PER M.M.KUMAR, J. - (1.) THE unsuccessful petitioner -appellant has filed the instant appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent against the judgment dated 25.11.2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge upholding the order, dated 7.9.2006 (P -6), dismissing the appellant from service after holding a departmental inquiry against him. He has been found guilty of the misconduct for accepting bribe for sanctioning of loan to farmers. The appeal filed by the appellant was also rejected vide order dated 19.12.2006 (P -3) and further appeal before the Review Committee also met the same fate, vide order dated 6.10.2009 (P -6).
(2.) BEFORE the learned Single Judge primarily two grounds were urged. Firstly, it was contended that during regular inquiry the petitioner cross -examined the complainant and the witnesses. The Enquiry Officer accepted the testimony of the witnesses and held the petitioner -appellant guilty. However, during the pendency of appeal he got affidavits from the said witnesses wherein they have resiled from the earlier statement given before the Enquiry Officer. As per the petitioner appellant, the whole inquiry is vitiated. Secondly, it was submitted before the learned Single Judge that the complainant was a disgruntled customer of the bank whom the petitioner -appellant had forced to pay the outstanding loan. To prove this fact, the petitioner wanted to examine the witnesses but was not allowed by the Enquiry Officer. Both these arguments have been repelled by the learned Single Judge by observing as under: " Both the arguments are misconceived. A subsequent affidavit may or may not have the probative value of testimony which is given in person and which has been tested by cross -examination. As regards the second argument, even if it is accepted that the complainant was a disgruntled customer, yet it would not detract from the merit or otherwise of the complaint. What the learned counsel is arguing, in reality is reappreciation of the evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Managing Director State Bank of Hyderabad and Anr. v. P. Kata Rao, 2008 (3) SCT 153 has held clearly that superior Courts exercise a limited jurisdiction in interfering with findings of fact arrived at by the inquiry officer. This would apply with even more vigour when the said findings of fact have been affirmed in appeal and further proceedings. Learned counsel has not been able to persuade me that the departmental proceedings were so vitiated as to render them nonest." In the instant appeal the petitioner - appellant has averred that the learned Single Judge has not considered the issue of quantum of punishment. It has been submitted that the respondents have inflicted upon him extreme penalty of removal from service merely on account of some lapses/irregularities without taking into consideration about 23 years of service rendered by him. According to the petitioner -appellant the Courts are empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty. In that regard reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ramanuj Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 7 SCC 248.
(3.) HAVING heard learned counsel for the appellant and perusing the paper book we are of the considered view that the instant appeal is devoid of merit and does not warrant admission. The petitioner -appellant has not been able to point out any material irregularity in holding of the departmental inquiry against him. It is well settled that the Courts are not a Court of Appeal over and above the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate/Revisional Authority. As a concept of law the Courts cannot re -appreciate evidence to reach a conclusion different than the one recorded by the Inquiry Officer merely because another view is possible. In that regard reliance may be placed on the observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212. Learned counsel for the petitioner -appellant has not been able to point out either any violation of the principles of natural justice nor any statutory rules warranting a conclusion that he has not been treated fairly. Once the findings of fact are well based and the procedural requirements contemplated by the Rules have been complied with then the quantum of punishment cannot be interfered with. It is equally well settled that if the Inquiry Officer, Punishing Authority or the Appellate Authority has proceeded on the basis of wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration or in violation of principles of natural justice only then the Courts are empowered to interfere with the quantum of punishment. In that regard reliance may be placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Gurdev Singh v. State of Haryana 2007 (1) RSJ 45. In that case a Division Bench of this Court (of which one of us, M.M. Kumar, J. was a member) has considered the application of Wednesbury Principles by referring to para 242 of a Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India (2) SCC 1. The aforesaid para 242 reads as under. - "242. The Wednesbury principle is often misunderstood to mean that any administrative decision which is regarded by the Court to be unreasonable must be struck down. The correct understanding of the Wednesbury principle is that a decision will be said to be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense if (i) it is based on wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration, (ii) it has ignored a very relevant material which it should have taken into consideration, or (iii) it is so absurd that no sensible person could ever have reached it." (Emphasis added) ;