SAMBUDDHA CHAKRABARTI,J. - (1.) The case of the petitioner is that while working in the Eastern Coalfields Limited, i.e., the respondent no. 1, he got involved in a criminal case and has been facing trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Asansol. While the petitioner was in judicial custody, he was placed under suspension with 50% wages. He makes a grievance that the order of suspension was passed pursuant to the order, dated January 22, 2015, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Asansol and the order of the competent authority, as mentioned in the order of suspension, did not speak anything about his suspension from the service. He is being paid subsistence allowance at the rate of 50% of the wages though the rule provides for enhancement of subsistence allowance upto 75% of the wages after three months from the date of suspension. The petitioner made an application for revocation of suspension and enhancement of subsistence allowance which have not been acceded to. The petitioner further alleges that uptil now no charge-sheet or departmental proceeding has been initiated against him and he continues to be paid 50% subsistence allowance without any enhancement.
(2.) The petitioner has, therefore, inter alia prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to set aside and quash the order of suspension and to pay enhanced subsistence allowance as per law which the petitioner is entitled to and for other reliefs. The General Manager (P and IR), Eastern Coalfields Limited, i.e., the respondent no. 3, has affirmed an affidavit-in-opposition. It has been specifically mentioned in the affidavit that the service conditions of the respondent no. 1 company are governed by the certified Standing Orders. Clause 28.9 of the said Standing Orders reserves the right of the management to suspend a workman being prosecuted in a court of law for any grave criminal offence involving moral turpitude or murder until disposal of the trial. In such cases, the workman concerned shall be entitled to 50% of the wages as subsistence allowance. In case, the workman is finally acquitted, he would be paid full wages for the period of suspension. The petitioner was arrested on August 13, 2014 and was in custody till January 27, 2015. He has been charged under Sections 326/307/302/120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 25 (1B)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act. Thus, he was charged with grave criminal offence involving murder, grievous hurt and criminal conspiracy. The disciplinary authority invoked clause 28.9 of the certified Standing Orders and placed him under suspension with 50% of wages till his conviction or acquittal.
(3.) The respondent no. 3 has specifically mentioned that the petitioner had not committed any misconduct in connection with the business of the company, but as a Government company the provision of the certified Standing Orders has to be followed in the present case. Mr. Kumar, the learned Advocate for the respondents, further relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (Civil Appeal No. 9454 of 2013). There the Supreme Court after considering several cases held that long period of suspension does not make the order of suspension invalid. It was further observed that mere delay in conclusion of enquiry or trial cannot be a ground for quashing the suspension order if the charges are grave in nature. But whether an employee should or should not continue in his office during the period of enquiry is a matter to be assessed by the disciplinary authority concerned and ordinarily the court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employee with the misconduct in question. The principal thrust of the petitioner's case is that even if suspension is not an order of punishment in the instant case the conduct of the respondents shows mala fide act by placing him under suspension for a prolonged period without initiating any departmental proceeding rendering the suspension bad in law. In this connection, Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhury Vs. Union of India, through its Secretary and Another, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render suspension punitive in nature. Departmental proceedings invariably commence with the delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the memorandum of charges, and eventually continue after even longer delay. The Supreme Court further observed in that case that protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanor, indiscretion or offence. ;