GOKAL CHAND MITTAL, J. - (1.) THE point of substance which arises in this revision filed by the tenant in whether his landlord can claim ejectment from the residential premises in his possession merely on the ground of bonafide personal necessity without proof of anything more in spite of the fact that the landlord is in occupation of another residential premises in the same urban area and a tenant.
(2.) THE facts, in brief, are that Smt. Vidya Devi filed an application for ejectment against her tenant Karnail Singh under Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, III of 1949 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), on the ground of personal necessity and it was stated that she had purchased the house in dispute from its previous owner for her personal use and occupation. The other ground was regarding non -payment of rent. The tenant, inter alia, pleaded that Smt. Vidya Devi was already in occupation of another house in the urban area concerned which was more commodious having more amenities and, therefore in view of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Act, she was not entitled to claim ejectment on the ground of personal necessity. Smt. Vidya Devi filed a replication in which it was pleaded that the house occupied by her is not commodious and her husband keeps buffaloes and the house is not sufficient for tethering those cattle. In her statement, she admitted that she is living in the rented house although she stated that she does not own any other house in the same urban area. However she explained that the house occupied by her as a tenant was a small one and the cattle could not be tethered in that house.
(3.) THE Rent Controller, Gidderbha, vide order dated 16th of November, 1978, by following M/s. John Tinson and Co. Ltd., Simla v. Shri Amar Chand Sood and another, 1971 Rent Control Reporter, 33 and Hari Kishan Dogra v. Arjan Singh, 1973 PLR 658 : 1973 RCR 721, came to the following two conclusions : - 1) Since Smt. Vidya Devi was in occupation of the other house only as a tenant and not as owner, it does not mean that she is occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned, and 2) that she had proved that she required the house in dispute for her personal use and occupation and that her necessity was bonafide and it did not make any difference if she wanted to keep the buffaloes of her husband in the house in dispute as the two buffaloes were needed for supplying milk to the members of the family and was not meant for doing the business of dairy. On the aforesaid findings, an ejectment order was passed against the tenant who took the matter in appeal and the Appellate Authority, in its brief judgment dated 19th of December, 1979, after noticing the contention of the tenant, proceeded to decide the appeal merely on the basis of M/s. John Tinson and Co. and Hari Kishan Dogra's case (supra) and held as follows : - "So far as the rented house is concerned, she was not occupying it in her own right. It is well settled that where a landlord occupying a rented premises wants possession of his own house, his need is bonafide. It cannot also be disputed that the tenant can purchase a building of his own need and an application for ejectment cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that he was already occupying another residential building in the area concerned. This view finds support from two authorities reported as M/s. Johan Tinson and Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Shri Amar Chand Sood and another, and Hari Kishan Dogra v. Arjan Singh (supra). The finding of the learned Rent Controller on this issue is endorsed." The argument was raised on behalf of the tenant on the other aspects also that Smt. Vidya Devi was occupying another house which was more commodious and pucca while the demised house was a Kutcha one and had lesser accommodation. It was further argued that the house occupied by the landlord consisted of two rooms, a latrine and a bathroom while the house in the occupation of the tenant does not have any bathroom or latrine. No decision was given by the Appellate Authority on the aforesaid matter and yet it was observed in para 10 of the order that no point was argued before him, which is apparently incorrect in view of the arguments of the tenant's counsel noticed in para B thereof. The tenant has come in revision before this Court and at the motion hearing, the learned counsel for the tenant urged that the two decisions relied upon by the authorities below did not lay down correct law as the occupation of a tenant is as of right and is interest in property under the Transfer of Property Act and such a possession is legally recognised and, therefore, has to be termed in one's own right and not at the sufferance of anybody else. According to the learned counsel, the possession of a tenant is clearly protected by the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Act and, therefore, an order of ejectment passed merely on the ground of not owning another residential building in the same area is of no consequence. It was further argued that it was shown on the record that the premises in occupation of Smt. Vidya Devi was bigger than the demised premises and that there was no latrine and bathroom in the demised premises whereas the house in her occupation had a latrine and a bath -room.;