Sarjoo Prosad, C.J. - (1.) THIS is a appeal by defendants Nos.3 and 4 and arises out of a suit which was instituted for their action by the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of the land and the houses which stand thereon. When he left Sibsagar on transfer he put the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit land and allowed them to occupy the houses in question. These defendants thus continued to be in occupation with their other brother defendant No. 3 and their mother. Defendant Number 4 is the wife of defendant No. 3. In 1943 it appears that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 set up their own title to the suit land repudiating that of the plaintiff by making a fraudulent purchase at an auction sale. The plaintiff then instituted Title Suit No. 3 of 1943 for ejectment of the defendants and for setting aside the sale, on the ground that it was a nullity and did not affect the interest of the plaintiff. The suit was decreed in November, 1944. That decree is binding on the defendants Nos. 1 arid 2 who are parties to the suit and also on the defendant No. 3 who, though not a party to the suit, was in occupation of the premises only as a member of the family of the other defendants. The plaintiff claims that although these defendants were not entitled to any notice of ejectment, he still served notices on them giving them reasonable time to vacate die premises and on their failure to do so instituted the suit. The suit was contested mainly by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 the present appellants, who deny the plaintiff 's title to the land. Their case is that the defendant No. 3 who is a brother of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as also defendant No. 4 along with their mother had been inducted on the land in 1922 and built houses thereon. Since then they, have been in occupation of die land in their own right and they deny the relationship of landlord' and tenant between themselves and the plaintiff. They further claim adverse possession.
(2.) THE trial Court held that defendant No. 3 not being a party to the earlier suit was in occupation of the land in his own rights along with his mother and as such was not liable to be evicted. It accordingly dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court has reversed that decision. It found that die decree in the earlier suit was binding On the two brothers defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and that defendants Nos. 3 and 4 came upon the land along with the other defendants who were the tenants of the plaintiff and were not entitled to claim any independent right on the land and they could be also regarded as permissive tenants thereof. It further held that after the decree in the previous suit these defendants were also trespassers and were liable to be evicted without any notice to quit, and in the circumstances It decreed the plaintiff's suit giving 3 month 's time to the defendants to remove all the structures standing on the land and to deliver vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff. The decision of the learned Subordinate Judge has been attacked on the ground that has erred in holding that the judgment in the previous suit was binding on these defendants and that these defendants were in the position of subtenants under the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and as such trespassers in law. These contentions, in my opinion, are unsound. The decision in the previous suit may not be res judicata against these defendants, but there can be no doubt that it is good evidence of the fact that, the plaintiff got a declaration of his rights as against defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the brothers of defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 3 or his wife could not claim any better title than the other two defendants in view of the finding in this case that they had all been inducted on the land as members Of the, same family and continued to live there as permissive tenants under the plaintiff, The observation made by the Court below that defendants Nos. 3 and 4 may be called sub -tenants' of defendant; No. 2 may not be altogether accurate but in substance his finding is clear that these defendants had also no independent rights in the land and the facts clearly established that they were as much permissive tenants under the plaintiff as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 against whom the earlier suit had been decreed. That being so, the Court below is right in holding that no particular notice to quit, except some reasonable notice, was necessary for eviction of these defendants. What the learned Subordinate Judge actually meant by these defendants being bound by the decree in the previous suit is that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who were parties to the earlier decree were undoubtedly bound by it and these defendants being merely in occupation at the instance of those other defendants or as members or dependants of the family they could not claim any better right to question the validity of the decree in the earlier suit. The evidence does show that the mother of these defendants was in fact recorded in the municipality in respect of the disputed land, but that could not necessarily convey any title either to the mother or to these defendants. Presumably, these defendants were not made parties in the earlier suit because the purchase at die sale which the plaintiff sought to avoid may have been in the name of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants, therefore, fails. The appeal is without any merit and must be dismissed with costs, and the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge must be affirmed.;