KAKA SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. PARKASH CHAND AND ANOTHER
LAWS(P&H)-1980-8-32
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Decided on August 20,1980

Kaka Singh And Others Appellant
VERSUS
Parkash Chand And Another Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Gokal Chand Mital, J. - (1.) PARKASH Chand Respondent successfully preempted a sale in regard to certain killa, numbers of Rectangle, Nos. 446 and 467. He took out execution of the pre -emption decree and obtained possession of the killa numbers of Rectangle Nos. 466 and 467. When the mistake came to the notice of the judgment -debtors, they moved for restoration of the Killa numbers of Rectangle Nos. 466 as the decree was in respect of the killa numbers of Rectangle No. 446. The Executing Court ordered restoration which order was upheld in appeal.
(2.) THEREAFTER , Parkash Chand decree -holder filed an application before the first appellate Court for correction of the decree stating that in the original sale which was pre -empted, instead of Rectangle No. 466, Rectangle No. 446 was wrongly mentioned with the result that in the plaint Rectangle No. 446 was stated in accordance with the sale -deed and the decree was also granted for Rectangle No. 446. The application came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge, Sangrur, which was strongly opposed by the judgment -debtors, mainly on two grounds, (1) that the application lay before the High Court as against the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, maintaining the decree for pre -emption granted by the trial Court Regular Second Appeal No. 653 of 1971 was filed in the High Court which was dismissed in limine and therefore, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court merged in the order of the High Court and as such the High Court alone had the jurisdiction to order the correction if any, and (2) that it was not a case which fell either under Section 151 or under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the correction sought for would amount to the change of the sale deed, which a preemptor is not entitled to say as the right of a preemption is not right of substitution. In spite of several authorities having been cited before the Additional District Judge, he allowed the application for correction of the judgment and decree by order dated 1st March, 1974, against which the Defendant -judgment -debtors have come up in revision to this Court. Some of the Defendant judgment -debtors, who had not joined as Appellants in R.S.A. No. 658 of 1971, have filed Regular Second Appeal No. 1145 of 1974 in this Court against the amended decree dated 1st March, 1974, and have prayed for a reversal of the entire Pre -emption decree on the ground that in 1973 the pre -emption Act had been repealed with the result that the appeal had to be allowed and the suit for pre -emption had to be dismissed. The learned Counsel for the Defendant -judgment -debtors has strenuously urged that the order of the Court below is perverse on the face of it as no case whatsoever had been made out for amendment of the judgment and decree. In highlighting the argument, it is urged that in the sale -deed itself Rectangle No. 446 was mentioned and the moment a suit for pre -emption was filed in regard to Rectangle No. 466, it would have been dismissed on the ground of partial pre -emption. He was further added to support the aforesaid argument that a right of pre -emption is very much different from other rights as it is not a right to re -purchase the property but is a right of substitution in place of the original vendee. The question whether the sale in favour of the original vendee was in regard to the correct killa numbers or not can never form basis of a pre -emption suit as the pre -emptor will have to seek his substitution in place of the vendee for the land which he has purchased vide the sale -deed. I find merit in the contention of the learned Counsel. If in the original suit it had been stated that Rectangle No. 446 was sold and in the sale deed by mistake Rectangle No. 466 was stated, there may have been a different state of affairs but in the present case as the claim stands the suit is in regard to Rectangle No. 446 for which it had been decreed. Therefore, there is no mistake whatsoever in the judgment and decree which are sought to be rectified.
(3.) I am of the firm view that in a suit for pre -emption no prayer can be made for amendment of the sale deed which is sought to be pre -empted. A Full Bench of this Court, in Lachhman Singh v. Pritam Chand, (1971) 72 P.L.R. 341 has held that if a co -sharer makes a sale of specified Khasra numbers, then that sale cannot be pre -empted by the other co -sharers because the Court of pre -emption will only go by the sale deed in which the sale is of specified Khasra numbers and not of shares. A reading of the facts of the case before the Full Bench would show that the vendor was a co -sharer but in spite of that he sold not his share but specific khasra numbers which happened to be in his possession. The present case is on much better footing for the vendee -judgment debtors because here it has yet to be found whether the sale was in regard to Rectangle No. 446 or Rectangle No. 466, as this point was never agitated during the trial of the suit.;


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