Ronojit Kumar Mitra, J. - (1.) In order to adjudicate the disputes between the parties in this application, the court was to consider whether the non obstante clauses as contained in the Companies Act, 1956, and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, were conflicting, and if so then which was to prevail. For the sake of brevity, I shall in this order refer to the two enactments as the "Companies Act" and the "Debt Recovery Act", respectively.
(2.) It was contended by the advocate on behalf of the petitioner, that the suit which was now pending before this court, ought to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 31(1) of the Debt Recovery Act. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, in this order shall in short be referred to as "the Tribunal". It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Debt Recovery Act was a later enactment and the non obstante clause contained in it would be applicable in preference to the non obstante clause in the Companies Act, which in point of time was an earlier legislation. In support of his submissions he cited and relied on the decision in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal. According to him, the Legislature at the time of making the new enactment, was fully aware of the non obstante clause contained in the Companies Act, and therefore, the insertion of the non obstante clause in the Debt Recovery Act was a clear intention of the legislators that this non obstante clause would prevail over the non obstante clause contained in the Companies Act and hence the laws under the Debt Recovery Act would be given full effect. He further cited and relied on the decisions in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishiva Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., and Srikant Kashinath Jituri v. Corporation of the City of Belgaum.
(3.) The Companies Act was a composite legislation, contended the advocate for the official liquidator, and any other enactment would not affect the provisions contained in this legislation. According to him, since there was no specific provision in either of the two enactments as to which of the non obstante clauses would prevail, over the other, it would not be correct to arrive at a conclusion by seeking to interpret the minds of the legislators at the time when this legislation had been enacted. He submitted that such conclusions would prejudice the interest of the creditors in liquidation proceedings, under the Companies Act. He argued that the Tribunal had no power to wind up a company or to entertain proceedings instituted by a creditor under the provisions of the Companies Act and therefore while the non obstante clause contained in the Debt Recovery Act could be applicable to other proceedings, it had no application as regards proceedings under, nor could be regarded to have any effect on the provisions of the Companies Act. He emphasised that it would be especially so, because such proceedings could not be instituted in any other court but the court taking up company matters. He submitted that winding up proceedings were representative in nature, and if the suit was to be transferred to the Tribunal then the interest of the creditors would suffer, as there was no indication in the Debt Recovery Act, that the Tribunal would continue with the suit while the winding up proceedings continued before the company court. According to him the suit should not be transferred to the Tribunal. He submitted that it was the considered view of the Supreme Court that, where there was a conflict in the interpretation of a statute, courts would attempt to give a harmonious interpretation, favouring any special protection which may have been sought to be reserved by the Legislature in any of the conflicting enactments. He argued that in Section 31(1) of the Debt Recovery Act, the words "... before any court..." should be taken to mean, before any original court, which would be the court where the suit had been originally instituted and not the court where the suit had come by way of operation of law, and was pending before that court on the date when the Debt Recovery Act came into force. Upon instruction he submitted that all formalities including publication of notice inviting and filing of claims had been completed in the present matter and settlement of claims in respect of the workers was near completion and the petitioner could receive its portion of claim as and when this court would direct. In support of his submissions he cited and relied on the decisions in [1996] 1 C.L.J. 380 (sic) and Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Srinivas Agencies [1996] 86 Comp Cas 255 (SC).;