Ganendra Narayan Ray, J. - (1.) In the instant Rule the legality and validity of initiation of a proceeding by a Special Officer of Mahishadal, under the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated Land Act, 1973 on an application made under section 4(1) of the said Act by the opposite party no. 4 Shri Radha Kanta Bhowmick and issuing a notice by the said Special Officer to the petitioner Civil Rule No. 3505 (w) of 1978. for the purpose of adjudication of the said application under Section 4(1) of the said Act are under challenge. The subject matter concerning the said proceeding initiated by the Special Officer, Mahishadal is one - third of a strip of land measuring '02 decimal appertaining to plot No. 185 of Khatian No. 493/2 of mouza Garh Kamalpur, within police station Mahishadal, in the district of Midnapore. The petitioner's case in short is that the land originally belonged to one Parimal Bhowmick and the said Parimal Bhowrcick owned two decimals of land comprising of a shop room and adjoining lands measuring '02 decimals and the petitioner was n tenant under the said Shri Parimal Bhowmick in the Mahishadal bazar area and he had been carrying on his business of a carpenter in the said shop room. The petitioner contends that the opposite party No. 4 Shri Radha Kanta Bhowmick purchased the said two decimal land from the said Parimal Bhowmick in September 1968 at a consideration of Rs. 8,000/- . The petitioner further contends that admittedly the land is situate at Rathgora Bazar at Mahishadal. The petitioner further contends that in the said deed of purchase of Radha Kanta Bhowmick from Shri Parimal Bhowmick, the said lands were described as shop - room and the adjoining land. After the purchase of the said land the said Radha Kanta Bhowmick served a notice of ejectment under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the petitioner requiring the petitioner to vacate and deliver possession of the said shop room and the adjoining lands and sueh notice has been made annexure B' to the writ application. In the said notice, the petitioner was described as a temporary tenant at a rental of Rs. 3/- per month and in the said notice it was also stated that in the event of not vacating the said premises, damage at the rate of Rs. 2/- per dial would be claimed. After the service of the said notice of ejectment, the petitioner offered to purchase a part of the said land where his shop was situated and it appears that on 19th December, 1969, one - third of the said 2 decimals of land was purchased by the petitioner for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/- and according to petitioner, he vacated the remaining two thirds of the said 2 decimals of land in favour of the said Radha Kanta Bhowmick. The petitioner contends that in view of the fact that the said land was only a shop room with the adjoining land cannot be conceived by any stretch of imagination as agricultural land and/or 'land' within the meaning of the Restoration of Alienated Land Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and accordingly, the Special Officer had no jurisdiction what soever to entertain the said application made by the opposite party No. 4 under the said Act and/or to initiate any proceeding under the said Act and/or to issue the said notice to the petitioner requiring him to appear for adjudication of the application made by the opposite party No. 4.
(2.) Mr. Sainanta the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that the said application was made before the Junior Land Reforms Officer but at the relevant time the J.L.R.O. had no jurisdiction to entertain the said application under section 4(1) of the Act and as such the filing of the said application and initiation of the said proceeding by the J.L.R.O. on the relevant date was completely beyond jurisdiction and on that score alone the proceeding should be quashed by this Court and the petitioner should not be dragged unnecessarily in the said proceeding. In this connection, Mr. Samanta contended that under Section 2(4) of the Act, Special Officer must be not below the rank oF Sub-Deputy Collector to be appointed by the State Government as Special Officer. Mr. Samanta also referred to section 5 of the Act and submitted that although the application is to be heard by the Special Officer but such Special Officer should hear the parties as far as possible in the office of the local J.L.R.O. It was, however, pointed out by Mr. Shyama Prasanna Roy Choudhury learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party No. 4. that under the West Bengal Amendment Act 1 of 1975 some of the provisions of the Act were changed and sub-Section (4) of Section 2 was amended to the effect that any Gazetted Officer appointed by the Commissioner of the Division will act as Special Officer. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also produced a copy of Memo No. 2746 RG, dated 24th of September, 1976 issued by the Commissioner, Burdwan Division. It will appear from the said memo that all Sub - Divisional Land Reforms Officers, Junior Land Reforms Officers and Special Revenue Officers, Grade - II, and Settlement Kanungos had been appointed as Special Officers by designation and not by name. Accordingly, Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that the J.L.R.O., after the said memo and issue of notification by the Commissioner, Burdwan Division, was competent to act as a Special Officer. Mr. Samanta however, contended that such notification was issued only on the 2nd of July, 1976 and as such on the relevant date when the said application was made before the J.L.R.O., such application must be held to be a void application ab initio. Since this contention goes at the root of maintainability of the proceeding on the ground of want of jurisdiction by the officer concerned, it is necessary to examine the contentions made by the respective Counsel in this regard. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 4, however, drew the attention of this Court to the application under section 4(1) of the Act made by the opposite party No. 4 and contended that such application was made before the Special Officer although it was filed in the office of the Junior Land Reforms Officer. Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that mere filing of the said application in the office of the J.L.R.O., will not vitiate the said application when specifically the application was addressed to Special Officer under the said Act. It may be noted, in this connection that under Rule 5 of the Act the Special Officer was required to hear the parties as far as possible in the Office of the local J.L.R.O. Accordingly, in my view when the said application was addressed to the Special Officer but was filed in the office of the J.L.R.O., it cannot be contended that the application was not made before the proper authorities. Admittedly, when the impugned notice was issued to the petitioner, the J.L.R.O., became Special Officer by virtue of the aforesaid notification issued by the Commissioner, Burdwan Division, and in the special facts of the case it does not appear to me that the J.L.R.O., Mahishadal, who acted as Special Officer in the case, had no jurisdiction to proceed with the said application made by the opposite party No. 4. Therefore, the preliminary contention of Mr. Samanta for quashing the proceeding on the ground of want of Jurisdiction of the Officer concerned for initiating the proceeding in question must fail.
(3.) Mr. Samanta the learned counsel, however, contended that under section 2(2) of the Act 'land' has been defined to the following effect:- "Land means agricultural land and includes homestead, tank, well and water channel". Mr. Samanta contended that unless the property in question does come within the definition of 'land' as given in the Act, no application can be entertained by the Special Officer and initiation of any proceeding under the Act in respect of any property which is not land within the meaning of the Act must be held to be illegal, void and without jurisdiction. Mr. Samanta contended that it will appear in the said sale deed between Parimal Bhowmick and the opposite party No. 4 Radha Kanta Bhowmick that the property in question was shop including the structure and it was described as land with structure as would appear from the schedule of the property that the said shop room was situated in the bazar area and it was precisely for the said reason, the price for only two decimals of land adjoining the shop room was Rs. 8 000/-, as mentioned in the said ejectment notice also, the said Radha Kanta also treated the land in question as a shop room with adjoining land and as a matter of fact, the present petitioner after the service of the said notice of ejectment purchased only one - third of the said 2 decimals of land where the shop room is situated for a consideration of Rs. 3.000/- , and such high price cannot be the value, by any stratch of imagination, for agricultural land in the State of West Bengal. Mr. Samanta contended that the definition of land, as given in the Act, is not applicable to the property purchased by the petitioner. Mr. Samanta contended that there is no ambiguity in the definition of land under section 2(2) of the Act and accordingly, the plain meaning of the said definition should be accepted by the Catsuit. Mr. Samanta contended that where there is no ambiguity and definition is quite precise, the ordinary principle of interpretation of a statute is that plain dictionary meaning of expression would be accepted. For this contention Mr. Samanta referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of B.N. Mutio v. Dr. T.K. Nandy, reported in AIR (1979) SC page 460 . Mr. Samanta also referred to the meaning of 'homestead' as given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edition). It appears from the said dictionary, that the expression 'homestead' is a composite word. Two words 'home' and 'stead' constitute the said composite expression 'homestead'. 'Stead' means the place of one's horns or dwelling and it appears from the meaning given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary that 'homestead' really means a house with its adjoining buildings and places. Mr. Samar.ta also referred to Webster's Dictionary for the meaning of the expression 'homestead'. It will appear from the said dictionary that the homestead' means home and land of the family, specially ancestral home and the homestead including the land and the buildings. Such land is a home of the owner and his family. Reference was also made to the Chambers Dictionary and it will appear from the said dictionary that homestead means the place of mansion - house or the enclosure immediately connected with it. In this connection, Mr. Roy Chowdhury also referred to the meaning of homestead which appears in A.G. Ayer's Manual of Land and Legal Terms and Phrases, 4th Edition. The homestead has been defined to the effect that word conveys the idea of mansion of a more homely kind or of a farm stead with their contiguous cartilage and when used in connection with a Hindu residence in a village it includes the site of the building, the dwelling house, the trees, wells and shrine etc. which together constitute the surroundings of the ordinary Hindu village home. Reference was made to a decision by the Bombay High Court reported in ILR 21 Bombay 597 wherein the aforesaid definition of 'homestead' was accepted. It also appears that the word 'homestead' under Bengal Tenancy Act, was defined to the effect that 'homestead' is used in the sense of the residence or habitation of the co-sharer tenant. Mr. Samanta contended that it will thus appear that homestead has always been understood in the sense that it constitutes the dwelling place and adjoining place and other necessary place for the convenient user for the purpose of dwelling. Mr. Samanta contended that interpreting the provisions of Statute, the Court has to give effect to the words actually used and it is not permissible to alter the cohesive underlying thought process of the Legislature by rendering the positive sense what has been set out in negative terms The Court will try to discover the real intent by keeping the dictum of the Statute intact. For this contention. Mr. Samanta referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Udayan Chenubhai v. R.C. Bali, reported in AIR 1977 SC page 2319 . Mr. Samanta also contended that the popular meaning must be accepted by the court to be the real meaning and 'homestead' is understood in the popular sense as a place of dwelling and the adjoining lands and buildings for the convenient user of the said dwelling place. Accordingly, Mr. Samanta contended that the shoproom in question situated in the bazar area where the said applicant namely, respondent No. 4 admittedly did not and could not reside until and unless the present petitioner surrendered two - third portion in favour of the said applicant and purchased one - third portion of the said two decimal land, cannot be treated as homestead or 'land' Within the meaning of the Act and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the initiation of the proceeding under the Act is completely without jurisdiction and as such should be quashed by this court. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, however, contended on behalf of the opposite party No. 4 that the definition of land given in the Act is only an inclusive definition and for the purpose of understanding real meaning, dictionary meaning should not be adhered to. In such circumstance, the object and purpose of the Act are also to be looked into and if necessary reference should also be made to tenancy laws for understanding the real meaning of 'homestead' used in section 2(2) of the Act. Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that it is also an accepted principle of interpretation of Statutes that definition in contemporary legislation having connection with the Act is also to be looked into for the purpose of understanding what was really meant by the Legislature. Mr. Roy Chowdhury in this connection submitted that the Act was really passed for giving protection to the raiyats who had to transfer lands under certain forced circumstances. Accordingly the definition of homestead' in the tenancy Acts of the State of West Bengal should be looked into for the purpose of appreciating the real meaning of the expression 'homestead'. Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that 'homestead' had not been defined in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 1955 but it has been provided that the 'homestead' under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act shall have the same meaning as in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. It will appear in section 2 (g) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 that 'homestead' means a dwelling house together with any courtyard, compound garden, outhouse, place of worship, family graveyard, library, office, guest house, tanks, wells, privies, latrines, drains and boundary walls annexed to or appertaining to such dwelling house. Accordingly, Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that homestead used in the Act will have the same meaning as homestead used in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act.;