- (1.) This order of mine would dispose of Civil Misc. Applications No. 585-CI to 591-CI of 1980 in R.F.A Nos. 805 to 811 of 1973, respectively, C.M. No. 592 CI of 1980 in R.F.A. No. 718 of 1973, C.M. No. 600-CI of 1980 in R.F.A. No. 228 of 1975, C.M. No. 582-CI of 1980 and C.M. No. 583 of 1980 in R.F. As. Nos. 277 and 278 of 1975, respectively. These R.F. As. pertaining to the acquisition of the applicants lands were decided by me together vide Judgment dated April 11, 1980, in the following terms :- "In view of the discussion above, I allow all these appeals to the extent that the rate of compensation of the acquired land is enhanced to Rs. 290/- per acre and the appellants would be paid the same at that rate besides the statutory solatium and interest at 15 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. All this, however, is subject to the claim made by the appellants and the court-fees paid by them. In addition to the above, the appellants would also be entitled to the costs of these appeals." As the appellant applicants claimed compensation at a rate lower than Rs. 290/- per acre, as awarded by me, they have put in these applications with the prayer that they be permitted to deposit the amount of Court-fee on the balance amount, that is the difference between the amount claimed by them and the one awarded by me so that they may have the full benefit of the said judgment of mine. For this unusual prayer though the learned counsel for the applicants has not been able to refer to any provision of law or the principle of law directly applicable to the facts of the case, yet he has chosen to rely on some observations made in a Division Bench judgment of this Court in L. Shiv Dayal Kapoor and others v. Union of India, New Delhi and others, 1963 AIR(P&H) 538 This is what has been observed in this judgment :- A plaintiff ought to be given such relief as he is entitled to get on the facts established upon the evidence in the case even if the plaint does not contain a specific prayer for that relief." In fact the learned counsel wants to read these observations out of context. That was a case where the petitioner had prayed for the grant permanent injunction directing defendant No. 1 to remove the guards, the Central Public Works Department had posted at the site of the plaintiffs work; restraining defendant No. 1, their servants, or agents, from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs and to allow them to remain in undisturbed possession of the plant, machinery etc., restraining of defendant No. 1, their servants, or agents from removing the casing or Teak wood waste lying at the site near C.P.W.D. warehouse, Factory Road, New Delhi, or tools, etc. lying or from using the tools, machinery, and plant etc. It was also prayed in the alternative that if the above relief by way of permanent injunction could not be given, such other relief might be granted as the Court might deem fit to grant. When it was found by the Court that relief of permanent injunction had become infructuous as the suit had been filed on January 17, 1950, and defendant No. 1 through other contractors had remained in possession of the site and had been working the machinery for over twelve years, the said relief was refused and the alternative relief by way of damages was granted. It was in these circumstances that the above noted observation was made by this Court. Moreover, the relief of payment of Rs. 90,977/3/- as damages to the petitioners was granted at the time of passing of the decree itself with the condition that they would not be entitled to execute the decree under that head without paying Court-fee on that amount. There is no such similar situation here. The applicants paid Court-fee on whatever they had claimed. There was no question of any alternative claim. The mere fact that in the grounds of appeal the applicants had stated that the value of their acquired lands was much more than what they were claiming or on which they were paying the Court-fee does not mean that the applicants had not abandoned their claim to the amounts over and above the one on which they had paid the Court-fees.
(2.) The only other submissions of the learned counsel for the applicants is that the course prayed for be adopted and allowed in the interest of justice as according to him the appellant-applicants would be deprived of the compensation amount on which they have not been able to pay the Court-fee. For this situation they have only to blame themselves. They cannot possibly complain of denial of justice when they have got whatever they had claimed. The applicants cannot be allowed to inflate their claim on the basis of their willingness to pay Court-fee thereupon. It has been ruled in Mt. Durga Devi v. Mt. Parbati, 1933 AIR(Lah) 208 that after the decision of the suit, the trial Court is no longer seized of the case and has no jurisdiction to require the plaintiff to make good the deficiency in Court-fee.
(3.) The learned counsel for the applicants also made a reference to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Gurdial Singh v. Massa Singh and others, 1977 AIR(P&H) 248, wherein it was held that under Section 149, Civil Procedure Code, the Court has untrammelled powers to allow in its discretion the making up of any deficiencies in the Court-fees and that the statute allows this to be done at any stage irrespective of bars of limitation or the alleged creation of vested rights in one or the other of the parties. This judgment, to my mind, is wholly irrelevant to the question involved in the present case. It is not at all a case of making up of any deficiency in the Court-fees. The applicants simply want to inflate their claim and to pay Court-fees thereon, in view of my order, the relevant part of which has been reproduced above. Once I have held that the amount of compensation payable to the appellants is subject to the claim made by the appellants/applicants and the Court-fees paid thereon, then I am convinced that I have no jurisdiction to allow them to increase their claims subject to their paying the Court-fees thereon.;