Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. - (1.) ON December 30, 1992, the assessee filed its return for the assessment year 1992-93. It declared an income of Rs. 1,16,99,320. The assessee had submitted a scheme of group gratuity to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Patiala. The scheme was approved by the Commissioner vide his letter dated April 23/24 of 1992. The scheme was made effective from February 1, 1992. The assessee paid an amount of Rs. 15 lakhs towards the scheme on March 31,1992, by a cheque in favour of the Life Insurance Corporation. This cheque was accepted by the Corporation, and a Policy No. GG(CA)/207345 was issued. It was made effective from February 1, 1992. The assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 15 lakhs from its income on account of the deposit having been made vide cheque dated March 31, 1992. This claim was disallowed by the Assessing Officer with the observation that the "case is covered under Section 43B(b) read with the second proviso." Various other deductions were also disallowed. Aggrieved by the order, the assessee filed an appeal. Its claim was rejected. The assessee then filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's claim and deleted the addition. Aggrieved by the order dated November 28, 2000, passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue has filed the present appeal. The solitary contention raised by Mr. R. P. Sawhney, counsel for the Revenue, is that in view of the provisions of Section 43B(b), the Tribunal has erred in allowing the deduction. Is it so ? Admittedly, the assessee had issued the cheque on March 31,1992. In pursuance of the cheque, the Life Insurance Corporation had issued a policy with effect from February 1, 1992. The employees of the assessee got the benefit and the cover under the policy issued by the Corporation with effect from February 1, 1992. Despite this factual position, counsel for the Revenue contends that the cheque having not been encashed within 15 days as provided for in the second proviso, the deduction was legally not admissible. Section 36 of the Act allows the assessee the right to claim deduction on account of payment of premium or gratuity, etc. Should this right be rendered redundant by an act of a third party on which the assessee has no control ? If the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue is accepted, an assessee would lose the benefit which is legally admissible to it on account of no fault of its own. It would lead to injustice and an unfair result. The provision contained in the second proviso to Section 43B is only calculated to ensure that the deduction shall be admissible if the payment has been made "within 15 days from the due date." The Corporation had accepted the cheque issued by the assessee on March 31, 1992. For reasons which are not on record, the entry regarding the encashment of the cheque was made on April 24,1992. For this, the assessee was not to blame. It has not even been suggested that the payment had not been made by the due date. The Corporation having accepted the cheque and issued the policy, it shall be deemed to have realised the amount irrespective of the fact that the entry regarding encashment was made after the expiry of 15 days. Mr. Sawhney contends that this interpretation of the provision would defeat the purpose of the second proviso. The contention is misconceived. We are interpreting the provisions of a taxing statute. The interpretation should be such as would promote the object of the Act. The clear object of the Act is to grant deduction in respect of a payment made by an employer/assessee towards gratuity paid to the employees. The assessee has admittedly made the payment. The employees have admittedly got the benefit. The Life Insurance Corporation had issued the policy. The policy was effective from February 1,1992. Despite the payment having been made by the assesses and the intended beneficiaries, viz., the employees, having got the benefit, the Revenue wants to deny the deduction to the assessee. This would be grossly unfair and cannot be allowed. No other point has been raised. In view of the above, we find that the Tribunal has taken a possible view. It promotes justice. The case does not raise any substantial question of law so as to call for any interference under Section 260A of the Act. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed in limine.;