- (1.) Harnam Singh filed an application under Section 42 of the Act and claimed relief regarding a path and a water-course. This application was allowed by the Additional Director on 9th January, 1968. He provided a path and water-course to Harnam Singh through the land of Dhan Singh, petitioner. Dissatisfied with this order, Dhan Singh has filed the present writ petition.
(2.) It has been argued by Mr. Anand Swaroop, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the application filed by Harnam Singh before the Additional Director was hopelessly time barred. Even the Additional Director had accepted this fact and had himself observed that the application was time barred. However, he has granted relief to Harnam Singh purporting to act suo motu. It is contended by the learned counsel that the Additional Director took cognizance of the case only on the application filed by Harnam Singh. He did not come to know about the facts of this case from any other source. He proceeded to decide this application. In fact in the opening part of the judgment, it is mentioned that once of the pleas raised by Harnam Singh is liable to be rejected because his petition is time barred. However, he has allowed two other prayers made by Harnam Singh in the later portion of the judgment. The Additional Director could not decide the application of Harnam Singh piecemeal. Either whole of the petition was time barred or it was within time. It has also been argued that when an authority takes cognizance of a case before it on the application by a party, in that case, it cannot be said that the decision had been made suo motu.
(3.) On the other hand, Mr. Naginder Singh, the learned counsel appearing for Harnam Singh, has contended that the decision has not been given on the application of Harnam Singh. The Additional Director came to know about the injustice done to Harnam Singh and he in his discretion thought it fit to grant relief to him. He has also contended that even while taking cognizance on an application of a party, the Additional Director can decide the matter suo motu. His powers are not in any way circumscribed by the rule of limitation. They are only applicable to a party. A litigant cannot insist for the adjudication of his rights beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the statute, but there is no bar on an authority to decide the matter itself, even if the matter comes before it at the instance of the party to the litigation. In support of this contention, he has relied on a recent judgment of Tewatia, J. in Puran Chand and others v. Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, 1979 PunLJ 188, wherein it has been held : "As to the second ground of the attack, it must be observed that the Dharmsala had been constructed on a certain piece of land for a part of the village community. The land on which it was constructed ought to have been reserved by the consolidation authorities. The lapse here is not of any individual but of the consolidation authorities, themselves. This lapse had been brought to the notice of the consolidation authorities such as the Director. Without there being even an application by an individual, the Director would have taken suo motu notice of that fact and proceeded in the matter. The mere fact that the Sarpanch moved the Director by an application under Section 42 would not change the position. In the circumstances, the impugned order is in the nature of suo motu order by the Additional Director where the question of limitation does not arise.";