M.M.KUMAR,J - (1.) THE question raised in this petition filed by the plaintiffs under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as to whether the High Court in its inherent jurisdiction could quash the criminal proceedings initiated by way of criminal complaint and what is the scope of its power under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure.
(2.) THE law on the aforementioned question is well settled and various judgments of the Supreme Court would elaborate the eventualities whether such a complaint or criminal proceedings could be quashed. It is, however, appropriate to mention that such eventualities are limited and the Supreme Court has furnished guide-lines in various judgments whether the Court can intervene for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated by first information report or complaint, State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others, AIR 1982 SC 949 presented before the Supreme Court an illustration whether the first information report lodged by the Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation against Swapan Kumar Guha and others disclosed an offence under Section 3 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. The Act had come into force on 13.12.1978 and 2 years period was given for binding up every kind of business relating to Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme which expired on 12.12.1980. A first information report was lodged on 13.12.1980, the very next day. The Calcutta High Court quashed the first information report on the ground that the contents of the first information report did not disclose any material constituting a cognizable offence. Against the judgment of the High Court, an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court. Rejecting the appeal of the State, their Lordships of the Supreme Court examined in detail numerous cases and concluded as under :- "The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A.N. Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and the rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. On the other hand, if the F.I.R. does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also considered as to whether there is unfettered discretion in the realm of power defined by Statute where the police can undertake investigation in every case and observed as under :- "There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code. I may, in this behalf, usefully draw attention to the warning uttered by Mathew, J. in his majority judgment in Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate. Kamrup, 1974(2) SCR 12 at pp. 22-23: (AIR 1974 SC 183 at p.199), to the following effect : We say, and we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law." 2. The Supreme Court has cautioned that the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised in a limited type of cases and not in a routine and mechanical fashion. In the case of L.V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar, 1983(2) RCR(Crl.) 400 : AIR 1983 SC 1219, their Lordships of the Supreme Court condemned the use of inherent power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings at the threshold and observed as under :- "The High Court, we cannot refrain from observing, might well have refused to invoke its inherent powers at the very threshold in order to quash the proceedings, for these powers are meant to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of law is being misused to harass a citizen." Another illustration has been provided where the Supreme Court refused to agree with the view taken by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Sethi and others. v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 372 and also refused to quash the criminal complaint lodged by the wife for misappropriation of 'Streedhan' by the husband. The Full Bench of this Court had taken the view that the question of misappropriation would not arise because the 'Streedhan' property of married woman would become a joint property with her husband as soon as she enters her matrimonial home. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, 1985(1) RCR(Crl.) 539 : AIR 1985 SC 628, one Pratibha Rani had lodged a complaint against her husband Suraj Kumar alleging that the dowry articles given by her parents including gold ornaments and clothes were entrusted to Suraj Kumar and his near relations and they took possession of those articles. When the relations between the wife and the husband got estranged, the dowry articles given to the wife were not returned. She filed a complaint claiming that the 'Streedhan' is the property of the bride and was entrusted to the accused -husband and his relatives for safe custody. The High Court has quashed the complaint on the ground that the 'Streedhan' property of a married woman becomes joint property has soon as she enters her matrimonial home, following the Full Bench judgment in Vinod Kumar's case (supra). However, the Supreme Court not only overruled the view taken by the Full Bench, it also held that the quashing of complaint by the High Court at the threshold amounted to substituting its own opinion in preference to the allegations made in the complaint. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court setting aside the view taken by the Full Bench in Vinod Kumar's case (supra) observed as under :- "By way of post-script we might add that we are indeed amazed to find that so deeply drowned and inherently engrossed are some of the High Courts in the concept of matrimonial home qua the stridhan property of a married woman that they simply refuse to believe that such properties are meant for the exclusive use of the wife and could also be legally entrusted to the husband or his relations. Thus, if the husband or his relations misappropriate the same and refuse to hand it over to the wife and convert them to their own use and even though these facts are clearly alleged in a complaint for an offence under Section 405/406 I.P.C. some Courts take the view that the complaint is not maintainable. Thus, even when clear and specific allegations are made in the complaint that such properties were entrusted to the husband, they refuse to believe these hard facts and brush them aside on the ground that they are vague. The allegations of the complainant in this appeal and the appeals before Allahabad and the Punjab and Haryana High Courts show that it is not so but is a pure figment of the High Court's imagination as a result of which the High Courts completely shut their eyes to the fact that the husband could also be guilty under Sections 405/406, I.P.C. in view of the clear allegations made in the complaint. In other words, the High Courts simple refuse to believe that there can be any such entrustment and even if it is so, no offence is committed. Such an approach amounts to a serious distortion of the criminal law, resulting in perpetrating grave and substantial miscarriage of justice to the wife at the hands of the High Courts. We cannot countenance such a wrong and perverse approach."
(3.) IN State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and others, AIR 1989 SC 1, the Supreme Court took the view that the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. There a written complaint was filed by the Range Forest Officer alleging that the accused shot and killed an elephant in a particular Range forest and removed the ivory tusks of the elephant. According to the provisions of Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, such an act constituted an offence. The High Court quashed the complaint on the ground that the first information report recorded on the basis of the complaint did not disclose any material which may constitute the offence alleged and the accused person was never named in the first information report nor there was any eye witness. Another ground given for quashing the first information report was that the accused was not identified in any manner whatsoever to sustain the allegations even prima facie. Relying upon the observations made in the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.K. Rohtagi, 1983(1) RCR(Crl.) 73 : AIR 1983 SC 67 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. P.D. Jhunjunwala, 1983(1) RCR 79 : AIR 1983 SC 158, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following guide-lines :- "The second ground takes into consideration the merits of the matter. It cannot be said that the complaint does not spell out the ingredients of the offence alleged. A complaint only means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence. It is trite that jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to regulate that jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears clear and it is that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the state of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence the High Court is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations, set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to criminal proceedings would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the court or not." ;