- (1.) The petitioner was enrolled in the Navy on the rank of LPM on 08.05.1987. On 04.11.1994, when he was on leave to his native village, the wife of his brother expired. Consequently, FIR No. 255 dated 04.11.1994 was registered against him and his brother under Section 302/34 Indian Penal Code. On 05.03.1997, the petitioner and his brother were convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari vide his judgment dated 05.03.1997. They were sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each. On the basis of the conviction, by order dated 01.07.1998 the petitioner was discharged from service. In the meantime, the petitioner had filed an appeal against the conviction order, which was allowed by this court by judgment dated 03.12.1998. The Division Bench while allowing the appeal observed :- "......From the facts and circumstances, so noticed it appears that the burn injuries were result of the accidental fire. We are quite satisfied and convinced that prosecution has badly failed to bring the charge of murder home to the appellants. Death of Birmati was either result of suicide or because of accidental fire. Therefore, appeal is allowed. Both the accused are acquitted of the charge of murder. Their conviction and sentence is set aside. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Fine if paid shall be refunded to them."
(2.) In view of the above, it becomes apparent that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge of murder to the petitioner and his brother. It was also held that the death of the deceased was either the result of suicide or because of accidental fire. On being acquitted, the petitioner made a representation for being reinstated in service on 22.6.1999. The representation of the petitioner has been rejected on the ground that reinstatement cannot be ordered in view of Regulations 118 and 119 of the Regulations of Navy Part-2. Mr. Gurpreet Singh relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. The Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and anr., 1997 1 SCT 824 The aforesaid judgment is of two paragraphs and the same is reproduced hereunder for ready reference :- "2. This case does not warrant interference for the reason that, admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under Section 302 read with 34 IPC for his involvement in a crime committed on October 1, 1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted the petitioner under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On that basis the respondents had taken action to have him dismissed from service since he was working as a Junior Clerk in the respondent-Electricity Board. The petitioner challenged the validity of the dismissal order by way of a special civil application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Pending disposal, the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated October 14, 1992 acquitted him of the offence. Consequently, while disposing of the writ petition, the learned single Judge directed the respondent to reinstate him into the service with continuity of the service, but denied back wages. The petitioner then filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 319/93 which was dismissed by the impugned order dated August 26, 1993. Thus, this special leave petition.
(3.) The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is; whether he is entitled to back wages It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference." 3. A perusal of the observations made by the Supreme Court reproduced above shows that the same had been made keeping in view the conduct of the appellant therein, who was held to have involved himself in the crime. In the present case, the impugned order shows that the petitioner was discharged from service only on the conviction being recorded against him by the trial court. The Supreme Court has further observed that each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it becomes apparent that the petitioner was falsely implicated in a crime, which occurred within the family. In these type of cases, it is the general tendency of the complainant to rope in as many members of the family as possible. The Division Bench while acquitting the petitioner and his brother has observed that the prosecution has failed to prove the case. It has been further held to be a case of suicide or accidental fire. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any manner responsible for his implication in the crime or the consequential incarceration. Furthermore, it has been very fairly brought to the notice of this court by Mr. Gurpreet Singh that in similar circumstances, Civil Writ Petition No. 10201 of 2000 has been allowed by this court by order dated 19.7.2001. In the aforesaid case, all consequential benefits have been allowed to the petitioner on reinstatement.;