- (1.) This appeal was admitted to Division Bench as the correctness of a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Y. K. Bhatia V/s. State of Haryana, 1977 1 SLR 85, was sought to be doubted on the basis of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Manager, Government Branch Press V/s. D. B. Belliapa, 1979 1 SLR 351, and that is how this case is before us.
(2.) We have gone through both the aforesaid decisions and find that there is no conflict between the two and no different law has been laid down in D. B. Belliapa's case , than was laid down by the Supreme Court in its various decisions which were followed by the Full Bench in Y. K. Bhatia's case . In para 4 of the Full Bench judgment, three Supreme Court decisions have been noticed wherein it was laid down that if the service of an employee is terminated either on the basis of the terms and conditions of service or under the relevant rules, the order cannot be held to be arbitrary and discriminatory and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution, merely because some juniors, are retained in service. Of the three Supreme Court decisions, the first Union of India V/s. Pandurang Kashinath, 1962 AIR(SC) 630 was by a Constitution Bench of five Judges.
(3.) In GOVT BRANCH PRESS, MANAGER V/S D B BELLIAPPA, 1979 LabIC 146 (SC) , the employee was required to show cause why disciplinary action be not taken against him as per rules and it was further stated therein that on failure to comply with the notice he would be suspended and further disciplinary action would be taken. Few days thereafter, an order of simple termination of service was served on the employee, which was challenged in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the Mysore High Court, and the employee in his additional affidavit dated 25th Jan. 1968, took up the plea that there was hostile discrimination against him because he was arbitrarily singled out for discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis the three named juniors who in all respects were similarly situated, because of the notice to show cause served on him and was not a simple termination of service either under the conditions of appointments or the relevant rules. These averments were not rebutted or countered by the opposite side on affidavit nor was any material produced on the record to show that there was any special reason for terminating the respondent's service and continuing the service of his juniors. On these peculiar facts, a Bench of three Judges drew a distinction as compared to earlier decided cases and did not lay down any rule as a matter of law that the service of a temporary servant cannot be dispensed with in accordance with the terms and conditions of employment or the service rules. Even in this judgment, the earlier view was reiterated that the service of a temporary Government servant can be terminated on the around of his un- suitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like, which would put him in a class apart from his iuniors in the same service, which would be clear from the following passage of the judgment: "The principle that can be deduced from the above analysis is that if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or his work being unsatisfactory or for a "like reason which marks him off in a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service there is no question of the applicability of Art. 16". After reiterating the aforesaid law, which was earlier laid down, the Bench proceeded to examine a case where the service of a temporary Government servant is terminated arbitrarily by pleading facts in a given case and in that situation a Question of unfair discrimination may arise notwithstanding the fact that in terminating his service, the appointing authority was purporting to act in accordance with the terms of employment. Then it was stated that where a charge of unfair discrimination is levelled with specificity, or improper motives are imputed against the order of termination of service, it is the duty of the authority to dispel that charge by disclosing to the Court the reasons or motive which impelled it to take the impugned action, and if in a given case the arbitrariness of the order or improper motive in terminating the service is made out then in those circumstances only the simple order of termination may amount to violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the iuniors were retained and he was discriminated against 'for those reasons. Therefore, D. B. Belliapa's case is a decision on its own facts and no general rule was laid down which was different from the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court which were followed in the Full Bench decision of this Court.;