- (1.) Heard Mr. B Chakravorty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. H Rahman, learned Govt. Advocate who represents the respondent Nos.1 &
(2.) The Digboi Town Committee, arrayed herein as respondent No.3, chose not to participate in the proceedings. 2.The petitioner, who was functioning as the Chief Accountant of Digboi Town Committee, faced a disciplinary proceeding and was placed under suspension by an order dated 19.8.1997 issued by the Executive Officer and EAC, who was discharging the function of the Administrator of the Town Committee, in the absence of the elected body. In the suspension order it was indicated that the writ petitioner unauthorisedly issued a trade license, using official seal of the Executive officer. Later on, a show cause notice dated 23.7.1998 along with statement of allegations containing 9 different charges was issued. The petitioner gave his reply on 4.8.1998 to the show cause notice but eventually, an Inquiry was ordered and the Inquiry Officer by his report dated 8.12.1999 held that 5 charges being No.1, 3, 4, 7 and 8 were proved, whereas 4 charges were not proved. 2.1.On the basis of the above inquiry findings, by order dated 3.7.2000, the services of the petitioner was terminated with effect from 29.5.2000. 2.2.The statutory appeal filed by the petitioner on 24.7.2000 was considered by the Appellate Authority who, by his order dated 21.2.2003 (Annexure T) held that the Disciplinary Authority (while the Town Committee was under dissolution), ought to have taken prior approval of the Government as per the provisions of Section 299 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before suspending the petitioner and since this was not done, the suspension order was ultra virus. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority ordered to treat the petitioner's entire suspension period from 19.8.1997 till 29.5.2000 to be, as in service and directions were issued to pay the pay and allowances in full for the said period. However, the Appellate Authority did not interfere with the termination order passed against the petitioner.
(3.) Assailing the disciplinary proceeding and the consequential termination, Mr. B Chakravorty, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the charge sheet dated 20.7.1998 given to the petitioner was not accompanied by the list of witnesses and the list of documents to be relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority, there has been a breach of the requirement of Rule 9(2) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and accordingly the disciplinary proceeding, leading to termination of the petitioner, is vitiated and the same justifies interference by this Court. 3.1.Next it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that vague and indefinite charges have been leveled against the petitioner in the charge sheet dated 23.7.1998 and as such the petitioner was not able to give a fitting reply to the charges and since a statutory duty is cast on the Disciplinary Authority to frame definite charges and there has been breach of this duty, the impugned proceeding is vitiated in law. 3.2.The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that notwithstanding the above stated disadvantage suffered by the petitioner, he gave replies to adequate each of the charges leveled against him and since the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authorities did not take into account the replies of the petitioner, he has been denied a fair treatment in the impugned proceedings. 3.3.Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that when the Appellate Authority has held that under Section 299 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), prior approval of the Government should have been taken before the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by the Administrator, (who was in-charge of the Digboi Town Committee in the absence of the elected body), and on this ground the suspension of the petitioner was held to be ultra virus and there was order for payment of full salary to the petitioner for the period under suspension, the Appellate Authority should have also interfered with the termination order on the same score.;