- (1.) To the application filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court by the workmen working in the Sugar Factory for salary during the period when they had not been paid their wages and when, according to the workmen, they were not allowed to work, the Labour Court found that the denial of employment at the relevant time was not justified and also found that the wages during the period when they were unjustly denied employment were to be paid. All the petitions under Section 33C(2) were allowed. By a single writ petition, the employer management has challenged all the awards. The workmen have contended that such a writ petition is not maintainable. The learned Senior Counsel relies on a judgment of Madras High Court in R. Maria Thangam v. U. Murugesan and Ors., 1979 LabIC 455 that held a single writ petition by a management challenging different awards filed by several workmen was not maintainable. The Division Bench further held that the Industrial Disputes Act itself allowed for a joint application to be filed by the workmen but, however, a single writ petition challenging different reliefs to different workmen under a common order would not be maintainable. In this case, it is not even a case of single petition but they were different awards and all such awards could not be brought through a single writ petition. I find that the Respondents have taken a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition and the Petitioners have not taken any appropriate step to challenge various awards through independent petitions. Each petition constitutes a different cause of action and, in my view, a single writ petition cannot be filed. It is just not merely a matter of procedure but it is also one that can deflect the Court from a proper focus from how each individual case might merit different consideration.
(2.) Even as regards the issue on merit, I will not find any reason to interfere with the awards passed by the Labour Court since the management itself has admitted in the course of proceedings that the termination of services of the workmen was liable to be reversed and hence restored their services. The Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents relies on a judgment in CWP No. 18810 of 1995. In that case, the Division Bench has considered the issue of the maintainability of the petition claiming wages for a period when the workmen were not permitted to join duty and do their work. The Bench held, "it is a settled proposition of law that where the services of a workman are illegally terminated without justification, he is entitled to reinstatement with full back-wages.... Instead of implementing the award in letter and spirit, they chose not to pay back wages to which the Respondent No. 2 (workman) was entitled." In such a situation when a petition under Section 33C(2) was filed, the Division Bench upheld the claim and rejected the plea that the petition was not maintainable. The learned Counsel for the workmen points out to the fact that when they had moved respective petitions claiming wages, the management had offered to take them back with full continuity of service. This fact has also been found reflected in the award of the Labour Court. If they were entitled to be taken back with continuity of service, the denial of wages shall not be merely done unless there were definite circumstances that would deny to a workman the wages on the basis of 'no work, no pay'. However, if the denial was not justified, there is no reason why the employer must be rewarded with a benefit of not paying the workmen the wages which they were entitled to. It would be perfectly legitimate to make exception to situation when the person was willing to work but was not allowed to work, to be treated 'as if he had worked', as noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, 2007 7 SCC 689 All the awards are confirmed and the writ petition is dismissed.;