DIPANKAR DATTA,J. - (1.) The respondents in W.P. 8694(W) of 2015 ( Namita Barui vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors .) are the appellants before us. They have carried in appeal an order dated May 02, 2016 passed by a learned Judge of this Court whereby such writ petition was disposed of by directing the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Panchayats and Rural Development to immediately appoint the writ petitioner in a suitable post irrespective of any waiting list, as per the recommendation of the Commissioner, Panchayats and Rural Development, West Bengal dated December 11, 2012 within three months of communication of the order. The reason assigned by the learned Judge for making such a direction is evident from the second paragraph of the order, which we quote below: "I have ordered appointment and not consideration because this recommendation was made in 2012. The Joint Secretary had enough time to reject the application which he has not done so. I have also ordered appointment irrespective of any waiting list because when this recommendation is pending for about four years, there is no question of waiting further." Although appointment was directed to be given to the writ petitioner, the learned Judge recorded that affidavits were not being invited and that the allegations contained in the writ petition were deemed not to have been admitted.
(2.) As is usual, the appeal is barred by delay. The delay is not negligible. The appeal is delayed by almost 02 years. An application (C.A.N. 5656 of 2018) has been taken out by the appellants seeking condonation of such delay. The writ petitioner has contested the application by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. It is her claim that no case has been set up for condonation of delay and, therefore, the appeal ought to be dismissed as time-barred.
(3.) We have perused the documents on record. Indeed, there is a certain lack of diligence on the part of the appellants to pursue the matter; yet, having regard to the submissions made by Mr. De, learned senior Government advocate on the merit of the appeal, which we shall refer to at a later part of this judgment and order, we consider it just and proper to condone the delay in tender of the appeal. The delay in tender of the appeal, thus, stands condoned.;