- (1.) This is an application by British Paints (India) Limited challenging the various orders passed by the 5th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. The petitioner is a Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act. One Vinod Kumar Kohli, the second respondent, was employed by the Company first as an Assistant Personnel Manager on probation with effect from Lt of September, 1968 on certain terms and conditions contained in a writing dated 5th of Aug., 1968. He was confirmed in that appointment with effect from 1st March, 1969 on the same terms and conditions, over and above on certain additional terms as contained in the letter dated 12th of March, 1969. He was appointed in the category of a Manager and his appointment could be terminated upon sixty days' notice by either party or pay in lieu thereof. As Assistant Personnel Manager, he was responsible to the Personnel Manager and carried out exclusively administrative and/or managerial functions. He supervised the work of the Personnel Department. He was directly under the Managing Director and in that respect he was second in line in the hierarchy of the administration of the petitioner company. Various functions that were discharged by the petitioner have been set out in various annexures annexed to the petition to indicate that the service he rendered to the company was of managerial nature and he was far from a worker or a supervisory staff. In fact he was on the side of the management and represented the management in matters relating to industrial disputes and he had put his signature on behalf of the management in such disputes and on such negotiations. He had the power to appoint staff, to issue letters of enquiry, to conduct enquiries to authorise overtime payments, to sanction leave travel expenditure to employees and to sanction medical expenses; and even dismiss employees. He was responsible for salary and wage administration; to institute training programmes, follow up such programmes etc. At the time of termination of his service he enjoyed a salary of Rs. 2452.50/- and other perquisites, like, furnished accommodation in Russell Street, the use of a motor car, a business promotion allowance, medical benefits and leave travel benefits.
(2.) The petitioner terminated the employment of Mr. Kohli by a letter dated 24th of March, 1975 upon payment of 90 days salary in lieu of notice. Although the petitioner was not a workman and could never come within the definition of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, yet the second respondent made a reference of industrial dispute tor adjudication and a issue was raised in the manner following: "Whether the termination of services of Shri V. K. Kohli is justified To what relief, if any, is he entitled to - The said reference was made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Section 2A. A written statement was filed and in the said written statement the petitioner contended that the second respondent was not a workman; as such the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain such reference and make any award in respect thereof. Thereafter both the parties filed certain documents on which they relied without there being any order as to discovery. At the time of hearing of the said reference on 24th of June, 1977 both the parties were directed to come prepared to give evidence. The principal question to be determined was the preliminary question i. e. whether the respondent was a workman on which the jurisdiction of the first respondent could be invoked. On the same day three applications were moved on behalf of the second respondent in respect of disclosure of further documents. The petitioner realised that all these applications were harassing and vexatious in nature and were taken out with the intent to confuse and/or mislead the tribunal and/or to delay the hearing of the said reference so that if the said reference continued for a long time the second respondent, Mr. Kohli, would not have to vacate his flat at Russell Street which lie had been enjoying and in possession in spite of the service of the said notice of termination. On 24th of June, 1977 the second respondent made an application for production of certain documents which, according to the petitioner, are wholly irrelevant and unnecessary. The petitioner contended that unless and until the preliminary point was decided, the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain such reference and it should not pass any order compelling the Company to disclose further documents. Thereafter on 12th of January, 1978 the second respondent again applied for discovery and the Company filed its objection stating that it is agreeable to discover documents on oath within a reasonable time in terms of the provisions of Order 11, Rules 12 and 14 of the Civil Procedure Code and also prayed for a cross order for discovery upon the second respondent. On 18th of April, 1978 the second respondent made another application for an order strikiug out the petitioner's defence on the ground of noncompliance with the order for discovery. The petitioner's case is that it has fully complied with all orders for discovery. The said application was heard on 7th of November, 1978. By an order No. 48 dated 29th of. November, 1978 the first respondent held that the petitioner was bound to discover all documents of which production had been sought by the second respondent's application on 24th of June, 1977. The petitioner's case is that none of the documents asked for is relevant save and except the documents which have been disclosed by the petitioner; as such the petitioner was not bound to discover the further documents.
(3.) According to the petitioner, in passing those orders the Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction and/or in excess of the jurisdiction and those orders are contrary to law and in violation of the provisions of law as it was the bounden duty of the tribunal to decide first whether the reference amounted to an industrial dispute in view of the fact that the second xespondent was not a workman as defined under Section 2 (5) of Industrial Disputes Act. Hence instead of deciding the said point the Tribunal went on entertaining frivolous applications for discovery of documents which have no relevance whatsoever in connection with the determination of the issue before the tribunal. Hence the present application has been taken out for quashing the said orders including the reference.;