Tek Chand, J. - (1.) The two respondents have been proceeded with under the Contempt of Courts Act on account of certain passages in the booklet "Economics of Prosperity". The first respondent, Sari Radha Krishna Khanna, is the author and the second respondent is a firm of publishers and distributors. This booklet is in two parts. The first 72 pages are under the heading "Economics of prosperity" and the subsequent 16 pages, which have been separately numbered are under the caption "The Punjab National Bank Case''. By order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice dated the 24th of March, 1960, notice has been issued to the author and the firm of publishers and distributors to show cause why action should not be taken against them in respect of certain passages in the booklet at pages 71, et seq. The second respondent has filed an affidavit denying knowledge about the publication, printing, distribution or sale of the booklet written by respondent No. 1. It is stated that this respondent had no knowledge of the book till show- cause notice from the High Court was received. It was also deposed that this respondent never gave any express or implied consent for the publication, printing, distribution or sale of the booklet and nothing to do with it. In view of the above affidavit and in the absence of any proof that the second respondent had anything to do with the printing, publication, sale or distribution of the booklet the rule against M/s. Atma Ram and Sons is discharged.
(2.) The first respondent has admitted that he is the author of the booklet. In his affidavit dated the 13th of May, 1960, he stated that he was a retired Irrigation Engineer from the Punjab and had written a number of hooks and pamphlets, and "Economics of Prosperity" is one of such publications. In the first 71 pages of this booklet, the author has criticised the economic policy of the Government and the planning undertaken by it These pages have no reference to Courts of law or to matters having any bearing on these proceedings. In the last two paragraphs of the booklet at pages 71 and 72, the author has made animadversions on certain matters pertaining to administration of law and justice. He began by referring to a lecture delivered at the Madras University by Shri C. D. Deshmukh, wherein he is reported to have said that comprehensive review by a high-level Commission of the law and order situation in the country was needed, and that if such a Commission was established, he would make a beginning by lodging half a dozen informations himself. In the last paragraph, respondent No. 1 says : "The author could also place before such a Commission half a dozen or more informations to show how corruption in the lower courts has been growing, sense of responsibility of the magistrates and judges, sometimes reaching even up to High Court stage has been declining, and in consequence the quality of justice dealt out to the people has been deteriorating, ever since the Government took to socialistic planning and started neglecting the duties and functions of a good government; which neglect has continued to grow with catastrophic consequences to the general administration and administration of law and justice in the country. The author by his personal experience of law courts for the past ten years can say and can prove, that in the present day administration of justice, it is not the merits of disputes but the degree of approach that a party commands, and the whims and fancies of magistrates and judges, that finally decide the results in many cases. In a case in which a single issue was involved, a judge decided the issue in favour of one party and gave the verdict in favour of the other. A judge on being suitably approached decided a case without taking any evidence at all, and yet discussed all the merits of the case from his personal impressions of bazar talks. Complaints made to the Chief Justice that the lower Court judge had no evidence or data on which to base Ms judgment, only evoked the reply that the aggrieved party should take legal action against the judge. A powerful party may even remove or destroy inconvenient documents from court files, and may win the case, which admittedly ho could not have done without the removal or destruction of documents, although it may be within the specific knowledge of the presiding magistrate that relevant documents had been done away with, Appeals to the higher courts can become mere formalities and matter of luck, and when there are concurrent judgments of two courts in a case, the Supreme Court in cases of special leave to appeal, may not think it necessary or convenient to interfere without much caring to go into the merits and points of law involved."
(3.) The next 16 pages which have been separately numbered are under the caption "The Punjab National Bank Case". In these pages, he refers to personal litigation that he has had with the Punjab National Bank wherein he has alleged that there have been flagrant denial of justice, which denial he has attributed to the influence of the Bank officers with the presiding officers of the Courts, There are some passages under this heading, which according to the learned counsel for the State are contemptuous of this Court and the Courts subordinate to it. At page 1, my attention has been drawn to the following passage; "A number of cases are still going on in various courts, one of them of more than 10 years duration, about which cases nothing may be said. But one case of flagrant denial of justice, which has gone through all the stages, including twice to the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal, may be cited here as an example of the quality of justice that is dealt out by law courts in India, and to show that it becomes impossible to get even a hearing of complaints of cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgeries of ledgers, vouchers, account books and documents on a colossal scale, against bank officers, as the bank is a powerful body, and besides having the right approach and influence can be desperate enough and resourceful enough to bo able to tamper with court records and remove or destroy court documents. This case was an of shoot of the dispute with the bank connected with the Delhi factory account." It is not necessary to go into detailed history of the litigation, which furnished occasion for writing passages to which objections have been made on the ground that they are contemptuous of the Courts. In broad outline, all that need be said for understanding the context in which the particular passages were referred to, is, that respondent No. 1. Shri Khanna, had an overdraft account with the Panipat Branch of the Punjab National Bank Ltd., which he had opened in January, 1946. In this account, he had pledged with the Bank six life insurance policies. The proceeds of two such policies had been realised by the bank some time in 1951. There remained pledged with the bank four life policies. The bank demanded payment to meet the overdue liabilities of the respondent and according to the respondent despite realising Rs. 1170 on the maturity of one of these four policies, the bank had failed to pay the monthly premium on postal life policy, The difference between the parties led to lengthy correspondence between them. Some of these policies were stated to have been surrendered by the bank to the insurance companies, and it is alleged, that due credit was not given, of the realisations by the bank, to the respondent. After perusal of a copy of the account supplied by the bank, the respondent noticed certain additions and interpolations, and he, thereupon, lodged criminal complaint in the Court of the resident Magistrate alleging, that credit had been given to him, in his account, of Rs. 3,880-4-6 by means of a fictitious entry in place of Rs. 4,854-14-0 which was the correct amount. This complaint had been lodged on 18th of August. 1953, and was dismissed by the Magistrate. The respondent, on the advice of his counsel, filed another complaint based upon certain facts, which, he alleged, came to bis knowledge after the filing of the first complaint. This complaint had been Bled under sections 409, 420 and 468, Indian Penal Code against certain bank employees. Shri Amar Singh. Magistrate 1st Class, who ultimately decided this case, found that the offences were not made out against the accused, who wete discharged. The respondent, then sought the revision of the order of discharge, in the Court of Sessions Judge and his petition came up before Shri E. F. Barlow, Additional Sessions Judge, who dismissed it. The respondent then filed a petition for revision in the High Court, which came up for hearing before Passey J. on the 31st of January, 1937, and on the 1st of February, 1957. This revision petition was dismissed by Passey J. as he thought that the allegations of the respondent that the policies had been surrendered by the bank without his information were false and frivolous. With reference to these proceedings, respondent No. 1 wrote as follows at pages 3 and 4: "An appeal against the judgment of the trying magistrate was straightaway dismissed by the Sessions Judge without much argument, and without even calling for the forged ledgers and registers as the appellant had applied for. In revision in the High Court, the honourable judge made it clear at the very outset, that it was only a revision and not an appeal, so Ms Lordship would deal with the matter expeditiously. When the complainant's lawyer, who is himself now a High Court Judge, started explaining his case from his lengthy brief, his Lordship cut him short and directed him to explain the case not as an appeal but as revision only. The lawyer naturally got upset, on which, the complainant made request that he be allowed to argue his own case, which request was granted by his Lordship. The complainant rushed through his case as his Lordship was hurrying him on, and among other things, he urged, that the forged copy of the account supplied to him, be compared with the forged enby in the ledger, which his Lordship did, by calling for the ledger on die dais. But at the same time he observed, that he was not concerned with forgeries. After lengthy arguments by the counsel for the opposite party, which lasted for more than three hours the next day, the complainant was allowed just half an hour to say what he wanted, because twice during the proceedings a lawyer from Delhi had interrupted his Lordship to say that he had specially come from Delhi and his Lordship promised that his case would be taken up after lunch. His Lordship took extensive notes of the arguments, including the ruling of the Supreme Court (Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, (S) AIR 1956 SC 575) of the 4th May 1956 on the point of entrustment, which the complainant had cited in order to show that the learned magistrate's findings on the point of entrustment was wrong. But immediately the complainant stopped speaking his Lordship dismissed the revision." Referring to Passey J. he said : "Basing the entire judgment on the wrong assumption that the bank had held a decree against the complainant, when the respondents committed their various acts, his Lordship further showed his displeasure against the complainant by observing, that The allegation that the Sunlight and the Oriental Policies had been surrendered without his Information must in view of the facts given above be spurned as false and frivolous'." He then said that an application for special leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court in limine in view of the scathing judgment of his Lordship. The second complaint resulted in the discharge of the accused. There were, however certain interlocutory matters, which came up for adjudication before the Sessions Judge prior to the discharge of the accused. After the Magistrate 1st Class, by his order, dated the 21st of September, 1957, had ordered the issue of summonses to the accused, the latter under Section 435, Criminal Procedure Code, applied to the Sessions Judge (Shri Badri Parshad Puri) for revision of the order of the trying Magistrate, who had declined to discharge the accused. With reference to Mr. Puri, respondent No. 1 at page 15 wrote: "The Sessions Judge happened to be a person who had personal grudge against the complainant, because he had made two complaints against him to the Chief Justice for illegally deciding cases by fully discussing the merits of the cases without taking any evidence at all. So, although it was represented to the learned Sessions Judge that the refusal of the magistrate to discharge the accused at their bidding, without taking any evidence, could not be challenged under Section 435, Cri P. C., on the ground of its not being a correct, legal or proper order, yet the learned Sessions Judge look cognizance of the matter, and by reproducing in his report long portions of the judgment of the High Court in the previous case, which had no relevance to the complaint in question, and by grossly distorting facts recommended the case to the High Court for the quashing of proceedings.";