- (1.) The common point of controversy which requires the considered scrutiny of this Court and the petitioners in all the pending petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India have joined in chorus in contending that the statutory forum created under Section 3 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Act No. 51 of 1993) does not have the jurisdiction to entertain prayers for mortgage in a substantive petition under Section 19 of the said Act.The Debt Recovery Tribunal as 1 constituted under Section 3 of the connected Act is conferred with jurisdiction in terms of Section 19 to entertain and decide applications of the Banks and the Financial Institutions. The said Tribunal is authorised to have assumed jurisdiction from the appointed day when the connected Act has come into force with regard to initiation of any proceeding for recovery of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions and the said proceeding is required to be initiated in terms of the provisions under Section 19 of the Act. All applications which have been filed on or after the appointed day as mentioned in the Act, the Tribunal is conferred with jurisdiction to entertain list within the limited sphere and it has also been conferred with powers and jurisdiction to proceed with any pending proceeding before any Court before the establishment of a Tribunal under the Act after transfer of pending cases in terms of Section 31 of the Act. The challenge looms large on the score on a common ground that the statutory authority being the Debt Recovery Tribunal is divested of any authority and/or jurisdiction to entertain matters with other prayers or reliefs apart from debt as modulated therein. There is further relief by way of mortgage in the shape of the secured debts even relating to immovable property where hypothecation has been made with regard to those immovable property either by way of deposit of title deeds or by the other methods which this Court will dilate in detail at a later stage when it will deal with the question of mortgage in extenso as contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act.
(2.) . This Court has taken long pains and has consumed enormous time to set on its process of thinking on motion to decide the ticklish question of controversy touching on the question of legal niceties where reference was made in abundance from the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act as well as from the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court is also not unaware of some of the decisions of the other High Courts who are stated to have delivered judgment touching on the said question but in view of the marathon arguments offered by series of illustrious lawyers appearing on behalf of the petitioners in different petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it has the occasion to hear at length even the arguments advanced by the learned Additional Solicitor General as well as by Sri Hirak Mitter and other eminent Lawyers appearing on behalf of the Banks and the Financial Institutions. This Court before plunging itself into the domain of controversy likes to have an initial look about the salient provisions of the concerned Act, namely. The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. At the outset it will like to have a first look at the salient provisions of the Act and it will first make reference to Section 17 of the said Act. Section 17 as engrafted bespeaks of the conferment of power and jurisdiction on the Tribunal to entertain petitions, if filed at the instance of the Bank and Financial Institutions against the private loanees and if it is for recovery of sum beyond a certain ceiling. The entire lis has to be initiated and the same is to be commenced by filing of an application under Section 19 of the Act. It is necessary to make a reference to the germane implication of relevant expressions contained in Section 17 itself and after scanning of Section 17 it appears that apart from other formalities the Tribunal is conferred with power to be in seisin of the controversy relating to recovery of debts. The jural expression 'debt' has been defined in Section 2(g) which is quoted hereunder :- " 'Debt' means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is alleged as due from any person by a Bank or Financial Institution or by a consortium of Banks or Financial Institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the Bank or the Financial Institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured or whether payable under a decree or order of any Civil Court or otherwise and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on the date of the application."
(3.) There is no iota of doubt that the Tribunal being a creature of the statute is conferred with jurisdiction and/or authority for recovery of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions. Significant expression contained in the aforesaid provision of Section 17 is the debts due to such Banks or Financial Institutions. The entire meaning of the construction of the expression 'debt' as contemplated in Section 2(g) of the Act is required to be elucidated for which a close perspective of scrutiny by way of scanning of the composite definition of Debt under Section 2(g) is required 2 to be made and the Court before arriving at and/or venturing to give an elucidation of the statutory meaning of the word 'debt' will be further required to use other words used within the dimension of the definition of debt. This Court will proceed with pause by picking up significant words separately and it will straightway ascribe meaning to each and every expression contained therein so that a picture of totality may emerge. At the doorstep of the definition of the expression 'debt', this Court is confronted with the expression 'any liability' and naturally it occurs to the mind of this Court as to why it has been attempted to be elucidated at the point of threshold as 'any liability'. The word 'liability' obviously means obligation. The term 'liability' in terms of its etymological significance means and connotes responsibility to the limited extent. The term 'liable' in terms of Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary suggests pecuniary obligation. The word 'obligation' though widely used in common parlance but it has a definite connotation in law as it has assumed legal significance and a reference may be made to the meaning of the juristic expression of the word 'obligation' as sought to be defined in Section 2(a) of the Specific Relief Act where 'obligation' includes every duty enforceable by law. It does not stand in the same parity with the circumscribed and narrow construction. A reference may be made in this context to the case of Fatik Lal Pal v. Kalipada Das, reported in (1978) 82 Cal WN 607. In the perspective of the aforesaid connotation as indicated herein that it cannot have a narrow construction and the amplitude is widened because of the prefix added to the expression 'any' which is suggestive of widest amplitude.;