K.KANNAN,J. - (1.) THE petition challenges the order passed by the Financial Commissioner affirming the decisions passed by two other authorities in the quasi-judicial hierarchy. The orders related to a claim of ejectment by a landlord under Section 14(A) (i) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (for short, 'the 1953 Act'). The Assistant Collector had originally ordered the ejectment accepting the landlord's plea by his order dated 01.06.1982 but this order was set aside at the immediate next appellate Forum and two other revisional Forums namely the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner.
(2.) THE contention of the landlord was that the tenant did not pay the lease for the land that he held to the extent of 16 kanal 12 marlas from Kharif 1974 to Rabi 1977. The application had been allowed on 05.10.1978. Again the tenant was alleged to have committed a default for the subsequent period from Kharif 1977 to Rabi 1979 for which he filed again another suit, which was allowed on 08.12.1980. The tenant subsequently filed a petition on 02.01.1981 under Section 14-A (iii) of the 1953 Act seeking for permission to pay the lease for Kharif 1979, Rabi 1980 and Kharif 1980. In the meantime, he claimed that he had also paid the lease for which the order has been passed. The landlord claimed that the past conduct of the tenant in not paying the rent regularly and the way he had allowed them to be accumulated for 3 crops when he moved a petition for deposit, was itself evidence of the tenant's conduct and filed a petition for eviction on 30.04.1981 under Section 9(i) of the 1953 Act. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners assails the orders of the Financial Commissioner and the authorities below on the ground that the reasoning adopted that the tenant had actually sought for permission to deposit the rent even before he filed the petition for ejectment was itself sufficient to show that a ground of eviction did not exist. The learned counsel would contend that there had been admittedly recurrent periods of default and even one default was sufficient to found a cause of action for eviction. The learned counsel would rely on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in "Kapur Chand v. B.S. Grewal and others, 1965 PLJ 91" that held as follows: "Where the tenant did not pay rent and for every year a suit land had to be filed and recoveries were only made through the Court, this establishes the very kind of conduct which is contemplated by Section 9(1)(ii) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and this furnishes a ground for eviction of the tenant under Section 14-A(i)." The learned counsel would also place his reliance on yet another judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in "Mrs. Raj Kanta v. The Financial Commissioner and another, 1980 PLJ 346" that explained the words "failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause" as postulating three conditions: (1) there must be a failure on the part of tenant to pay rent; (2) such failure must be to pay rent regularly, i.e. rent should be paid punctually consistently without any break or breach; (3) if there is any default ranging from one to several, tenant has got to show sufficient cause if his case is to be taken out of the mischief of Section 9(1)(ii) Tenant in order to escape ejectment must be regular in payment of rent and to get rid of consequences of default, tenant must prove sufficient cause. The learned counsel pointed out that Hon'ble the Supreme Court was laying down the law Raj Kanta's case (supra) finding fault with an interpretation made by this Court in its Full Bench decision in "Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1954, 167".
(3.) AS opposed to this, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant would contend that the tenant had deposited the whole rent and there was no default on the date when the landlord's application was filed on 30.04.1981. The counsel for the petitioner would state that the tenant had not actually deposited the rent when he had moved petition for eviction on 30.04.1981 and a mere permission sought for deposit would not do. The counsel for the respondent would contend that he was required to seek for such permission only because the landlord refused to accept the tender and he could deposit the rent only when permission was granted by the Assistant Collector on his application on 14.09.1983.;