J.P.MITTER, J. - (1.) THIS Rule is directed against an Order of commitment upon charges under Ss. 420 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner, who is in a large way of business, is alleged to have set fire to his godown said to contain a huge quantity of milk powder and to have realised from the insurance company, with which the goods had been insured, a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs by falsely representing the fire to have been accidental.
(2.) THE commitment is sought to be quashed on two grounds, namely, (a) there was a breach of the procedure laid down in Section 207A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and (b) there was no prima facie case.
(3.) THE learned Advocate -General for the State has contended that the opinion of the Magistrate that the accused should be committed for trial is not justiciable. He has contended further that Section 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure not having been amended to include a commitment under Section 207A, this Court has no jurisdiction to quash a commitment, which can only be done on a point of law. In support of the first point, Mr. Advocate -General has invited me to contrast the language of Sub -section (6) of Section 207A with that of Sub -section (1) of Section 209, as also the language of Sub -section (7) of Section 207A with that of Sub -section (1) of Section 210. In my view, the difference in the language concerned cannot affect the scheme of the section which, taken as a whole, requires a prima facie case for commitment. Mr. Advocate -General has conceded that the absence of a prima facie case is a ground for quashing a commitment. In my view, to say that the opinion of a Magistrate that an accused should be committed is not justiciable is to make nonsense of the several provisions of the Section, regarded individually or collectively. Sub -section (6) of Section 207A empowers a Magistrate to discharge an accused, if the evidence and documents referred to in the preceding sub -sections disclose no grounds for commitment The sub -section further requires the Magistrate to record his reasons for such discharge. True, Sub -section (7) does not say that the Magistrate must record his reasons for committing an accused, but Sub -section (10) expressly requires the Magistrate to record briefly the reasons for such commitment. Section 207A, as a whole, ensures that there is no capricious discharge or commitment. The facts of the case of Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. 1885 -10 AC 282 were different. There the action of the Governor was made dependent upon the opinion of the Collector and naturally the Governor's action could not be questioned by showing that the opinion of the Collector was erroneous. Sections 435 and 439 give this Court ample powers to interfere with any order of discharge or of commitment under Section 207A. In my view, Section 215 remained untouched through oversight. In any case, Section 215 cannot affect the re -visional powers of this Court under Ss. 435 and 439. In my view, the true purport of Section 207A of the Criminal Procedure Code was succinctly put in the case of Panchanan Bailav v. The State, : AIR1959Cal207 .;