 27.6.1990 with the permission of the appellant. The writ petitioners also failed to pay even the first installment and sought to surrender the site to save forfeiture of initial deposit. The appellant committee initiated action and passed order of resumption dated 3.7.1992 and rejected the prayer for surrendering the site. The amount deposited by the allottee was forfeited. It was held that since the writ petitioners failed to pay the installments in spite of Show Cause Notice dated 8.12.1990, prayer for surrender could not be accepted in view of Clause 10 of the allotment letter. The writ petitioners filed appeal before the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation and it was argued that an Executive Officer could not have passed an order of resumption and only President could pass such order. The Commissioner held that as per resolution dated 10.5.1990 passed by the Notified Area Committee, power of the Committee mentioned in Schedule I of the Punjab Municipal (Executive Officers) Act, 1931 ('the 1931 Act') could be exercised by the Executive Officer. The appeal was accordingly dismissed vide order dated 15.6.1999.
(2.) THE writ petitioners challenged the order of resumption and the appellate order. Learned Single Judge held that though the powers of the committee could be exercised as per delegation in the resolution as per the 1931 Act, power of resumption was not of the Committee but only of the President and thus, could not be exercised by any other authorized representative. It was also noted that the writ petitioners had made deposit with 24% interest and, thus, order of resumption was liable to be set aside. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the appellants submits that the power exercisable by the President in the terms of allotment letter is power of the Municipal Committee and thus the said powers could be exercised in accordance with the statutory provisions by such authority to whom the same are delegated. Learned Single Judge was in error in restricting the exercise of said powers only to the President. It was further submitted that the order of resumption being valid, mere fact that during pendency of the writ petition, deposit was made by the writ petitioners after more than 15 years of order of resumption, could not by itself be ground for setting aside the order of resumption.;