M.M. Punchhi, J. - (1.) THIS petition was heard by us at great length and we reserved judgment way back on 19th December, 1979. Shortly thereafter, my learned brother D.S. Tewatia, J. became seisin of two Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 101 and 102 of 1977 referred to a Full Bench in which he was a member thereof. The decision in those cases was reserved on 9th January, 1980 and hence decision in this case was deferred. The judgment in those cases was authored by my learned brother D.S. Tewatia, J. with whom the other members of the Bench S.C. Mital, J. and S.S. Kang, J. concurred and the same was pronounced on 19th February, 1980 : 1980 L.L.R. 307) Since I have been made wiser having gone through the judgment of the Full Bench, some point common to it have now to be shelved by us and kept abided in accord with the dicta of the Full Bench. Others raised are presently being dealt with. But before that, I must hasten to give facts of the petition.
(2.) THE Petitioner Amrit Sagar Kashyap approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to challenge the revisional order of the Chief Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, dated 24th August, 1977 (Annexure P. 41. In the order of the Estate Officer passed on the original side and that of the Chief Administrator passed on appeal, the site belonging to the Petitioner under Booth No. 41, Sector 11 -D, Chandigarh, which was initially resumed, was later restored by the revisional order burdened with the condition that a sum of Rs. 2.500/ - be forfeited out of the price paid and the same be deposited by 26th September, 1977. The alleged misuser of the site was attributed to the tenant, Respondent No. 2, which led to the impugned action of the Chief Commissioner. The Motion Bench finding that there was no decided case on the subject in which the landlord was made to suffer for the breach committed by the tenant, this petition was admitted to be heard by a Division Bench. This is how the matter was placed before us. Other facts are within a short compass. The father of the Petitioner, late Shri H.S. Kasbyap, had purchased the site under Booth No. 41, Sector 13 -D, Chandigarh, on 4th November, 1968 from the Estate Officer, Chandigarh, against full payment in foreign exchange. It appears that attar building the booth on the said site, it was given on monthly rent to Respondent No. 2 under terms and conditions embodied in a lease deed dated 18th November, 1974, copy Annexure P. 1. It appears that the tenant was attributed misuser of the booth from that of general trade to furniture manufacturing and a notice to that effect was served on the Petitioner on 22nd January, 1975. He in turn asked the tenant to stop the misuse vide notice, Annexure P. 2 and also gave reply to the Estate Officer on 10th March, 1975 vide Annexure P. 3. The Estate Officer ultimately resumed the said site vide his order dated 13th January, 1976 and forfeited a sum of Rs. 3,130/ - representing 10 per cent of the consideration money. The Petitioner filed an appeal before the Chief Administrator which was dismissed on 12th July, 1976. The Petitioner's revision was partially accepted by the Chief Commissioner vide Annexure P. 4 whereby the site was restored subject to the payment of Rs. 2,500/ - by 26th September, 1977 as said before.
(3.) THE Estate Officer, Chandigarh, also initiated proceedings for ejectment of the tenant, Respondent No. 2, under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 to which the Petitioner was made a party but later on discharged as being unnecessary. Simultaneously, the Petitioner too filed an ejectment petition against Respondent No. 2 before the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, for the misuse of the said site on receipt of notice for resumption and the said matter was stated to be pending. However, as per return filed by the tenant -Respondent No. 2. The Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 rejected his application for evidence and ordered ejectment of the tenant from the premises. The view then prevalent, based upon a decision of a Sing'e Bench of this Court in Mulkh Raj v. The Estate Officer etc. Civil Writ Petition No. 3825 of 1968 dated 26th November, 1971 and of a Division Bench judgment reported as Mohan Lal Ghansham Dass v. The Chandigarh Administration and Ors., 1979 P.L.R. 94, was that the lessee/tenant could not make a grouse of the resumption of site and the real person who could make such grievance was the landlord and his battle could not be fought by the tenant. The Full Bench in Brij Mohan v. The Chief Administrator and Ors. L.P.A. No. 101 of 1977 decided on 19th February, 1980 :, 1980 L.L.R. 307, has overruled the aforesaid view and has held that the tenant is a party aggrieved against the resumption order and thus is entitled to file an appeal under Section 10 of the Act. A fortiori, the tenant also is entitled to challenge proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. This aspect of the case can no longer engage us in view of Brij Mohan's case (supra), more so, when the tenant -Respondent No. 2 remains ready and willing to pay the penalty imposed. The stance of the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh on the other hand, is that such penalty is primarily the liability of the landlord and he may have his remedy against his tenant, but the authorities would not accept payment of penalty from the tenant on the plea that there is no privy between the authorities and the tenant and hence would not restore the site in his favour. This stance is thoroughly shaken by the dictum of the Full Bench which has held as follows: The proposed order of resumption has dual consequences : (i) the depriving of ownership right in the site or building which concerns only the owner of the site or building and (ii) the deprivation of the lessee of his lawful possession thereof. Such being the consequences of the order of resumption, both lessee and his lessor would be affected by the order and would thus be entitled to be heard before such an order is passed. That the Estate Officer was alive to the right of a lessee to be heard is apparent from the fact that in Letters Patent Appeal No. 101 of 1977 arising from Civil Writ Petition No. 1452 of 1974 Brij Mohan v. The Chief Administrator Union Territory Chandigarh end Ors. a copy of show -cause notice sent to the landowner was also served upon the Petitioner -lessee inviting his objections, if any, to the proposed action under Section 8 -A of the Act. If the objections raised by the lessee are over ruled and an order of resumption is passed, which would have the consequence of putting an end to the lawful possession of the lessee of the site or building, then surely he would be the person who would be equally aggrieved by the order of resumption and would thus be entitled to challenge that order in appeal under Section 10 of the Act.;