TARSEM LAL ADVOCATE Vs. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT PUNJAB AND OTHERS
LAWS(P&H)-2011-11-297
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Decided on November 04,2011

Tarsem Lal Advocate Appellant
VERSUS
Chief Secretary To The Government Punjab And Others Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Rajiv Narain Raina,J. - (1.) This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by a practising Advocate of this Court who has appeared in person and has made an impassioned plea before us that a writ of mandamus should be issued to the respondent-State of Punjab to apply the reservation policy of the State for Scheduled castes and Backward classes to the office of Advocate General, Punjab and to operate the reservation roster and the prescribed percentage on the posts of Assistant Advocate General and Deputy Advocate General, Punjab. It is also prayed that the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 (for short," 2006 Act") should be made applicable to the office of Advocate General, Punjab. As an interim measure, it is prayed that the State should be restrained from making further appointments of Law Officers of any rank till the reserved points are filled in accordance with roster points earmarked for direct recruitment. Further, on the strength of Section 4(2) of 2006 Act, it is submitted that the percentage of reservation for filling up vacancies by direct recruitment or by transfer in Group "A" and Group "B" and Group "C" services have been fixed at 25 % for Scheduled Castes and 12% for Backward Classes. The petitioner has also submitted that he has made a representation (P11) to the Hon'ble Deputy Chief Minister, Punjab and Principal Secretary to Government, Punjab, Department of Home Affairs, Law and Justice that his candidature for the post of Deputy Advocate General/Assistant Advocate General be considered positively in view of Sections 3 and 4, 4(5), 4(7) of the Act. He says he has also presented a separate memorial dated 28.4.2007 (P6) to His Excellency The Governor of Punjab, Chandigarh for taking punitive action against those responsible for not applying the Act to the Advocate General Office. The petitioner avers that he had moved the Punjab State Commission for Scheduled Castes regarding registration of case under the protection of the Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the Commission by a letter dated 23.5.2007 had requested the Principal Secretary to Government, Punjab, Department of Home Affairs, Law and Justice to submit facts and information to it within one month of receipt of the said letter. The State Government by its communication dated 29.8.2007 responded to that letter of the Commission. Reasons were given by the State Government to the Commission as to the inapplicability of the 2006 Act. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association reported as 1995(1) S.C.T 670 : (1994) 1 SLR 533 (SC) was relied upon. In the petition itself, a part of para No.14 of the U.P. State Law Officers Association's case (supra) has been reproduced and it has been stated that the decision is "absolutely irrelevant so far as reservation policy is concerned." A distinction has been sought to be drawn by Mr. Tarsem Lal, Advocate appearing in person that judgment is inapplicable to the case in hand since it deals with a case of "brief holders" who were engaged by the UP Government to appear on its behalf in the High Court. It is argued that since the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not deal with appointments of Assistant Advocate General and Deputy Advocate General in the said case, the respondent State was wrong in rejecting the claim for reservation based appointments. Still further it is contended that the judgment is not an authority that reservation policy should or should not apply to the Advocate General Office, Punjab. We are afraid that the petitioner has misread the judgment. Para Nos.14 and 15 of the judgment are reproduced:- "14. Legal profession is essentially a service-oriented profession. The ancestor of to-day's lawyer was no more than a spokesman who rendered his services to the needy members of the society by articulating their case before the authorities that be. The services were rendered without regard to the remuneration received or to be received. With the growth of litigation, lawyering became a full-time occupation and most of the lawyers came to depend upon it as the sole source of livelihood. The nature of the service rendered by the lawyers was private till the Government and the public bodies started engaging them to conduct cases on their behalf. The Government, and the public bodies engaged the services of the lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period. Although the contract in some cases prohibited the lawyers from accepting private briefs, the nature of the contract did not alter from one of professional engagement to that of employment. The lawyer of the Government or a public body was not its employee but was professional practitioner engaged to do the specified work. This is so even to-day, though the lawyers on the full-time rolls of the Government and the public bodies are described as their law officers. It is precisely for this reason that in the case of such law officers, the saving clause of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules, waives the prohibition imposed by the said rule against the acceptance by a lawyer of a fulltime employment. 15. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer for personal reasons and is at liberty to leave his also, for the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give reasons for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The lawyer in turn is not an agent of his client but his dignified, responsible spokesman. He is not bound to tell the court every fact or urge every proposition of law which his client wants him to do, however irrelevant it may be. He is essentially an advisor to his client and is rightly called a counsel in some jurisdictions. Once acquainted with the facts of the case, it is the lawyer's discretion to choose the facts and the points of law which he would advance. Being a responsible officer of the court and an important adjunct of the administration of justice, the lawyer also owes a duty to the court as well as to the opposite side. He was to be fair to ensure that justice is done. He demeans himself if he acts merely as a mouthpiece of his client. This relationship between the lawyer and the private client is equally valid between him and the public bodies."
(2.) It is well settled that no mandamus can be issued by the writ court to the State to grant or create reservation. Article 16(4-A) is an enabling provision which leaves the State free to grant reservation according to its wisdom. Adequacy or inadequacy of reservation and reservation to be consistent with efficiency of administration are matters for the Government to consider and decide. The Court cannot compel the State to create reservation in the office of Advocate General, Punjab and to make appointments following the rule of reservation and roster. A client cannot be forced to engage a particular counsel. It is the free choice of a litigant as to who should represent him in a court of law. The Government before the court is itself a litigant and client of law officers appointed by it. Choice of counsel is a matter of personal faith, trust and belief. No counsel can be thrust on an unwilling client. Caste and creed do not enter the field. The petitioner's right to practice the profession of law is not infracted by State not applying rule of reservation and roster in the office of the Advocate General. The highest standards cherished by many generations of lawyers in our courts eschew clamouring for such prestigious assignments. Pure merit must prevail if the State is to discharge its duty effectively towards the constitutional and other courts. We feel strongly that reservation of any kind in such office is insupportable on logic and experience. We refrain from issuing any direction as prayed for. The matter appears to us to be in fact squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. State Law Officers Association (supra) which the petitioner has so casually brushed aside as irrelevant not just in spoken words but in pleadings.
(3.) There is no substance in this petition which is dismissed at the threshold as no legal right has been demonstrated by the petitioner which vests in him and which is enforceable or any legal obligation on the State to appoint law officers on reserve roster point and prescribed percentage of reservation in direct recruitment for Group A, Group B and Group C posts mentioned in the '2006 Act', in the absence of any legal instrument, rule, notification or bye law shown to us declaring the posts of Deputy Advocate General and Assistant Advocate General and classifying these posts in one of the said groups and still further that this Court should cause issuance of a mandamus to the State to include the said posts together with the Office of the Advocate General, Punjab lock, stock and barrel in the Act, 2006. We have no such power or authority. Petition dismissed.;


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