S.S.Dewan, J. - (1.) SHADI Singh petitioner was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh for the offence u/s 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter called, the Act). He was sentenced to six month's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ - in default to under go rigorous imprisonment for six months. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh in an elaborate judgment not only upheld his conviction but affirmed his sentence Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up by way of revision.
(2.) THE prosecution case that on 26.3.1976 at about 7.15 a.m., the Government Food Inspector Chandigarh intercepted the petitioner in the area of Sector 9, Chandigarh, and found him carrying 10 lts. of cow's milk contained in a drum for sale. The Food Inspector purchased 700 mls. of the said milk from him on a payment of 1.50 paise against receipt Ex P.B. He divided the sample into three parts and sent one part to the public analyst for analysis, handing over the other part to the petitioner and retained the third part with him. According to the public analyst's report Ex. PD, the sample was found to be having milk -fat (sic) and milk -solids not fat 5.9% Therefore, in his opinion, the contents of the sample were deficient in milk -solids not fat by 29% of the minimum prescribed standard. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate accepted the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and rejected the defence version and consequently held that the petitioner was guilty of the offence as noted above. The only contention raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the conviction was bad in as much as it rested solely on the evidence of Shri O.P. Gautam, Food Inspector and the other so -called independent witness Devi Dayal (P.W 2) joined by him, having refused to support the prosecution case. It is unfortunately not an infrequent occurrence to find that the witness from the public turn hostile and go back upon what is stated earlier in the memos in utter disregard of truth. This betrays lack of character and absence of civic sense which not only result in the guilty escaping the punishment but leave to general deterioration in standards of nicety and integrity This is a highly reprehensible phenomenon which has to be curbed in the larger interest to the administration of justice. Here apart from the endorsement in the memo and the signature at the foot of it showing that Devi Dayal was a witness to the taking of the sample, we have the statement of Mr. O.P. Gautam that Devi Dayal had put his signatures below the memo. The prosecution case obviously cannot be thrown out merely because Devi Dayal refused to support what had. been stated by him in his handwriting in the memo and went back it to the utter dismay of the prosecution. It is true that by the reason of the defection of Devi Dayal, the prosecution was left only with the sole testimony of the Food Inspector but his evidence was relied by the Sessions Judge as well as the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Both the Courts found his evidence to be sufficient for the conviction of the petitioner and I do not see why I should interfere with the concurrent view taken by them as regards the appreciation of this evidence. There is no rule of law that conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of a Food Inspector. It is only out of a sense of caution that the Courts insist that the testimony of a Food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness. This is a necessary caution which has to be borne in mind because the Food Inspector may in a sense be regarded as an interested witness but this caution, is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law; if it were otherwise, it would be possible for any guilty person to escape a punishment by resorting to the bribing recovery witnesses. The conviction of the petitioner cannot, therefore, be assailed as infirm on the ground that it rested merely on the evidence of the Food Inspector. In this view I am fortified by a decision in Ram Lubhaya v. Municipal Corporation Delhi, (1974) 1 Cri. L.T. 165.
(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner then pleaded that in any event on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, (sic) should be given to the petitioner and he should not be consigned to the rigors of jail life. This plea also does not impress me. Adulteration of Food is menace to public health. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted with the aim of the eradicating that anti -social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. In view of the above object of the Act and the intention of the Legislature as revealed by the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ - has been prescribed, the Court should not lightly resort to provisions of Probation of Offenders Act in the case of persons above 21 years of age, found guilty of the offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The imperatives of social defence must discourage the applicability of the probation principle. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti social activities in the guise of respectable trade, jeopardize the health and well -being of innocent consumers. It might be dangerous to leave him free to carry on his nefarious activities by applying the probation principle to him. Moreover, it must be remembered that adulteration is an economic offence prompted by profit motive and it is not likely to lend itself easily to the rapeutic treatment by the probationary measures. I cannot, therefore, give the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the petitioner and release him on probation. I accordingly affirm the conviction and sentence recorded by the Court below and dismiss the revision petition.;