R.L. Anand, J. - (1.) I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and with his assistance have gone through the record of this case.
(2.) THE plaintiff has been non -suited by the first appellate Court for the following reasons given in para Nos. 8 to 11 of the impugned judgment : - "In the instant appeal, the only point for determination is whether the suit filed by the appellant was within limitation. On this point Shri S.K. Sharma, ld. counsel for appellant has mainly argued that the suit filed by the appellant was within limitation because right of increment is recurring right. He has cited ruling Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 1996(2) SCT 87 (P & H) :, 1996(1) A I J 652. This contention of the ld. counsel for the appellant has no merit. Admittedly, the appellant has filed the suit challenging the impugned orders on 29.4.1996. Thus, it shows that the last impugned order challenged by the appellant was dated 17.2.1977 whereas, he filed the present suit on 29.4.1996. It has been held by Full Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. 'Gurdev Singh, Asnok Kamar, 1991(3) SCT 93 (SC) :, AIR 1991 SC 2219, that the limitation for challenging the impugned orders is three years. If the party approaches the Court after the expiry of statutory period, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for. In the supra ruling it has been held as under : - "A suit for declaration that an order of dismissal or termination from service passed against the plaintiff dismissed employee is wrongful, illegal or ultra vires is governed by Article 113. It cannot be said that there is no limitation for instituting the suit for declaration by a dismissed or discharged employee on the ground that the dismissal or discharge was void or inoperative. If a suit is not covered by any of the specific articles prescribing a period of limitation, it must fall within the residuary article. The purpose of the residuary article it is to provide for cases which would not be covered by any other provision in the Limitation Act. The party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the declaration sought for". Similar view was held by our own Hon'ble High Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Kaur, 1996(3) PLR 795 in which the penalty of withholding one increment with cumulative effect was imposed and it was held that the period of limitation to challenge the said order was three years as provided under Article 113 of the Limitation Act (36 of 1963). In para No. 9, it was held that : ".........The order of penalty, may be illegal or other - wise, can only be set aside within a period of three years from the date of cause of action accrued to the Government employee. In the present case cause of action accrued to the plaintiff, when the order of penalty was initially passed on 30.8.1993 and later on 8.5.1986 when the order of penalty was modified. Therefore, the suit to get these orders declared as illegal and void ought to have been filed within a period of three years from the latter dated viz 8.5.1986 as by virtue of this order right to revise salary by the employee on expiry of the month was put to an end. The order of penalty still stands, it having not been set aside within the period of limitation. Once that is so, it was not open to the Courts below to grant relief as has been granted in the present case." To the similar effect are rulings Punjab State v. Hardev Singh, 1997(2) SCT 101 (P & H) :, 1997(1) PLR 669, State of Punjab v. Baku Singh, 1996(2) SCT 91 (P & H) :, 1996 PLR 482 and the Punjab State v. Kulwinder Singh, 1995(2) PLR 718. 9. On the other hand, ruling, 1996(2) AIJ 652 (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant do not apply to the facts of the present case and is quite distinguishable. In the said ruling the delinquent official has claimed arrears of increment and it was held by their Lordships that no doubt the right to increment is a recurring right and the petitioner is entitled to the same, but in view of the laches on the part of the (petitioner) payment of any arrears of the increments prior to 1990 was declined. Similarly, the other rulings State of Punjab v. Sandhu Singh, 1993(2) RSJ 766, Punjab State v. Paramjit Singh, 1992(1) PLR 417 and State of Punjab v. Parkash Singh, 1993(3) SCT 394 (P & H) :, 1992(8) SLR 689 are also quite distinguishable and do not apply to the facts of the present case. 10. As far as the ruling State of Madhya Pradesh v. Syed Qamarali, 1967 Services Law Reporter 22 cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the same is also not applicable to the facts of the present case in view of ruling AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2219 (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. 11. Thus, relying upon the supra authorities, I hold that the period of limitation for challenging the impugned orders was within three years. The appellant has failed to file the suit within three year and as such his suit has been rightly dismissed b; the learned trial Court being time barred. Tin learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly appreciated the evidence while dismissing the suit being time barred and thus, I affirm the same". Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both the Courts below fell in error by holding that the suit of the plaintiff was be yond limitation. He submitted that the case pertains to the arrears of salary of the plaintiff and in these circum - stances there will be no limitation. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon, 1996(1) SCT 8, M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and others. I do not subscribe to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. The cited judgment is distinguishable on facts. In fact the plaintiff was challenging the order dated 18.11.1971 and other orders dated 7.4.1972, 18.7.1975 and 17.2.1977 vide which his two annual increments with cumulative effect were stopped and the period with effect from 9.1.1977 to 21.1.1977 was treated as leave without pay. The cause of action arose to the plaintiff on the date of the passing of these orders. Resultantly, the suit ought to have been filed by the plaintiff within three years. The present suit was filed in the year 1991 which was hopelessly barred by limitation. There is no error of law on the part of the Courts below. No merit. Dismissed.
(3.) APPEAL dismissed.;