S.S.NIJJAR, J. - (1.) HEARD learned Counsel for the parties. The petitioner is being prosecuted for offences under Sections 420/120-B IPC read with Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He made an application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production/summoning of certain documents. It was specifically prayed that complaint dated 22.4.1996 be produced in Court. He had also wanted the production of reports made by Harbhajan Singh, Inspector (Vigilance Bureau), Bachittar Singh, Inspector (Vigilance Bureau), Paras Ram, D.S.P. (Vigilance Bureau), Sukhbir Singh, D.S.P. (Vigilance Bureau), and other officers were also required to be summoned before framing of charge. Similar applications were also made by Ajit Singh Sidhu seeking directions for production of complaint dated 21.1.1997. It was argued on behalf of the State that the petitioner has merely tried to create a defence on the basis of the complaint. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the learned Special Judge, Ropar, has dismissed the application. The learned Special Judge has found that the documents are irrelevant. He has also held that these documents can, in any event, be summoned in defence evidence.
(2.) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. J.J.M.S. Bhalla, submits that the approach adopted by the learned Special Judge is against the settled law. In support of his submission, learned Counsel has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration and another, J.T. 1996(7) S.C. 6 : 1996(3) RCR (Crl.) 411 (SC) On the other hand, Mr. J.S. Brar, learned Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, has vehemently argued that the complaint which is sought to be relied on by the petitioner has, actually, been found to be baseless. This plea is specifically taken in paragraph 4 of the written statement filed by the respondent. It is stated that during investigation complaint dated 22.4.1996 was found to be baseless and thereafter the case against the accused was registered after thorough enquiry into the complaint against other co-accused. Learned Deputy Advocate General has relied on a judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Nallammal v. State, 1999(3) R.C.R. (Crl.) 347 and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau, 1999(3) R.C.R. 658. On the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Umar Abdul's case (supra), Mr. Brar submits that at the stage of framing of charge, the learned Magistrate is not required to go deep into the matter.
(3.) I have considered the arguments put forwarded by the learned Counsel for the parties. I am of the considered opinion that the judgment of the Madras High Court in Nallammal's case (supra), is of no assistance to the case put forward by the State of Punjab. The Madras High Court after adverting the various judgments of the Supreme Court, has held that the judgment in Satish Mehra's case (supra) was rendered only on the peculiar facts available in that case. With respect, I am unable to agree with the view expressed by the Madras High Court. Perusal of paragraphs 13 to 15 of the judgment reproduced later in this order, would clearly demonstrate that the ratio laid down therein is of a general nature. These are not remarks made by the Supreme Court, merely for deciding the particular case. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Umar Abdul's case (supra), was dealing with the question which related to the scope of investigation under Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. by the trial Court while framing the charge. In this context, it was observed that the Court is not expected to go deep into material which is produced before the Court. The question which has arisen before this court is as to whether the accused persons are entitled to make an application to the trial Court for production of certain documents before the framing of the charge. This question has been squarely answered by the Supreme Court in Satish Mehra's case (supra). In paragraph 13 to 15, the Supreme Court has observed as under :- "13. Similar situation arises under Section 239 of the Code (which deals with trial of warrant cases on police report). In that situation the Magistrate has to afford the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard besides considering the police report and the documents sent therewith. At these two stages the Code enjoins on the Court to give audience to the accused for deciding whether it is necessary to proceed to the next stage. It is a matter of exercise of judicial mind. There is nothing in the Code which shrinks the scope of such audience to oral arguments. If the accused succeeds in producing any reliable material at that stage which might fatally affect even the very sustainability of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no such material shall be looked into by the Court at that stage. Here the "ground" may be any valid ground including insufficiency of evidence to prove charge. 14. The object of providing such an opportunity as is envisaged in Section 227 of the Code is to enable the Court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the case ends there it gains a lot of time of the Court and saves much human efforts and cost. If the materials produced by the accused even at that early stage would clinch the issue, why should the Court shut it out saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial proceedings. Hence, we are of the view that Sessions Judge would be within his powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code. 15. But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are mindful that most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of workload. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste or time it is advisable to truncate or nip the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself." ;