M. R. Sharma, J. - (1.) The appellant was appointed as a Clerk in the office of the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, PEPSU, Patiala, in the year 1955. On Jan. 9, 1958, he was appointed as a temporary Excise Sub-Inspector vide office order copy of which is Ex. P. 3, which leads as under:- "So long as they remain temporary they are liable to be reverted to their substantive posts if any, in case their work is not found to be satisfactory. They are also liable to be reverted, if they fail to pass the departmental examination within the prescribed lime limit of 3 years from the date of their joining as Excise Sub Inspectors, in case any of them has not so far qualified in the examination. (ii) They are being appointed subject to the orders of Government in regard to determination of seniority of Shri Prehlad Singh on the integrated list of Excise Sub Inspector candidates for the new State of Punjab. (iii) The appointments are further being made provisionally subject to the condition that they will have to make room, if any surplus person becomes available for absorption against the posts) hereafter. (iv) They shall not draw their first increment in their time-scale of pay till they have passed the departmental examination and have completed the training prescribed for them as the case may be. Their appointments as Excise Sub Inspectors shall be considered as fresh appointments and they will hold no lien on the post of Taxation Sub Inspector." On Aug. 13,1963. the appellant was reverted to his substantive post of a Clerk. The appellant challenged the order of his reversion on two grounds. Firstly, it was submitted that since he had worked as an Excise Sub Inspector for more than five years, he be deemed to have become permanent under the Rules. Secondly, it was contended that the order of reversion was silent and the conditions on the basis of which he could have been reverted to his substantive rank were not mentioned therein.
(2.) There is no merit in either of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.
(3.) It is no doubt true that the PEPSU Excise Inspectorate Services Rules, 1 54, do lay down that the members of the Service shall be on probation for an Initial period of two years and this period could be extended only by one year and no more If a permanent post was available and the appellant had in fact been appointed as an Excise Sub Inspector on probation, then on the basis of the ratio in the State of Punjab Vs. Darshan Singh, 1968 S.L.R. 247 , the appellant would be deemed to have become permanent after three years of the date of his appointment as an Excise Sub Inspector. But in the instant case, the appellant was not appointed on probation but was detailed to perform the duties of an Excise Sub Inspector on purely temporary basis. Besides when he challenged the order of his reversion, in the return filed on behalf of the respondents it was mentioned that the record of service of the appellant was not satisfactory. According to the appellant, during all this period only remedial remarks had been conveyed to him and his work and conduct was satisfactory in all other respects. Only on the basis of the performance put in by the appellant he should have been allowed to continue as an Excise Sub Inspector or not is entirely for his superiors to decide. Since ha had not been appointed on probation to the Service and had been detailed to perform the duties of an Excise Sub Inspector on purely temporary basis, he could not be deemed to have become automatically permanent after an expiry of three years. In Dalip Singh v State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960, S.C. 1305 , it was held that, where a public servant challenged the order of termination of his service, which was on the face of it innocuous, but the State Government put forth a plea in the written statement that his service record was not satisfactory, the circumstances did not attract Art. 311 of the Constitution. The first plea raised on behalf of the appellant is therefore repelled. The order of reversion of the appellant was of course innocuous in nature but the respondents in a regular trial have been able to establish the grounds on which he had been reverted. There is no rule of law which makes it incumbent upon the appointing authority to indicate the grounds, on which an order of reversion has been passed against a temporary employee, in the order itself. There is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.;