S.S. Nijjar, C.J. - (1.) We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. In our opinion, in order to appreciate the scope of the reference it would be appropriate to reproduce the exact reference as follows: There is a divergence in the views taken by two different Division Benches of this Court, on the scope and ambit of Sec. 59 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1959. The Court, therefore, deems it appropriate to refer the writ application to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench, to adjudicate the issue of whether Sec. 59 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, read with Sec. 5 and 6 of the 1971 Act confers on KPT a right of lien on, or the right to detain, seize and/or sell the goods of third parties, lying on the public premises, for realization of arrears of rent due from tenants, irrespective of whether the rent accrued in respect of those goods and irrespective of whether the owner of those goods had any privity of contract with KPT.
(2.) The facts involved in the matter need not be elaborately noticed as the reference raises only pure legal issues with regard to interpretation of Sec. 59 of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (herein after referred to as MPTA) read with Ss. 5 and 6 of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as PPA). The Petitioner Nos. 1 to 17 are liners and steamer agents of liners, engaged in the business of shipping, inter alia, of providing services and facilities like ocean freighting and logistical support to the exim trade. They are in business of taking the transportation of containerized cargo to and from the port of Kolkata as liners and the steamer agents of liners on the basis of bill of lading. These companies are direct and an important link to the exim trade by way of carrying laden export containers from parts of India to various overseas destinations and bringing import laden containers of several cargo beneficiaries to India. These companies had entered into agreements with Reftech Container Services Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Raftech) for storage and repair of the containers at a plot of land known as P 1 Plot of the Kolkata Port Trust (herein after referred to as KPT) at Transport Depot Road, Taratala, Calcutta. Reftech had represented to the Petitioners that it had a valid licence and permission to carry on business of storage of containers at the aforesaid plot from the KPT. The entire amount due to Reftech on account of ground rent and service charges has been paid. There are no dues outstanding against the Petitioners. The Petitioners have been using plot P 1 for the past 3 -4 years. On 8th March, 2008 when some representatives of the Petitioners had visited the plot for removing their containers, they found that the entrance gate of the plot had been locked. When Reftech was contacted it expressed its surprise and ignorance as to why the gate was locked. Subsequently, the Petitioners were informed that Reftech was carrying on business from the aforesaid plot in association with Shalimar Tar Products Ltd., (herein after referred to 'Shalimar'). On further inquiry it transpired that KPT had instituted proceedings against Shalimar, sometime ago under the PPA. An order of eviction was passed by the Estate Officer of the KPT on 9th July, 2007 directing Shalimar to vacate the plot and to pay damages for unauthorized use and occupation of the public premises. This amount which was amounting to Rs. 2,46,64,411.00/ - calculated upto 30th June, 2005 excluding interest, had accumulated to a sum of Rs. 5,98,77,564.12/ - along with accrued interest calculated upto 9th September, 2008. On 1 -2 -2008 KPT applied for execution of the eviction order. The possession of the premises in question and the containers stacked at the plot was taken by the authorized Officer on 19th February, 2008 after making inventories of materials/articles/goods lying in the plot. A notice was issued under Sec. 6 of PPA, 1971, on 24th March, 2008 to remove or cause to be removed any property belonging to the occupant failing which it would be disposed of by public auction. Reftech made representations before the Estate Officer on 8th March, 2008 for grant of permission to remove the containers lying inside the sealed plot. The Petitioners have also moved individual representations. None of the representations have been considered. The Petitioners, therefore, filed the writ petition challenging the action of the KPT on various grounds. KPT opposed the writ petition by filing an affidavit -in -opposition. The matter was heard at length by the learned Single Judge. Since the submissions made before the learned Single Judge have been reiterated before us, the same need not be adverted to at this stage. Suffice it to say that in support of his submissions Mr. Tilak Basu, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta v/s. Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. and Anr. : 1987 (28) E.L.T. 334 (Cal.) and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay and Ors. v/s. Sriyanesh Knitters : 1999 (112) E.L.T. 373 (S.C.) : AIR 1999 SC 2947. On the basis of the judgments it was submitted by Mr. Bose that lien of the Calcutta Port Trust under Sec. 59 of the MPTA, 1963 would only be for its rates and rents against the goods on which such rates and rents had accrued. On the other hand, Mr. Anindya Mitra, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondent, relied on a judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata v/s. Canoro Resources Ltd. and Ors., 2008(1) CHN 141. On the basis of this judgment it was canvassed by Mr. Mitra that reading the provisions of Sec. 59 of the MPTA, 1963 with Sec. 6 of the PPA, 1971 gave the KPT a lien in respect of any goods or articles lying at the public premises, if rent was due in respect of the premises. Upon consideration of the relevant provisions of both the Acts and the judgments cited by both sides, the learned Single Judge, formed an opinion that there is a conflict between the two aforesaid Division Bench judgments of this Court. Hence the reference.
(3.) We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length.;