- (1.) Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has repeatedly stated that the earlier writ petition was withdrawn with a specific permission given by this Court enabling the Petitioners to withdraw the civil suit, so that they could file the instant petition. Nothing is borne out from the earlier order to this effect. It is apparently an attempt to over-reach the Court.
(2.) Shri Sachdeva has tried to explain the lapse on his part by saying that it was a bonafide error. The Court is not convinced with the explanation given by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners for the simple reason that the order by which the petition was permitted to be withdrawn, was withheld from this Court. Secondly, it was repeatedly sought to be projected before this Court that the Court had granted the permission to withdraw the civil suit enabling the Petitioners to file the instant petition. None of these are borne out from the record. It is thus a clear reflection on the part of the Petitioners who have made a misleading statement before this Court. It is settled law that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands, does not deserve any indulgence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramjas Foundation and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors,2011 1 RCR 176 observed as follows: 14. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in other Courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case. In Dalgesh v. Jarvie 2 Mac and G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. observed: "It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any fact which he has omitted to bring forward. In Castelli v. Cook, 1849 7 Hare 89, 94 Wigram V.C. stated the rule in the following words: "A Plaintiff applying ex parte comes under a contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not properly brought forward, the Plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go. In Republic of Poeru v. Dreyfus Brothers and Company, 55 LT 802, 803, Kay J. held as under: I have always maintained, and I think it most important to maintain most strictly, the rule that, in ex parte applications to this Court, the utmost good faith must be observed. If there is an important misstatement, speaking for myself, I have never hesitated, and never shall hesitate until the rule is altered, to discharge the order at once, so as to impress upon all persons who are suitors in this Court the importance of dealing in good faith in the Court when ex parte applications are made.
(3.) The same rule was restated by Scrutton L., J in R.V. Kensington Income Tax Commissioner, (1917) 1 K.B. 486. The facts of that case were that in April, 1916, the General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the district of Kensgington made an additional assessment upon the applicant for the year ending April 5, 1913, in respect of profits arising from foreign possessions. On May 16, 1916, the applicant obtained a rule nisi directed to the Commissioners calling upon them to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not be awarded to prohibit them from preceding upon the ground that the applicant was not a subject of the King nor resident within the United Kingdom and had not been in the United Kingdom, except for temporary purposes, nor with any view or intent of establishing her residence therein, nor for a period equal to six months in any one year. In the affidavit on which the rule was obtained the applicant stated that she was a French subject of the United Kingdom nor a resident in the United Kingdom; that during the year ending April, 5, 1993, she was in the United Kingdom for temporary purposes on visits for sixty-eight days; that she spent about twenty of these days in London at her brother's house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, generally in company with other guests of her brother; that she was also in the United Kingdom during the year ending April 5, 1914, for temporary purposes on visits, and spent part of the time at 213, King's Road aforesaid; and that since the month of November, 1914, she had not been in the United Kingdom. From the affidavits filed on behalf of the Commissioners and of the surveyor of taxes, who showed cause against the rule nisi, and from the affidavit of the applicant in reply, it appeared that in February, 1909, a leasehold house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea had been taken in the name of the applicant's brother. The purchase-money for the lease of the house and the furniture amounted to 4000, and this was paid by the applicant out of her own money. The accounts of household expenses were paid by the brother and subsequently adjusted between him and the applicant. The Divisional Court without dealing with the merits of the case discharged the rule on the ground that the applicant had suppressed or misrepresented the facts material to her application. The Divisional Court observed that the Court, for its own protection is entitled to say "we refuse this writ of prohibition without going into the merits of the case on the ground of the conduct of the applicant in bringing the case before us." On appeal, Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. and Warrington L.J. approved the view taken by the Divisional Court. Scrutton, L.J. who agreed that the appeal should be dismissed observed: and it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts - facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it - the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.;