D.Basu, J. - (1.) This appeal is against the order of B. C. Mitra, J. passed on March 6, 1969 in Matter No. 344 of 1968, on an application made by the Assistant Collector of Customs, the respondent in the parties under Art 226 of the Constitution. That petition had been brought by the appellant against the respondents Customs authorities and the Union of India, challenging the validity of the order of authorisation dated May 11, 1968 (vide page 79 of the paper book), under which the Preventive Officer of the Customs Department, respondent No. 2, was authorised under Section 105 of the Customs Act to enter into the premises of the appellant and to search for and seize and take possession of their goods and documents and things, pursuing the belief of the Customs authorities that goods liable to confiscation under the said Act were secreted in the premises of the appellant. Certain documents. Inter alia, were seized from the custody of the appellant in pursuance of this order and the petitioner challenged the order of authorisation as well as the seizure made thereunder on various grounds. While Issuing the Rule on this petition an interim order of injunction was issued by the Court on 16-5-1968 directing the seized documents to be kept in the sealed box, and restraining respondents, that is, the Customs authorities, "not to examine or look into the books seized until further orders of this Court". Thereafter there was an application for vacation of the said order by respondents and simultaneously an application for the extension of the period of interim injunction which was originally limited to six weeks, was made by the appellant.
(2.) These applications were disposed of by the order of the Court on 8-8-1968 (page 8 of the paper book) by which the original interim order was modified to the extent that the respondents, that is, the Customs authorities, would be at liberty to break open the seals for purposes of examining the documents in the presence of the petitioner but that the respondents "shall not take any further steps in pursuance thereof." In short, though by the interim order, as originally issued, the respondents had no right of inspection of the documents, they were given that right for their own inspection by the first order of variation of the interim injunction dated 8-8-1968. The matter, however, did not end there since another party, namely, the Directorate of Enforcement, was anxious to have inspection of the seized documents for purposes of their own under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. They, therefore, mentioned the matter to this Court before B. C. Mitra, J. asking for inspection on 13th December, 1968 and the Court upon hearing the Counsel concerned ordered that instead of mentioning the matter orally, an application should be filed by the proper party (vide paragraph 10, p. 9 of the paper book). In pursuance of that direction of the Court, a formal application to this effect was filed by the Customs authorities, together with the Union of India (respondents 1 and 2), which is at pages 5 to 9 of the Paper Book. In this application the prayer of the Customs authorities was that while they themselves had already the right to inspect the seized documents, they should now be permitted to allow the Enforcement Directorate to inspect the documents and for this, the permission of the Court was sought It is that application which has been disposed of by the Court by the impugned order at page 51 of the paper book. In this order the Court said that the Enforcement Directorate had statutory powers under Sections 19-E and 19-F of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 to compel the appellant or even the Customs Department to produce the disputed documents but that the Court could not allow them to exercise that power while the documents were in the custody of the Court in the pending proceedings, at the end of which the appellant had a right to get back the documents. The substance of this observation seems to be that it was in exercise of the powers of the Customs authorities under the Customs Act that the disputed documents had been seized and that after the disposal of the petition under Article 226 arising out of that seizure, if that terminated in favour of the petitioner, he was entitled to get a return of the seized documents. Nevertheless, the Court held that unless the Enforcement Directorate was allowed an inspection of the documents the object of the statutory powers of the Enforcement Directorate would be defeated simply because the documents were in the custody of the Court in a proceeding initiated by the Rule Nisi on the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In other words, it was because of the pending proceedings before the Court that the Enforcement Directorate was not in a position to exercise their statutory powers and that was a reason why the Court should allow them to inspect the documents which had been seized by the Customs authorities. To reproduce the relevant observations of the Court below on this point- "But at the same time if the Enforcement Directorate has a right to call for production of documents under Section 19-E of the said Act and also a power to summon any person to give evidence and produce documents under Section 19-F of the said Act, the ends of justice demand that they should not be denied the right to look into the documents because a Rule Nisi has been issued by this Court and interim orders have been made with regard to the documents."
(3.) We are to determine the validity of this reasoning in the present appeal but before we go into the merits, a preliminary objection raised by Mr. Kar on behalf of the respondents has to be cross- ed, namely, as to the maintainability of this appeal from the impugned order. It was argued by Mr. Kar that the impugned order was nothing but an order of inspection of documents which was not a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent under which the appeal comes from the decision of a single Judge to this Division Bench, Mr. Kar relied upon certain decisions showing that interlocutory orders like an order of amendment, or service of a notice. or an order for inspection of documents in a suit., did not constitute a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. The word 'judgment' has, however, been interpreted by the Supreme Court in another context in a number of decisions because that word occurs in Articles 132, 133 and the like. It has been explained in those cases that a decision in order to be a judgment must finally determine the rights of the parties in the proceeding. But all proceedings are not of the same nature. In a suit, inspection of documents Is only an interlocutory step like similar other steps, such as interrogatories, discovery and the like, which are preliminary steps for deciding the cause in the suit which may not be identical with the right of inspection. A suit may be one for declaration of title or other reliefs such as partition, accounts and the like. Those reliefs are independent of the inspection of documents and that is why there cannot be a 'judgment' from which appeal would lie when the Court either grants or refuses inspection of documents in a suit.;