T.VAIPHEI,J. - (1.) THIS application under Rule 36-A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937 is directed against the order dated 2. 2. 2007 passed by the Ld. Additional Deputy Commissioner, West Khasi Hills, Nongstoin in T. C. A. No. 1 of 2006 disposing of the appeal purportedly on compromise between the parties. The grievance of the petitioners is that though they were parties in the suit, the compromise was arrived at without their knowledge before the appellate court. The case has a chequered and long history and its genesis can be traced back to 1979, but with no end in sight even at this stage.
(2.) IT was in the year 1979 that the late Ka Ringhit Sangrin and others had instituted a title suit against the petitioners and others, their predecessors-in-interest including the respondent No. 1 before the Ld. Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, West Khasi Hills District, Nongstoin over the land called "langja" ('the suit land' for short ). The suit was originally registered as T. S. No. 16 (and) of 1979, which was subsequently re-numbered as T. S. No. 1 (T) of 1996. The plaintiffs claimed that the land is a private land whereas the petitioners claimed otherwise contending that the suit land is a Raid or community land. It transpires that in the year 1998, the clan elder of Ka. Ringhit Sangrin, one Brikshon Kharlyngdoh and the then Sirdar of Jyrngam Sirdarship had effected a compromise between the rival parties together with the residents of five villages, namely, Langja, Ktiethawtar, Khyllew, Sangrin, Umthlu and Mawribah village whereupon the Sirdar of Jyrngam Sirdarship forwarded the compromise agreement bearing dated 22. 4. 1999 to the Ld. Magistrate First Class-cum-Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Nongstoin with a prayer to dispose of the suit in accordance therewith. The suit was eventually compromised by the Lok Adalat held on 7. 12. 1999. The decision of the Lok Adalat compromising the suit was, however, challenged before this Court by one of the parties in W. P. (C) No. 93 (SH) of 2000 of the ground that the Lok Adalat did not have the jurisdiction to effect the compromise. Finding that the dispute was not referred to be by the trial court nor was the same made on the joint application of the parties, which contravened the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, this Court by the order dated 7. 5. 2004 set aside the award of the Lok Adalat and directed the Ld. Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Nongstoin, to try the suit at the stage in which the application for compromise had been filed. It may be noted that the petitioner in that case had taken the specific plea that she was not a signatory to the compromise allegedly arrived at by those parties and the same had been done behind her back. It may be noted that this Court had also given liberty to the parties to make joint application afresh before the Ld. Assistant Deputy Commissioner to effect compromise in accordance with law. It would appear that the suit was restored to the file of the Ld. Assistant to D. C. , Nongstoin and that following the death of the said Ka Ringhit Sangrin (the original plaintiff), an application for substitution was made by the respondent before the trial court, which was objected to by the petitioners by filing their written objection on 8. 6. 2006. However, the Ld. Assistant to D. C. , again by the order dated 8. 6. 2006 disposed of the suit on the basis of the same compromise agreement accepted by the Lok Adalat, which was set aside by this Court. It is not the allegation of the petitioners that such course of action was taken by the trial court fully knowing well the existence of the order dated 7. 5. 2004 passed by this Court. Aggrieved by the order of the trial court, the respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal, being T. C. A. No. 1 of 2006, before the Ld. Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Nongstoin. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondents, on 22. 12. 2006, without the knowledge of the petitioners, submitted a compromise petition before the appellate court, which by the impugned order disposed of the case purportedly on compromise arrived at between the parties by dividing the suit land amongst themselves. This is how this revision petition has been filed. Mr. T. T. Diengdoh, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the appellate court has acted with material irregularity in acting upon the compromise petition dated 22. 12. 2006 executed only by and between the respondents and by losing sight of the fact that all the contesting parties in the appeal including the petitioners did not take part in the compromise or put their signatures thereon. The appellate court in its anxiety to dispose of the long pending case, contends the learned counsel, has committed grave miscarriage of justice in acting upon the onesided compromise arrived at by one group of the parties without the knowledge the consent of the opposite parties and has, in the process, allowed the respondents to divide the suit land amongst themselves to the great detriment and prejudice of the petitioners. It is maintained by the learned counsel that a valid compromise decree contemplates a situation in which all the rival parties in the case reach an amicable settlement of the case on mutually acceptable terms, and the compromise petition acted upon by the appellate court in disposing of the case has the effect of non-suiting the petitioners and depriving them of their property without authority of law. Consequently, the impugned order suffers from gross non-application of mind and improper exercise of jurisdiction calling for the interference of this Court. On the other hand, Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the impugned order was meant to conclude finally the long pending suit between the parties, and need not be interfered with. He, however submits that if the impugned order suffers from gross jurisdictional errors, the matter be remanded to the appellate court for fresh hearing.
(3.) UPON hearing the learned counsel for the rival parties and after perusing the materials on record, I am of the firm view that the impugned order does not call for my interference. The reason is that the petitioners were not parties to the appeal, and the decision so rendered based on compromise or otherwise between third parties cannot bind them in any manner. Such decision will never operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the petitioners and the respondents. If the petitioners are likely to be affected by the compromise decree, the remedy lies in filing a separate and independent suit challenging the compromise decree obtained by the respondents, subject of course, to the law of limitation. The question is one of locus standi. I have carefully gone through the record relating to T. C. A. No. 1 of 2006 upon which the impugned order was passed and examination of the memo of appeal filed by the respondents clearly indicates that there in one Ka Trin Syiemiong as the appellant and three persons, namely, (1) Late Ka Ringhit Sangrin (since dead), (2) Late Ka Drosila Sangrin (since dead) and (3) U Brickson Lyngdoh, who were arrayed as party-respondents and that the petitioners herein were not impleaded as party-respondents in that appeal. It is also interesting to note there is nothing on record to show that any appeal was preferred by the petitioners from the judgment and order dated 18. 6. 2006 passed by the Ld. Asst. to D. C. , Nongstoin, the same judgment and order challenged by the respondents in this revision. It is quite possible that the respondents were up to some trick in challenging the impugned order without impleading the petitioners as party-respondents even though they were parties to the suit in question and that because of this diabolical ingenuity, they managed to obtain a compromise decree at the expense of the petitioners. However, this manipulation, howsoever abhorring and despicable it may be, cannot detract from the crucial position obtaining in this case that the petitioners were not impleaded as party-respondents in the appeal. The legal position is crystal clear that no revision can lie at the behest of someone who was not a party to the appeal disposed of by a Court subordinate to this Court. Nevertheless, the petitioners cannot at the same time be bound by such decree obtained by the respondents without their knowledge and without impleading them a party-respondents. Having said that, since petitioners are admittedly not parties to the appeal in question, this revision petition filed by them is not maintainable either. In Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Co. Vs. Union of India, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 132, it has been held by the Apex Court that revisional power under Rule 36-A of the High Court in such case, therefore, must be exercised in conformity with the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.;