DIPANKAR DATTA,J. - (1.) FMA 1084 of 2008 (earlier MAT 878 of 2001) is an intra-court writ appeal, presented on March 16, 2001. It is directed against a judgment and order of dismissal of the appellant's writ petition [W.P. 514(W) of 2001). C.A.N. 8249 of 2010 and C.A.N. 7189 of 2015 are interlocutory applications filed in such appeal by the appellant. These two applications were listed for consideration before us prior to the summer vacation. Having regard to the age of the appeal, we had directed it to be posted for hearing immediately after reopening. The parties to the appeal have been heard on the merits of the appeal. We now venture to decide it finally, together with the interlocutory applications.
(2.) The pleaded case of the appellant is this. At the material time, when the appellant was an employee of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (hereafter the Corporation), the Corporation had proceeded against him departmentally. A notice dated March 30, 1988 was issued whereby the Corporation sought for an explanation from him as to why he had contracted a second marriage with Smt. Pratima Nayak (hereafter Pratima) on April 22, 1987 during the subsistence of his first marriage with Smt. Jayanti Rani Maity (Bal) (hereafter Jayanti), without obtaining the permission of the Corporation and even without intimating it about such marriage. According to the Corporation, such an act of the appellant was a misconduct within the meaning of paragraph 19(41) of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to employees of the Corporation (hereafter the standing orders). The reply of the appellant to such notice is not on record; however, it is evident that he had challenged such notice in a writ petition [C.O. 7069 (W) of 1988] before this Court. A learned Judge by an order dated December 19, 1988 disposed of the writ petition with a direction upon the respondents to consider the grievance of the appellant as raised therein, upon affording an opportunity of hearing and by passing a reasoned order. The respondents were specifically directed to take into account that the marriage between the appellant and Jayanti came within the prohibited degree in terms of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. While granting the appellant liberty to make an effective and detailed representation in support of the contentions raised by him in the writ petition, the respondents were restrained from giving effect to any final order of punishment for a week from date of service of such order upon the appellant. He thereafter faced an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed by the Corporation for such purpose. A report dated July 20, 1990 was submitted by the enquiry officer. He held the appellant guilty of the charge of misconduct levelled against him. Considering the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority of the appellant dismissed him from service by an order dated November 7, 1990. The enquiry report was forwarded to him along with the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal dated November 7, 1990 was challenged by the appellant by presenting a fresh writ petition [C.O. 14976 (W) of 1990]. Such writ petition was dismissed by another learned Judge by a judgment and order dated January 25, 1991. Such judgment and order was carried in an intra-court appeal by the appellant (FMA 464 of 1992). By a judgment and order dated January 10, 1997, a coordinate bench dismissed the appeal. The lis between the parties, however, took a different turn in the wake of an event in which the Corporation had no role to play. Jayanti had lodged a criminal complaint against the appellant, accusing him of bigamy. The appellant stood trial before the Sub-divisional Magistrate. By an order dated March 16, 1993, the magistrate acquitted the appellant bearing in mind the evidence of Jayanti that the appellant was the son of her father's sister (pishima). The marriage, it appeared to the magistrate, to be within the degree of prohibited relationship; hence, he held the marriage to be void ab initio. In the opinion of the magistrate, a valid marriage was a pre-condition to drive home the charge under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code which was wanting in the case before him. The submission on behalf of Jayanti in course of arguments that in pursuance of a local custom permitting marriage between cousins that her marriage was solemnised with the appellant, was not accepted on the ground that Jayanti in her evidence had not so deposed. Resting on such order of acquittal recorded in his favour, the appellant had approached the corporation with a representation dated October 9, 1998 to revoke the order of dismissal. Such representation not having been considered, the appellant initiated the third round of writ litigation [W.P. 16764(W) of 1999] before this Court. By an order dated March 18, 2000, a learned Judge of this Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction upon the relevant respondent authority to consider the said representation in accordance with law and to pass a speaking order, in the event the prayer of the appellant were refused. The learned Judge observed that the punishment of dismissal having been upheld by this Court in an appeal, it was not open for His Lordship to interfere with such dismissal but in the changed circumstances, the appellant's representation could be considered. Having regard to the contents of the first paragraph of the order, it is clear that by 'changed circumstances' was meant the order of acquittal that had seen the light of the day subsequent to the appellant's dismissal from service. In compliance with the order dated May 9, 2000, the corporation extended an opportunity of hearing to the appellant on May 17, 2000. The representation stood rejected for the reasons recorded in an order dated June 10, 2000. One of the points based on which the appellant's representation was rejected appears to be that there was no change in the material circumstances of the case, since the order of dismissal was approved by the Division Bench by its order dated January 1997. The appellant was acquitted of the charge of bigamy by the order dated March 16, 1993, i.e., at a point of time when this Court was in seisin of the intra-court appeal (FMA 464 of 1992); therefore, acquittal by the criminal court on March 16, 1993 was not a development subsequent to the order dated January 10, 1997. The said order also referred to an application dated May 13, 1997 filed by the appellant seeking review of the judgment and order dated January 10, 1997 and its dismissal by an order dated August 6, 1998. The review was sought for, inter alia, on the ground that the criminal court had acquitted the appellant of the charge of bigamy. The authority concerned was of the view that no new point had been raised based on any development subsequent to the order passed by the Division Bench warranting revocation of the order of dismissal. Challenging the order of rejection of the representation dated June 10, 2000 as well as the order of dismissal dated November 20, 1990, the appellant initiated another round of litigation by presenting the writ petition, out of which this appeal has arisen. It was dismissed by a learned judge of this Court by a judgment and order dated January 17, 2001, the legality and or correctness whereof is the subject matter of challenge in this intracourt writ appeal.
(3.) Till the appeal was finally heard by us on June 11, 2019, more than 18 years have passed since it was preferred. During its pendency and as noticed above, the appellant filed two interlocutory applications. In CAN 8249 of 2010 dated September 8, 2010, a prayer was made for analogous hearing of this intra-court writ appeal together with FMA 130 of 2008 and MAT 3171 of 2002. In such application, the appellant referred to presentation of another writ petition before this Court [WP 19373 (W) of 2006] and its dismissal being carried in a further appeal. In CAN 7985 of 2015, a prayer was made for permission to the appellant to rely on additional evidence.;