- (1.) Municipal Corporation, Amritsar, through its Commissioner, has approached this Court raising primary issue that in the matter of imposition of house tax and its recovery, the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction in view of the specific provision under Section 146 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), which provides a remedy of an appeal which according to the appellant is an efficacious remedy. It is further stated that the Civil Courts have committed grave error in entertaining the suit of House Tax Assessee. Before the above said question, raised by the appellant, is decided, it will be necessary to give a brief gist of the facts. The respondent/plaintiff Dr. (Mrs.) Prem Rai is owner of the property under the name and style of Dr. Prem Rai Nursing Home, The Mall, Amritsar. The property was assessed by the Municipal Authorities at the rate of Rs. 27,000 per month and w.e.f. 1.4.1979, the house tax of Rs. 3,645 per annum was levied. However, in the year 1993-94, supplementary bills were sent. Thereafter, a notice under Section 103 of the Act was issued to the plaintiff on 9.10.1991. The plaintiff gave reply to the notice and raised objections. On 13.9.1993, another notice was served calling upon the plaintiff to attend the office of Executive Officer of the appellant/defendant Corporation. An adjournment was sought by the plaintiff, which was refused and an ex parte decision was taken and the property was assessed at the rate of Rs. 2,06,400 per annum. Thus, the objections raised by the plaintiff were ignored. In the suit, various grounds were pleaded to question the assessment of the property. The grounds have been summed up by the trial Court in paragraph No. 1 of its judgment. This Court need not to give any details as the only question raised before me is as to whether the Civil Court could try the suit or not.
(2.) Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana, through its Commissioner and Others v. Raghbir Kaur and Another, 2010 1 RCR(Civ) 188, wherein learned Single Judge of this Court has held as under:- 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon Munshi Ram and others v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, 1979 AIR(SC) 1250, wherein it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of any matter pertaining to assessment of house-tax. Reference is also made to Kelash Nath v. Municipal Committee, Batala, 1962 AIR(P&H) 389 (Full Bench), Ramesh Kumar and others v. The Municipal Committee, Gardaspur and others, 1981 AIR(P&H) 295 (D.B.), M/s Rama Krishna Rice Mills v. Municipal Committee, Sultanpur Lodhi, 1985 87 PunLR 221 and N.D.M.C. v. Satish Chand (deceased) by L.R. Ram Chand, 2003 4 RCR(Civ) 373. 7. The Courts below have decreed the suit for the reason that in the written statement or in evidence, the Corporation has not disclosed any basis of increase of house-tax. Whether the house tax is liable to be increased and to what extent, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Authorities under the Act. Such is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Munshi Ram's case , wherein it has been held to the following effect : 23. From a conjoint reading of Sections 84 and 86, it is plain that the Municipal Act, gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act, irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principles of assessment. The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which is analogous to that provided in Section 66(2) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922. Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act. 24. It is well-recognized that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle, it is clear that Sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar by inevitable implication, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act. 8. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.D.M.C.'s case again reiterated the principle enunciated in Munshi Ram's case . Before this Court a Division bench in M/s Rama Krishna Rice Mills case considered the earlier judgments of Division Bench of this Court in Ramesh Kumar's case and held that in Ramesh Kumar's case the question whether the assessment and competition of house-tax could be challenged in the Civil Court wherein it was held that such challenge is not maintainable before the Civil Court. It was held that challenge before the Civil Court in respect of assessment not made on the basis of fair rent is not maintainable. It was held that merely raising the legality of the assessment order is beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 9. Though the aforesaid judgments are in respect of Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Muncipal Act, 1911, but the said provisions are pari materia to Sections 146 and 149 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. Therefore, the enunciation of law as laid down in above judgments is applicable to the facts of the present case as well. 10. Since the findings recorded by the Courts below are against the principles of law, therefore, such findings are unsustainable. Thus, the substantial question of law as mentioned above is answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
(3.) Therefore, the substantial question of law, formulated in the present case as to whether the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to try the Civil Suit in view of Sections 146 and 149 of the Act or not, is to be answered in favour of the appellant/defendant. It is disputed that Sections 146 and 149 of the Act are pari materia to Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, In the above said judgment, learned Single Judge of this Court had already noticed the position of law laid down in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, 1979 3 SCC 83. Furthermore, a Division Bench of this Court in Romesh Kumar v. Municipal Committee, Gurdaspur, 1981 AIR(P&H) 295 relying upon Munshi Ram's case held that Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters of assessment and computation of house tax. Therefore, in the present case, the trial Court had rightly held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. However, the lower Appellate Court, without considering the question as to whether the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred or not, had decreed the suit of plaintiff/respondent and restrained the defendant-Corporation. The lower Appellate Court held that the disputed amount could not be recovered as the Punjab Government vide Gazette notification issued on 22.6.1979 had exempted hospitals from the levy of house tax. The lower Appellate Court, while doing so, lost its sight of the fact that it was for the plaintiff to prove that the Nursing Home run by her was the charitable hospital. Furthermore, this question could be decided by the authorities and the ex parte decision taken by the authorities levying the house tax was appealable. An efficacious remedy of filing the appeal against the assessment order has been provided under Section 146 of the Act and furthermore, Section 149 of the Act barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It is a definite stand of the Corporation that the plaintiff/respondent is running a private Nursing Home and not a charitable hospital and its activities were commercial in nature. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the lower Appellate Court had not examined the issue whether the Nursing Home run by the plaintiff/respondent was a charitable or a commercial in nature. Furthermore, the lower Appellate Court had not examined the question as to whether the finding returned by the trial Court that the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction to try the suit was valid or not. Thus, this Court answers the question posed in favour of the appellant-Corporation by holding that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Civil Court could not entertain the suit. In view of the consistent ratio of law propounded in the judgments cited above, this Court has no other option but to accept the present appeal. Hence, the judgment and decree dated 8.11.2006, rendered by the lower Appellate Court, is set aside and that of the trial Court dated 24.1.2002 are restored.;