Permod Kohli, J, - (1.) Appellant herein was an employee of the Punjab State Electricity Board and was involved in a criminal case F.I.R. No. 62 dated 21.6.1998 registered at Police Station Sadar Fagwara, Distt. Kapurthala under sections 302/306 Indian Penal Code Appellant was convicted under section 306 I.P.C and sentenced to undergo R.I for 10 years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I for six months. Appeal filed by the appellant came to be decided vide judgement dated 6.12.2010, whereby the sentence imposed upon the appellant has been reduced from 10 years to undergone. The appellant had undergone 21/2 years of actual sentence. On conviction of the appellant, he was placed under suspension w.e.f. 21.6.1998 i.e on the date of registration of FIR. He remained in jail from 23.6.1998 up to 22.12.1998 when he was released on bail. After he was granted bail he was reinstated vide order dated 3.6.1998. Conviction of the appellant was taken note of by the employer and he was dismissed from service vide order dated 16.8.2001 with a stipulation that in case the decision of the appeal preferred by the appellant in High Court is rendered in his favour and the Court acquits him, the order of termination of his service would be considered afresh. Unfortunately, the appellant's conviction was upheld, though sentence was reduced by the High Court as noticed above.
(2.) Order of termination was challenged by the appellant in CWP No.7844 of 2011. This writ petition has been dismissed by learned Single Judge vide the impugned judgement dated 4.5.2011. Present appeal has been preferred against the aforementioned order of dismissal of writ petition before us.
(3.) Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued that conviction in a criminal offence per se is not a ground to dismiss an employee and his conduct leading to his conviction was required to be considered by the competent authority. Appellant relied upon a Division Bench judgement of this Court reported as 2007 (4) RSJ 780 titled as Kaur Singh and another Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and others before the learned Single Judge and also before us. It has been observed in the aforementioned Division Bench judgement that the competent authority was required to consider the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features. In the context of the case before the Hon'ble Division Bench, it was said that all the relevant factors have not been considered by the employer and accordingly the writ petition was allowed and order of termination set aside with liberty to the employer to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Learned Single Judge, however, noticed that conduct of the petitioner has been specifically looked into by the respondents while passing the order of termination and came to the conclusion that no interference is warranted. Apart from the above observations, learned Single Judge also found that the impugned order of termination was passed in the year 2001, whereas the writ was filed in the year 2011 i.e after a lapse of about 10 years with no change in circumstances. 4-5. Mr. Chaudhary has reiterated the grounds raised in the writ petition before us. We have heard Mr. Chaudhary and perused the order passed by the learned Single Judge as also the termination order dated 16.8.2001 impugned in the writ petition. The competent authority while passing the termination order specifically taken note of the conduct of the appellant which led to his conviction. Relevant observations are as under:- " The conduct of Sh.Amrik Singh son of Sh.Joginder Ram being not good, criminal charge of burning his wife to death was proved against him by the Sessions Court, Kapurthala for which he awarded sentence. On receipt of the copy of important decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case, Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) Vs. S.Nazar Meera- AIR 1998 Supreme Court-1364 received vide letter No.19933/34/L.B.3(24)26/99 dated 28.3.2001 of P.S.E.B Patiala and keeping in view the instructions therein, services of Sh.Amrik Singh son of Sh.Joginder Ram, R.E.M are hereby terminated under the Punjab State Electricity Board Punishment & Appeal and Regulation 5(8) read with Regulation 14." 6. Thus, the argument of Mr. Chaudhary that the conviction of the appellant which led to his conviction has not been considered by the competent authority is without any substance. 7. Clause (a) of proviso Second to Article 311 (2) exempts the application of Article 311 clauses (1) and (2), where a person is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on a ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. In Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Administration), Madras Vs. S. Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3, SCC 377 , it has been held as under:- "9. The Tribunal seems to be of the opinion that until the appeal against the conviction is disposed of, action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is not permissible. We see no basis or justification for the said view. The more appropriate course in all such cases is to take action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) once a Government servant is convicted of a criminal charge and not to wait for the appeal or revision, as the case may be. If, however, the Government servant-accused is acquitted on appeal or other proceeding, the order can always be revised and if the Government servant is reinstated, he will be entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been entitled to had he continued in service. The other course suggested viz. To wait till the appeal, revision and other remedies are over, would not be advisable since it would mean continuing in service a person who has been convicted of a serious offence by a criminal court. It should be remembered that the action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) will be taken only where the conduct which has led to his conviction is such that it deserves any of the three major punishments mentioned in Article 311 (2). As held by this court in Shankardass v. Union of India (1985(2) SCR 358) . "Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution confers on the Government the power to dismiss a person from service on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge." But that power like every other power has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Surely, the Constitution does not contemplate that a Government servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in a no-parking area should be dismissed from service. He may perhaps not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty since clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) makes the provisions of that article inapplicable when a penalty is to be imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. But the right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly." In Ram Kishan and others Vs. State of Rajasthan (1997) 7, SCC 518 , it is held as follows:- "A bare reading of Rule 19 shows that the Disciplinary Authority is empowered to take action against a Govt. servant on the ground of misconduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. The rules, however, do not provide that on suspension of execution of sentence by the Appellate Court the order of dismissal based on conviction stands obliterated and dismissed Govt. servant has to be treated under suspension till disposal of the appeal by the Appellate Court filed by Govt. servant for taking action against him on the ground of misconduct which has led to his conviction by competent Court of law. Having regard to the provisions of the rules, the order dismissing the respondent from service on the ground of misconduct leading to his conviction by a competent Court of law has not lost its string merely because a criminal appeal was filed by the respondent against his conviction and the Appellate Court has suspended the execution of sentence and enlarged the respondent on bail. This matter may be examined from another angles. Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellate Court has power to suspend the sentence and to release an accused on bail. When the appellate Court suspends the execution of sentences, and grants bail to an accused the effect of the order is that sentence based on conviction is for the time being postponed, or kept in abeyance during the pendency of the appeal. In other words, by suspension of execution of sentence under section 389 Cr.P.C an accused avoids undergoing sentences pending criminal appeal. However, the conviction continues and is not obliterated and if the conviction is not obliterated, any action taken against a Govt. servant on a misconduct which led to his conviction by the Court of law does not loose its efficacy merely because Appellate Court has suspended the execution of sentence. Such being the position of law, the Administrative Tribunal fell in error in holding that by suspension of execution of sentence by the appellate court, the order of dismissal passed against the respondent was liable to be quashed and the respondent is to be treated under suspension till the disposal of Criminal Appeal by the High Court." In Sushil Kumar Singhal Vs. Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8, SCC 573 , it has been held as under:- "the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the conviction of an employee in an offence permits the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee or to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis of his conviction. " 8. Thus, in view of the ratio of the aforesaid judgements and the application of mind by the competent authority noticing the conduct of the appellant which led to his conviction, we find ourselves in agreement with the judgement impugned. No merit, appeal dismissed. Appeal dismissed.;