- (1.) The Court : An initial objection as to the receipt of the appeal was taken, not by the respondent-plaintiff but by the Court. Since the appeal appears to arise out of a matter covered by the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, the appellants were required to demonstrate how the appeal would be maintainable. The suit is fashioned as one under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. There are specific averments at paragraphs 3 and 21 of the plaint to such effect and the primary relief is couched in the classical manner seeking a decree for recovery of possession without even seeking a mandatory injunction for return of possession. Section 6 of the Act of 1963 does not permit any appeal being carried from any order or decree passed in proceedings instituted under such provision. However, Section 6 of the Act could not have impinged on the authority conferred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to carry an appeal since such provision does not expressly rule out the operation of the Letters Patent or the appellate provision therein. However, if the suit was to be regarded as a suit under the said Act of 2015, implying that a commercial dispute was involved therein, the overriding effect of the Act of 2015 would have kept the operation of Clause 15 out of the purview.
(2.) It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that Section 2(1)(c) of the Act of 2015 defines "commercial dispute" and sub-clause (vii) thereof covers "agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce". It is contended on behalf of the appellants that since a suit under Section 6 of the Act of 1963 need not be pegged to any agreement or need not be concerned with any contract, ordinarily, a suit of such kind may not be regarded as a commercial dispute within the meaning of the relevant provision in the Act of 2015. To boot, paragraph 3 of the plaint is placed where some previous agreements between the parties are referred to but it is expressly pleaded that the agreements are not the basis for the suit. Elsewhere, as noticed above, paragraph 21 of the plaint claims the suit to be exclusively under Section 6 of the Act of 1963. The submission on behalf of the appellants on the point of appellability is unexceptionable since the dispute in the lis does not pertain to any agreement as such. Accordingly, the appeal is received and taken up for assessment on merits since Clause 15 of the Letters Patent permits the appeal notwithstanding the prohibition under Section 6 of the Act of 1963.
(3.) The appellants submit that the appellants were really put into possession of the suit premises by the respondent and, as such, no case of the appellants being dispossessed from the suit premises could have been made out. The appellants refer to the order impugned and the directions contained therein to say that a substantial part of the order and the directions thereunder are beyond the purview of Section 6 of the Act of 1963. Several letters have been referred to in the order impugned, including letters of August 4, 2017, August 9, 2017, August 14, 2017, September 1, 2017 and September 4, 2017. Without going deeper into the contents of each of the letters, it may be noticed that it is the contention of the appellants that it would be evident from such correspondence exchanged between the parties that possession of the suit premises had been made over by the respondent to the appellants and, as such, there was no question of the respondent having been dispossessed from the suit premises otherwise than in due process of law. ;