- (1.) THIS is a Rule against 22 persons calling upon them to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt of Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. The charge against them, as far as it can be gathered from the petition, filed in this Court, is that on the 14th of November, 1958, they forcibly entered upon the land in dispute in violation of an order of perpetual injunction restraining them from entering upon the land, in an ex parte decree passed by the 9th Subordinate judge, 24-Parganas, in Title Suit No 93 of 1957. That suit was instituted by the petitioner for khas possession in respect of the lands described in Schedule C of the plaint and for an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from entering upon the land described in Schedule B of the plaint. The operative portion of the decree is as follows: "plaintiff's title to the suit land is declared and the plaintiff do get khas possession of C schedule land by ejecting defendants therefrom. The defendants be restrained permanently from interfering with the plaintiff's cultivation and possession in B Schedule land. Defendants are given 30 days' time from date to remove structures standing on the suit land. In default the plaintiff will get khas possession or dismantle the same in execution of their decree. "
(2.) ON the 29th April, 1958 the defendants filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in that proceeding they filed an application "to stay execution of the decree pending the hearing of the application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. " Upon this application the court made two orders. By the first order dated the 7th of May, 1958, the court directed that stay would be granted only on the applicants' depositing the entire cost by 21-5-58. In default, the petition would stand rejected. On the 21st of May 1958, the Court passed the final order of stay and as there is some dispute between the parties with regard to the construction of this final order of stay I set out the whole of it. It is as follows: "order No. 43 dated 21-5-58. Applicant deposits Rs. 947. 19 np. as claim and cost as per Challan No. 2329 (V) dated 22-5-58. Execution of the decree is stayed till the disposal of the Misc. Case. "
(3.) THEREAFTER, according to the petitioner, all the opposite parties forcibly entered upon the disputed land with a view to harvesting the paddy which had been grown by the petitioner but the petitioner succeeded in resisting the opposite parties. It is further stated by the petitioner that between the early part of November 1958, and the 21st of December, 1959, the petitioner harvested the paddy crops grown on the B Schedule land from about 3/4ths of its area and that the paddy-crop grown on the remaining l/4th area still remained to be harvested when a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started against it. These statements made by the petitioner are challenged by the opposite parties who aver in their affidavit-in-opposition that they grew the last crop at their cost on their respective plots and that the allegations of force and violence were all false. In paragraph 26 of the petition the petitioner states that the paddy crops which were sought to be harvested by the Opposite Parties were grown on the land in B schedule of the plaint. This statement, however, is not specifically denied by the Opposite Parties who merely say in paragraph 16 of their affidavit-in-opposition that "they grew the last crop on their respective plots. " These "respective plots" can, therefore, be reasonably inferred to be the plots described in Schedule 'b' of the plaint as alleged by the petitioner. Reading paragraph 26 of the petition upon which this Rule was issued and paragraph 16 of the affidavit-in-opposition where the statement in paragraph 26 is sought to be denied, the conclusion seems to be reasonable that the apposite parties admit that they went upon the land of Schedule B with a view to harvesting the paddy which according to them was grown upon the land by them. Mr. Ghose appearing far the opposite parties also does not contend before us that the opposite parties did not enter upon the land of schedule B. This act of the opposite parties, in our opinion, constitutes a violation of the order of perpetual in junction incorporated in the ex parte decree dated the 8th of April, 1958. Mr. Ghose appearing for the opposite parties however raised certain points for our consideration.;