- (1.) This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 13, 836 and 914 of 1979. All these petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment as the questions of law and facts in all these petitions are common.
(2.) Improvement Trust, Sirsa, framed a Commercial Development Scheme which was sanctioned by the State Government vide notification dated 26th August, 1971. Copy of this notification is Annexure P.2 in Civil Writ Petition No. 13 of 1979. The Scheme in question could not be fully executed within a period of five years as postulated under Section 44-A of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (hereinafter to be called the 'Act') as applicable to the State of Haryana. On 22nd May, 1978 the State Government issued a notification extending the period for executing the Scheme by one year. Subsequently, on 12th April, 1979, the State Government issued another notification, copy of which is attached as Annexure P.7 with Civil Writ Petition No. 13 of 1979, providing therein that the period of execution of the Scheme shall stand extended retrospectively with effect from 26th August, 1976 to 21st May, 1981. It may be mentioned that this notification rescinded the earlier notification dated 22nd May, 1978, copy of which is annexure P.6. The petitioners have approached this Court for quashing of the notification issued by the Government, copy of which is Annexure P.7, on the ground that there is no power with the State Government to extend the period for execution of the Scheme retrospectively and, thus, the part of the Scheme which had not been executed within the period of five years, could not be executed subsequently. A Bench of this Court in Surat Ram and others v. The State of Haryana and others,1979 PunLJ 430, held that the power of the State Government under proviso to Section 44-A of the Act could be exercised before the expiry of period of five years as postulated under Section 44-A, and after the period of five years has passed, the period for execution of the scheme could not be extended retrospectively. The Civil Writ Petition No. 1087 of 1979 (Rajeshwar Parshad v. State of Haryana and others) decided on 24th May, 1979, another Bench of this Court took the same view and held that an order of the State Government passed after the expiry of five years of the enforcement of the Scheme could not be sustained.
(3.) The learned counsel for the respondents-Trust tried to persuade us to hold that the view taken by the Division Benches in Surat Ram and others' case and in Rajeshwar Parshad's case , is not the correct view of law. It has been contended by Mr. Mohunta, the learned counsel for the Trust, that the provisions of Section 44-A of the Act are not mandatory, but are directory in nature. It has been contended that even if the Scheme is not executed within a period of five years from the date of the notification under Section 42 of the Act, it could still be executed and that the period for executing the Scheme could be extended retrospectively. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel. It is well settled that until and unless the Legislature has expressly conferred power on the delegatee to exercise the power with retrospective effect, the delegatee cannot exercise any such power retrospectively. The provisions of Section 44-A of the Act are as follows :- "44-A. Any scheme in respect of which a notification has been published under Section 42, shall be executed by the Trust within a period of five years from the date of such notification : Provided that the State Government may, if it is satisfied that it is beyond the control of the Trust to execute the scheme within the said period, extend the same as it may deem fit." A reading of the above-mentioned provision would clearly show that the execution of a scheme was to be exercised prospectively and not retrospectively. The Legislature consciously used the word 'is' in the proviso, when it has been provided 'if it is satisfied'. If the Legislature wanted to give power to Government to exercise the same with retrospective effect, the wording of the proviso would have been certainly different. Keeping in view the scheme of the Act, it is difficult to hold that the provisions of Section 44-A are directory in nature. As is clear from the various provisions of the Act, the rights over the property which falls within the Scheme so framed by the Trust, are put in jeopardy when the Scheme is initiated and finally sanctioned under Section 42 of the Act. The landowners cannot transfer the land. They are prohibited from making any improvement on the land so as not to raise any construction. By issuance of a notification under Section 36 of the Act, which is equivalent to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the ceiling on the market value of the property is imposed. By enacting Section 44-A, the Legislature advisedly enacted so as not to prolong the jeopardy on the rights of the citizens beyond the period specified therein, except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that it was beyond the control of the Trust to execute the said Scheme within the period of five years and the same may then be executed during the extended period. The provisions of Section 44-A of the Act do postulate that after the expiry of five years, if no order of extension has been passed by the State Government before the expiry of five years, the jeopardy put on the rights of the citizens will be no more in existence and the citizens, whose property has not yet been acquired, will be entitled to dispose of the same, or to develop the same by raising construction etc. If it is held that the period of execution of the Scheme can be extended retrospectively under the proviso, in that case, a citizen, who transfers the land or raises construction on the land during the period after the lapse of five years and before any extension was made, will be left remediless and will not be entitled to any compensation for the improvements made or construction raised and the third party's rights, who may purchase the land, may also be put to jeopardy. We have, therefore, no reason to take a different view than the one taken by the earlier Division Benches, referred to above.;