- (1.) These two revision petition Nos. 2014 of 1978 and 2242 of 1978 are directed against identical orders and involve identical question of law and are, therefore, disposed of by a common order. However, for facility of reference, wherever necessary, the facts from Civil Revision No. 2014 of 1978 shall be referred to.
(2.) Ravinder Singh plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) filed a declaratory suit against his sons namely Baljit Singh, Tejinder Pal Singh and Mahesh Inder Pal Singh seeking a declaration that sale of landed property to them by him was Benami transaction and that he continued to be the owner of the said property and be declared as such. A similar suit regarding the same property was filed by Tejinder Pal Singh, Mahesh Inder Pal Singh seeking an identical declaration against their Brother Baljit Singh, father Ravinder Singh and sister Daljit Kaur. During the pendency of these suits, admittedly, the parties reached a compromise amongst them. Baljit Singh petitioner-defendant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) moved an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code bringing to the notice of the Court that the parties had compromised; that the plaintiff should be required to act upon the compromise; that he be directed to place the compromise on the record of the case; that in accordance with the said compromise both the suits had to be dismissed as withdrawn; and that an order to that effect be passed. Plaintiffs in both the suits contested the application inter alia with the plea that the compromise had been entered into under duress and, therefore, it was an illegal compromise and should not be acted upon. The trial Court struck the following issues : (1) Whether the alleged compromise was signed by the plaintiff under pressure. If so its effect OPP. (2) Relief. The defendants put a copy of the agreement on the record and sought the same to be exhibited. The trial Court by its order dated December 7, 1977, observed that the said compromise was in the nature of the partition deed and thus required registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and since it was not so registered it would not be exhibited. However, it was then argued that there had been part performance of the compromise and that the same could be seen for a collateral purpose. That aspect of the claim was left undecided and it was directed that the compromise was marked and placed on the record and that claim to it being exhibited on the record should be decided later on.
(3.) During the evidence, when the defendant sought to prove the said document and the argument of part performance was put forward for the justification of the claim, the trial Court vide impugned order dated September 2, 1978, held that in the instant case nothing had been performed on the basis of the said agreement and that vide order dated December 7, 1977, it was held that the compromise could not be exhibited, as such, the same now could not be looked into for any purpose whatsoever. With the result by the impugned order the Court put the compromise finally beyond its reach when it observed that the same could not be looked into for any purpose whatsoever in the instant case. In the very breath, the trial Court had also observed as follows :- "As regards the collateral transaction, the factum of entering in such an agreement and its legality has yet to be determined. The question of collateral transaction at this stage does not arise." The two observations run contrary to each other. By one observation it keeps the matter open and by the other it shuts it out completely. That shows a certain amount of confusion in the approach of the trial Court.;