- (1.) The respondent-landlord filed a petition under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act) for the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the house in dispute on the ground that he needed the premises for his own occupation. The averment in this respect made in the petition was that is the climate of Delhi does not suit the applicant's wife and his business has failed there, he wanted to come back and settle at Phagwara where the house in dispute is situate. The application was opposed by the tenant and the averments made in the petition were denied. The Rent Controller after recording evidence of the parties, negatived the plea of the landlord and dismissed the petition. However, on appeal, the Appellate Authority relying on the two judgments of this court in Shri Gurbux Rai v. Shrimati Kanti Rani, 1975 RCR(Rent) 131 and Shri Devid Appaji v. Smt. Shanti Devi alias Krishna Kumari,1975 RCJ 530, held that the desire of the landlord to shift to Phagwara was a good ground for the ejectment of tenant. Consequently the appeal was allowed and the tenant ordered to vacate the premise, and put the landlord in possession within two months. Aggrieved thereby the tenant has filed this revision under Section 15(3) of Act. To prove, his case, the landlord appeared in the witness-box as his own witness and led no other evidence. All that he stated was need the house for my personal use and occupation. My wife remains ill at Delhi and my business is also suffering there. I have no good business there." This statement was hardly sufficient substantiate the plea of personal necessity. The landlord never disclose as to what business he was carrying on in Delhi nor he had any evidence apart from his statement to show that he was not fairing well there His bald statement in this respect could not be reasonably accepted to each a conclusion that he was not fairing well in his business at Delhi. Similarly statement regarding the illness of his wife is also not supported by any evidence apart from a vague assertion by him. Although a medical certificate was produced on the file but that was never proved or exhibited. The appellate authority in the present case, therefore, relied on the ipse dixit of the landlord to reach at the conclusion that he needed the premises for his own occupation. Though at one time it was the view prevail in this court that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and unless any mala fide is proved on the part of the landlord his statement should be accepted in his respect. But this view does not hold field any more and recently in R. K. Jain v. Khazan Singh, 1980 1 RCR(Rent) 687 M.M. Punchhi, J. relying on. a judgment of the Supreme Court and a Division Bench of observed thus: "That it requires determination as to what would be the spreading distances of the word 'need' and that of the word excuse. From a given set of facts one court may spell an element of need and another an excuse, making it speculative. The sphere of the two words is obviously overlapping across their dividing line but an attempt has to be made to demarcate the same between the two. It appears that the element of need would signify the existence of such state of affairs that requires relief which cannot be well done without and it is the want of something which cannot be fulfilled except by the course sought to be adopted. The degree of need, of course, will vary from case to case but the absence thereof would make a sought for ejectment to be mere excuse. The landlord has to travel a longer distance, much beyond the span of a mere wish, want or excuse, to enter into the field of need for the possession of the demised premises without which he cannot well do."
(2.) As regards the two decisions relied upon by the Appellate Authority, sufficient is say that in both the cases the statement of the landlord was accepted on the peculiar facts of those cases and there is not much of discussion as to what were the circumstances in which the statement of the landlord was accepted. The said decisions thus furnish no guidance so far as the present case is concerned. In view of the above discussion this petition is allowed, the impugned judgment set aside and the application for ejectment dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs throughout.;