I.S. Tiwana, J. - (1.) THE Petitioner, who initially was appointed as a Lecturer in Dev Samaj College of Education, Ferozepur. run by the Respondent -society was later selected and appointed as Principal of Dev Samaj College of Education, Chandigarh in the year 1981, -vide Annexure P/l. As per her stand, before her selection, Sh. Nirmal Singh Dhillon, Chairman of the Managing Committee (Respondent No. 2) asked her to deposit two signed blank papers with the Management. The Petitioner complied with the said request and handed over the two blank signed papers to him. This obviously was done to keep her under the thumb of the Management and to cut short her tenure as Principal of the College at the sweet will of the Management. She further maintains that soon after her joining as Principal, Shri Nirmal Singh Dhillon and his father -in -law Shri Iqbal Singh, who too was a member of the Managing Committee tried to persuade her to convert to the Dev Samaj Religious order. She, however, expressed her inability to accede to their request. Ultimately, Sh. Nirmal Singh Dhillon extended the threat that he would use the said blank signed papers "to malign, humiliate and harm" her in case she insisted to continue or stick on to the post of Principal. Since the Petitioner could not bear this threat, she succumbed to the pressure and tendered her resignation from that job in April, 1983. Copy of this letter of resignation is Annexure P/3. The same was accepted by the Chairman of the Managing Committee on April 23, 1983 and copy of this letter of acceptance is Annexure P/4. Vide her letter dated April 25, 1983 the Petitioner requested the Chairman to return the two blank signed papers, which the latter had obtained irom her immediately before her appointment. Copy of this letter is Annexure P/5. However, before returning the said two papers, the Management asked her to write another letter to show that the resignation submitted by her was voluntary. The copy of this letter is Annexure P/6. Ultimately, the two papers were returned to her with the covering note of Shri Nirmal Singh Dhillon and the copy of the same is Annexure P/7. The material part of it reads "two blank signed papers submitted by you before the undersigned are being returned herewith".
(2.) ON May 31, 1983, the Petitioner approached the Director of Public Instructions (Colleges). Union Territory, Chandigarh as per her stand under Section 4(3) of the Punjab Affiliated Colleges (Security of Service of Employees) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, - vide notification dated July 21, 1978 with the request that the resignation in question was not her voluntary, act and the same tantamount to her removal, from service which apparently was brought about without complying with the provisions of the Act, i.e. Section 3 of the Act. She also requested the Director for her reinstatement. Copy of that application is Annexure P/8 to the petition. The Director, after due notice to the Management, of the College, accepted the plea of the Petitioner, -vide his order dated February 14, 1984 and while holding that termination of her services was illegal directed that she will be deemed to be holding the post of the Principal of Dev Samaj College of Education, Chandigarh for an intents and purposes. Copy of his order is Annexure P/11 to the petition. On an appeal preferred by the Dev Samaj Council Society (Respondent No. 1) and the Managing Committee of the College (Respondent No. 2), the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh up -set that order of the Director and concluded (i) the representation of the Petitioner before the Director was barred by time; (ii) since it was not a case of dismissal or removal from service and was rather a pure and simple case of resigning from the job, the provisions of the Act could not be invoked and (iii) the order of the Director was totally without jurisdiction. He also negatived the stand of the Petitioner that she had submitted the resignation under threat or duress. It is this order of the Additional District Judge, which is now impugned before us. At an early stage, a controversy was raised on behalf of the Petitioner that the Additional District Judge was not competent to decide the appeal under Sub -section (4) of Section 4 of the Act, but the same stands firmly settled by a Full Bench of this Court, -vide its judgment dated February 28, 1989. Now. the challenge of Shri Anand Swaroop, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner is two -fold, (i) there was no justification with the learned Additional District Judge to up -set the conclusive finding recorded by the Director that the Petitioner had been made to submit the resignatkm under duress or threat and the same was not voluntary: (ii) the resignation in question was not valid one in view of statute 11(1) of the Punjab University Calendar, Volume 1, 1981 governing the conditions of service and conduct of teachers in non -government affiliated Colleges which reads, "a permanent teacher may at any time terminate his engagement by giving the governing body three months notice in writing or three months salary in lieu thereof."
(3.) HAVING given our thoughtful consideration to the entire matter, we are of the opinion that the above noted contentions of Shri Anand Swaroop do not merit acceptance. So far as the challenge to the findings of fact recorded by the Additional District Judge is concerned, we cannot possibly sit as a Court of appeal to reappraise the evidence and record our conclusion on merits. In somewhat similar situation, their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressed themselves in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 789, as follows: it is clear beyond doubt that the High Court had transgressed its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by -entering upon the merits of the controversy by embarking upon an enquiry into the facts as to whether or not the letter of resignation submitted by the Appellant was voluntary. The question at issue as to whether the resignation was voluntary was a matter of inference to be drawn from other facts. The question involved was essentially one of fact. If cannot be questioned that the Government undoubtedly had the jurisdiction to draw its own conclusions on the material before it. Regrettably the High Court has in allowing the writ petition converted itself into a court of appeal and examined for itself the correctness of the conclusion reached by the Government and decided what was the proper view to be taken or the order to be made. We, therefore cannot possibly go into the merits of the factual findings recorded by the Appellate Judge.;