A.K. Nandi, J. - (1.) This revisional application is directed against order no. 16 dated 19.11.88 passed by the Ld. Addl. District Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore, in Title Appeal No. 706 of 1987. This is a very interesting case. A Landlord sued his tenants for eviction. The suit ended in a decree in the trial court on the ground of reasonable requirement of the landlord for his own use and occupation and unauthorised construction. An appeal was preferred before the 3rd Court of the Ld. Addl. District Judge, Alipore, being Title Appeal No. 706 of 1987, which was presided over by Mr. M.K. Sen Gupta. In the judgment Mr. Sen Gupta while dealing with the question of reasonable requirement records as follows: Ld. Lawyer for the appellants is fair enough to concede that the plaintiff reasonably requires four rooms for the use and occupation of the plaintiff and the members of his family. Apart from this concession, the Ld. Judge agreed with the finding of the Ld. Munsif and finally concluded that the premises was reasonably required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation. The tenants thus lost in appeal also. A second appeal was preferred. In the High Court the matter came up for hearing before a Division Bench presided over by Padma Khas tagir and L.M. Ghosh, JJ. On 9.10.88 for admission of the appeal. The Ld. Judges pointed out the concession recorded in the judgment of the lower appellate court. The Ld. Lawyer appearing for the appellants challenged the concession before the Hon'ble Judges who over -ruled the contention and summarily dismissed the second appeal on 11.10.88. Thereafter, on 15.11.88 the present petitioners filed a petition under Ss. 152 and 153A of the Code of Civil Procedure before the lower appellate court asking the court to expunge the concession said to have been made in the judgment in Title Appeal No. 706 of 87. The said Ld. Judge Mr. M.K. Sen Gupta by the impugned order No. 16 dated 19.11.88 rejected the application as misconceived.
(2.) The Ld. Lawyer for the opposite party invites my attention of the Xerox copy of the certified copy of the judgment marked Annexure 'A' to this petition. It will appear that the certified copy of the judgment of Title Appeal No. 706 of 87 was applied for on 18.6.88 and it was delivered to the party on 27.8.88. Referring to paragraph 11 of the revisional application, it is contended on behalf of the opposite party that the petitioners moved in second appeal as late as on 11.10.88. A period of about two months had elapsed between the receipt of the certified copy and the appearance before the Division Bench. It is contended that it ought to have dawned to the petitioners in the meantime or rather it ought to have dawned to the Ld. counsel for the petitioners, who drafted the memo of appeal, that there had been a concession at all, the petitioners would have taken steps immediately in the first appellate court for correction of the relevant part of the judgment so as to delete the concession. It was too late in the day to move the court after the second appeal had been summarily rejected. There is much force in the argument. A single Judge is inferior to a Division Bench in the High Court. What was confirmed by a superior Court cannot be disturbed by an inferior Court. The factum of concession was taken notice of by the Division Bench while dismissing the second appeal summarily. Now the petitioners cannot reopen the question before a single Judge sitting in revision. In my opinion, this could not be reopened before a court of concurrent jurisdiction either, since the matter has been concluded by a judgment. When the second appeal had been summarily dismissed and the petitioners did not move the Supreme Court, the judgment of the High Court attained finality This finality cannot be disturbed by way of revision. It I interfere now with the impugned order and grant relief to the petitioners as prayed for, then the first appellate court will be further required to decide the question of reasonable requirement afresh. That shall be impermissible in law since the second appeal has been dismissed summarily.
(3.) The petition is untenable from the point of view of law also. The petition has been preferred under Ss. 152 and 153A of the Code. Under Sec. 152 of the Code only clerical or arithmetical mistakes or mistakes by accidental slip or omission may be corrected. This concession does not come within the scope of any of the descriptions. Sec. 153A of the Code only confers jurisdiction upon the court of first instance to amend the decree or judgment despite the disposal of an appeal. These two provisions do not confer jurisdiction upon a court to expunge an alleged concession. The right course has been laid down in the decision in Bank of Bihar v/s. Mahabir Lal ( : AIR 1964 SC 377). It has held that the statement in the judgment that a particular thing happened or did not happen before it, ought not to be permitted to be challenged by a party unless both the parties to the litigation agree that the statement is wrong or the Court itself admits the statement to be erroneous. Otherwise, the party has a remedy by way of review. The question as to what happened before a court and how to decide it came up for consideration also before this High Court in Debabrata Chakraborty v/s. N.K. Das ft Ors., [1989(2) CLJ 214]. This Court opined that where in a dispute as to what happened before a court or tribunal, the stamen of the presiding officer is generally accepted to be correct. In similar tone the Supreme Court expressed its opinion in Union of India v/s. T.R. Varma ( : AIR 1957 SC 882 - para 8). In the instant case the very presiding Judge Mr. M.K. Sen Gupta, who delivered the judgment in the Title Appeal, also passed the impugned order. He refused to interfere presumably on the ground that the concession was made before him. The Ld. counsel Mr. Nani Gopal Choudhury had sworn an affidavit and in spite of that, the Ld. Judge revised to concede that there was no concession. Since the opposite party is contesting the matter, it can safely be held that he is not also conceding, that there was no concession. The only way left open to the party was by way review. It is contended that by whatever label the petition might have been made, this was in substance a petition for review. It is undoubtedly so. Nevertheless, Since the same Ld. Judge refused interfere presumably on the ground that he was not ready to accept that there was no concession, the review would not be entertain able. In any view of the matter, the petitioners cannot succeed either in law or on facts. In the result, the revisional application fails and is dismissed. Let this order be communicated to the court below forthwith.;