I.S. Tiwana, J. - (1.) THE short but significant question that arises for consideration in this case is as to how for the cross objections filed by the two objectors, namely, Bhag Singh and Bachnna, under Order 41, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure (In R.F.A. No. 154 of 1980 filed by the Union, of India against these two objectors and their brothers) are within limitation. The facts leading to this controversy are as follows:
(2.) THE land of the objectors along with that of their co - sharers and brothers, namely, Bachna and Harbans, situated in village Atawa, was acquired by the Chandigarh Union Territory Administration along with some other land of various landowners for the development of a part of Sector 43 of the city. On a reference sought by these four brothers under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, the Act) the Land Acquisition Court, Chandigarh, - -vide the impugned judgment, enhanced the rate of compensation of the acquired land to a flat rate of Rs. 36,000 per acre, as against the highest rate of Rs. 21,000 per acre awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector for the best quality of land, that is Chahi Land. The Chandigarh Administration has made a grouse of this enhancement and has filed the above -noted regular first appeal. On admission of this appeal, a notice was ordered to be issued by this Court on January, 17, 1980 to the four Respondents, that is, the objectors and their brothers. In pursuance of this order, notices were issued to these Respondents on August 20, 1980, returnable for September 22, 1980. Notices are alleged to have been served on these two objectors on September 1, 1980, though they, - -vide Civil Misc. No. 1529 -C.I. of 1980 have disputed the genuineness of the service and the correctness of the report of the process -server on the plea that they have been living away from village Atawa - -the village in which they are alleged to be the residents as per address mentioned in the notice for the last more than one year and the bogustity of the thumb impressions obtained by the process -server in token of his having served the notices on them. This assertion might have called for a deeper probe and a serious view but I feel, that is unnecessary in this case in view of the legal contention which has been raised by their learned Counsel. The present cross -objections claiming a still higher rate of compensation were undisputably filed in this Court on November 12, 1980. On receipt of a notice about these cross -objections, Mr. R.K. Chhibbar, learned Counsel for the Union Territory Administration has raised a preliminary objection that these cross -objections are barred by time as the same were not filed within one month from the date of service of the notice on the objectors about the date fixed for hearing in this appeal. Mr. Chahal, learned Counsel for the objectors meets this challenge with the submission that even if the service dated September 1, 1980, is taken as genuine and good service, yet that being no notice about the "day fixed for hearing of the appeal", there is no question of the running of the period of limitation against them. In order to resolve the controversy, I feel it is necessary to reproduce here the material part of Rule 22, Order 41, Civil Procedure Code, which runs as follows: Any Respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour and may also take any cross -objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed, for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. A bare reading of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that it is only on the receipt or service of a notice fixing the date of hearing of the appeal filed against a Respondent that the period of 30 days limitation starts running against him. To my mind Rule 22 referred to above gives two distinct rights to the Respondent in the appeal - -the first is the right of upholding the decree of a Court of first instance on any of the grounds on which that Court decided against him; and the second right is that of taking any cross -objection to the decree which the Respondent might have taken by way of appeal. In the first case, the Respondent supports the decree and in the second case he attacks it. The stage for filing cross -objections arises only when the appeal is admitted and the Court directs the issue of a notice of its hearing to the Respondent. Rules 14 and 15 of the Order 41 deal with the content and the manner of service of such a notice. In fact the form of such a notice is prescribed as Form No. 6 in Appendix 'G ' to the Code of Civil Procedure. Instead of serving any such notice on the objectors (Respondents in the R.F.A.) the notice which has been issued and is alleged to have been served on them says specifically that the date fixed, that is, September 22, 1980, was only a Farzi date. Thus it is apparent that instead of it being a notice of the date fixed for the hearing of the appeal in terms of Rule 22, it pointedly brought to the notice of the objectors that no such hearing of the appeal was involved and the date fixed was only a Farzi date, that is, for the completion of the case.
(3.) MR . Chhibbar, learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, contends that in case the service of the notice on the objectors on September 1, 1980, is taken as good service, then this at least is established that they had come to acquire the knowledge of the pendency of the appeal and according to him, in view of the judgments in Gottimakkula Chetti Venkataraju v. Gottemakkula Ramabhaddrirraju and Ors. : A.I.R. 1942 Mad 403, Labhu Ram and Ors. v. Ram Partap and Ors. : A.I.R. 1944 Lah 76 (F.B.), and Chennama Shettithi and Ors. v. Krishnayya Setti and Ors., A.I.R. 1916 Mad 734, such a knowledge is good enough to make the period of limitation run against them. I find that this submission of the learned Counsel is not well -founded. Firstly, the service of a notice informing about the date fixed for hearing the appeal is not, to my mind, enough unless it is also proved that the memorandum of appeal was also served on the Respondent and thus he had knowledge about the scope of the appeal against him. In fact the accompanying of such a memorandum of appeal with the notice to be served has been made mandatory by the provisions of Sub -rule (3) of Rule 10 of Order 41. In the present case undisputably there is neither any record nor any proof about the sending or the receipt of the memorandum of appeal with the notices. Secondly, I find that none of the authorities referred to above helps the Appellant. None of these authorities deals with the content or the form of the notice which is required to be served on a Respondent to make the period of limitation run against him in terms of Order 41, Rule 22 Code of Civil Procedure. On the other and there is a direct Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Kancherla Pushkaramba and Anr. v. Kancherla Nagaranamma : A.I.R. 1926 Mad 283, which clearly supports the stand of the learned Counsel for the objectors. After making a reference to the form of notice (6 -A) appended to Order 41 -A, Schedule I, as made by the High Court of Madras, it was observed by the learned Judges that the actual notice then in use could not be construed as fixing a day for hearing by implication. I feel it is worthwhile to make a detailed reference to the facts and the conclusion recorded, in that case. The same are reproduced as follows: In this case a notice in the form (6 -A)' appended to Order 41 -A, Schedule 1, Code of Civil Procedure made by the High Court was received by the 1st Respondent (1st Petitioner) on 21st December, 1923, and the 2nd Respondent (2nd Petitioner) on 5th January, 1924. The Respondent's vakil claims that he is in time as he has not yet received a notice fixing the date of hearing and it is only within 30 days from the receipt of such a notice that he was to file his memorandum of cross -objections. In framing Order 41 -A, and Form 6 -A, fixing time for appearance, Coder of Civil Procedure, Order 41. Rule 22 seems to have been overlooked. Order 41, Rule 22 requires that a day for hearing should be fixed and even if we can construe Order 41 -A as making this unnecessary, there must be some rule guiding the litigants as to how Order 41, Rule 22 should be complied with. There is no rule saying that the day fixed for appearance shall be regarded as the day fixed for hearing within the meaning of Order 41, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that there was no service of any notice on the objectors about the "date fixed for the hearing of the appeal" by the time they filed the objections on November 12, 1980 and thus the said objections cannot be held to be barred by limitation. It is not in dispute that a Respondent does acquire the right to file cross -objections the moment appeal against him is admitted and the Court directs the issuance of a notice.;