I.S. Tiwana, J. - (1.) THE petitioner -landlord sought the eviction of the tenant -respondent on the ground specified in section 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the plea that be wanted to accommodate his widowed sister and her two children in the demised premises as it was his legal and moral obligation. This plea of his has concurrently been dismissed by both the lower Courts, that is, the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, Amritsar, as the same was not found to be bona fide.
(2.) RIGHT at the outset the learned counsel for the respondent points out that this concurrent finding recorded by the lower Court does not call for interference in the exercise of the revisional powers under section 15(5) of the Act. In support of his stand, the learned counsel firmly relies (on the latest Supreme Court pronouncement in M/s Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangeswamy Chattiar : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1253. That was a case under section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. On comparing these two provisions, that is, subsection (5) of section 15 of the Act and section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Act which both deal with the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, I find that the phraseology and scope of the two sections is almost similar. While interpreting the scope of the revisional power of the High Court in these matter this is what has been held by the said Court: A concurrent finding based on evidence, that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not a finding which can be touched by the High Court expressing jurisdiction under section 25. In such a case, merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. In fact it has to be noticed that under section 25 the High Court calls for and examine the record of the appellant authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy itself under section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence Therefore, despite the wide language employed in section 25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. While dealing with the argument as to whether a finding about the bona fide requirement of a landlord is or not mixed question of fact and law, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, without examining the submission threadbare in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand opined that merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power unless it is shown that there was a taint of unreasonableness resulting in miscarriage of justice (Paragraph 4 of the judgment). In the light of the above noted pronouncement I do not find that any case has been made out by the petitioner for interference in this case. The plea of the appellant that his widowed sister Sudesh Rani who was a tenant of one Des Raj on the date of the filing of the application by the petitioner is not occupying that accommodation in her right, has again no substance in view of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Karnal Singh v. Vidya Devi, 1980 (1) R.C.R. 592, wherein it has been held that the occupation of a premises by a tenant on rent is an occupation in his (tenants) own right and not at the mercy of the landlord. According to this judgment the tenancy rights are rights in the property and are not only covered by the Transfer of Property Act but are further protected by the provisions of the Act.
(3.) OTHERWISE also I find that even a widowed sister is not one of the dependents mentioned in section 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. It cannot possibly be disputed by the petitioner that Sudesh Rani on her marriage became a member of the family of here in law and acquired rights as their in the property of her deceased husband. As per the evidence on record it is no where shown as to how and when she ceased to be a member of the family of her -in -law or was in any way ousted from that family and came to depend upon the petitioner for residence and maintenance. She cannot possibly be taken to be a member of the family of the Petitioner.;