- (1.) In all these abovenoted revisional applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the impugned orders under challenges are in nature of ad-interim orders passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The said revisional applications are numbered as five separate applications and before dealing with them serially this Court will consider the common questions of law and jurisdiction involved in the said proceedings.
(2.) The common question which permeates the crux of the central range of controversy along with series of other pending revisional applications is centered-round on resolution of a question raised which has an element of commonality in character as to how far Debt Recovery Tribunal is competent and is authorised to pass under a self-contained statute know as The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial institutions Act, 1993 (Act No. 51 of 1993) which has been contended by the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of series of the petitioners and attention of this Court has been drawn to different dimensions focussed in order to substantiate their contention that the Debt Recovery Tribunal has neither any authority nor they are conferred by any blessing of the statute to pass such ad-interim orders. It has been contended by way of echo in a cohesive manner by all the petitioners that it has no vestige of jurisdiction by the same tribunal to pass ad-interim orders. The said contentions have been controverted by the Counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents Financial Institutions by joining issues to the propositions canvassed before this Court. This Court has carefully considered the contentions and counter-contentions of the respective parties at length and there has been some delay caused because of change of determination of this Court and because of the intervention of Annual Vacation. This Court has tried to carefully assess the respective contentions of the contentious propositions canvassed by the contesting parties. Before dealing with elaborate contentions raised by the learned Counsels 1 on behalf of the petitioners separately, this Court tends to take up the common pleas of the submissions made by the learned Counsels for the petitioners. Before dilating in details about the specific contentions raised by different Lawyers on behalf of the petitioners, this Court tends to deal on the substantive substance of their arguments. At the very outset it is salient to refer to the gist of the arguments and contentions made by the respective Counsels on behalf of the petitioners. Attention of this Court has been repeatedly drawn to the provision of Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) wherein it has been stipulated in Sub-section (2) of Section 19 that every application under Sub-section (1) shall be in such form as may be prescribed. The Rules known as Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 have come into force on the date of the publication in the official gazette and in terms of Rule 10 thereof it has been envisaged that an original application under Section 19 (1) shall not seek relief or reliefs based on more than a single cause of action in one single application unless the reliefs prayed for are consequential to one another. The procedure for final application and of its presentation in form has been prescribed in terms of Rule 4 of the said Rules. In terms of the said Rule, form has been prescribed in the said Rules with different clauses as detailed therein. Column 6 of the said form formulated under Rule 4 contemplates filling up of the reliefs sought for in the main application under Section 19 (1) of the Act itself. Column 7 of the said form envisages interim order pending final decision on the application issuance of interim orders which are asked for what are being prayed for. It is necessary in this context to refer back to Section 19 itself and attention of the Court has been drawn to Clauses 4 and 6 of Section 19. Section 19 (4) contemplates that the Tribunal may after giving the applicant and the respondent an opportunity of being heard pass such orders on the application as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice. Section 19 (6) envisages that the Tribunal may make an interim order (either by way of injunction of stay) against the respondent to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with or disposing of any property and assets belonging to them without the prior intimation to the defendant. It is clear from perusal of Clause 19 (6) that the court may pass an interim order and the expression used is by way of mention of an order of interim nature. The said interim order has been further circumscribed by way of injunction or stay as adumberated within the bracketed portion specifying the object of order of such interim nature to debar the defendant from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with or disposing of any property and assets belonging to the petitioner without prior permission of the Tribunal. There has been adaptation of Section 19 (6) in the form prescribed under the Rules covered by Rule 4 as mentioned in Column 7 which also make the same pinpointed by describing the nature of the order as interim. The term of the adjective 'interim' as appended to order has been exemplified in Column 7 itself by making the mention pending final decision on the parent application which is under Section 19 (1) of the Act. Even from the phraseology of Column 7, the term 'interim order' has been explained away as an order pending final decision on the parent application. Peculiarly enough, Section 19 (6) read with the format as contained in the form in terms of Rule 4 of The Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 and Column 7 seems to be the adaptation of the engrafting of Section 19 (6) of the Act. There does not appear to be any column which is required to be filled up for prayer of ad interim order. In terms of provision of Section 19 (2) every application under Section 19 (1) shall be in such form as may be prescribed and the expression used there is by way of coinage of the word 'shall'. It apparently appears to be mandatory that unless a new application at the threshold of the commencement of the proceeding after the promulgation of the Act is not in form, the same will become procedurally irregular and it is bound to be in compliance of such form. Any addition, alteration or deletion of the columns as prescribed in the form covered by Rule 4 will not be in strict conformity with the procedures as prescribed in terms of Section 19 (2) which is by way of a mandate. The significant omission in the form as prescribed under Rule 4 of the Rules seems to be eloquent having a germane implication. This Court on prima facie facie scrutiny cannot decipher as to why there is no mention of any column about inclusion of ad interim prayers. 2 From the resume of entire Section 19 of the Act itself there also does not appear to be any reference about ad interim orders. In the backdrop of the same this Court has been confronted with another provision as contained in Section 19 (4) which prescribes that the Tribunal may after giving the applicant and the respondent an opportunity of being heard pass such orders on the application as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice. This Court has been asked to reconcile both the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) and (6) of Section 19 and has been requested to make a harmonious construction to do away with any element of dichotomy in between the said two provisions as contained in Sub-section (4) and (6) of Section 19. This has left this Court on the precipice of its platform to interpret and to decipher the meaning of the word 'orders' as mentioned in Section 19 (4). The expression used, namely, 'orders' appears to be a plural expression which previously in terms of grammatical construction contained reference to plurality of orders. The said orders are attempted to be comprehended by an expression of prefix such as a preclude to the expression 'orders' to meet the ends of justice. The Court is made to wonder as to what is meant by such orders meaning thereby as to what should be the nature of such orders. This Court to make the point threadbare wants to refer to the purpose of such orders to meet the ends of justice which cannot be except for the purpose of meeting the ends of justice. The same has been preceded by Sub-section (3) of Section 19 which prescribes as to what the Tribunal should do on receipt of an application under Section 19 (1) and after appearance or service of such notice it can pass such orders to meet the ends of justice in compliance of the provisions of Section 19 itself coupled with the other ancillary provisions and the rules framed thereunder. It has been followed by incorporation of Sub-section (5) of Section 19 that the Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed by it to the applicant and the respondent. In terms of format of Rule 4, Column 6 several reliefs are sought to be contemplated by way of incorporation to fill up Column 6 and reliefs should be of plural nature on a particular cause of action for initiation of proceeding. If there are severl reliefs prayed for, then there may be plurality of orders which can be singled out by way of specification of species. Sub-section (4) being placed in between Sub-section (3) and Sub-section (5) it gives an inkling that it relates to the orders passed on the substantive application under Section 19 (1) itself and it excludes orders of interim nature. It has been contended by Mr. Roy, one of the learned Advocates on behalf of the financial institutions in one of the pending matters that such orders must be deemed to be orders of final nature. This Court for the reasons as aforesaid is in agreement with the submissions of Mr. Subrata Roy so far as his contention is concerned that such orders as appearing in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 must refer to as orders of final nature.
(3.) Now coming at the doorstep of the construction of Section 19 (6) of the Act which contemplates the Tribunal may pass an interim order and the same has been circumscribed within the exhaustive list as bracketed namely by way of injunction or stay from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with or disposing of any property and assets without prior permission of the Tribunal. It is significant to make the mention that the illustrations as put in within the bracket appear to be exhaustive and not illustrative because it is not followed up by user of any omnibus expression as 'etc.' The pattern put in appears to be significant as it indicates exhaustive catena and the same cannot be construed as illustrative in nature. So far as the connotation of the interim order is concerned, the same has been explained away in the form under Rule 4 of the Debt Recovery (Procedure) Rules, 1993 in Column 7 thereof which tends to pinpoint that interim order is pending final decision of the adjudication of the parent application which must be one under Section 19 (1) of the Act. As the modern trend is to make all of us plunge into domain of terminology and in order to extract the essence of the said terms there should be clarity of conception about the terms used. So far as plurality of orders contemplated in a pending lis (mainly in suits) from the inception and/or commencement of the proceeding are classifiable in the separate categories, namely, orders of final nature, interim orders, ad interim orders and interlocutory orders. Orders of final nature mean and connote the plurality of orders in terms of separate reliefs prayed for being based on one cause of action in a composite application at the state of its disposal giving rise to finality. 3 So far as interim order is concerned common notion of law is that such orders are required to be passed during the pendency of the proceeding and/or pendency of the suit. In the same tune, Column 7 for filling up of the interim orders have been explained as pending final decision on the parent application. In Column 7 of Rule 4 of the connected Rules of 1993 during the pendency of the application under Section 19 of the Act there are other species of ad interim orders conceivable which tend to connote the orders which are capable of being comprehended only during the pendency of an interlocutory application either in the main proceeding or in the suit. Here, the main proceeding is one under Section 19 (1) of the connected Act. Therefore, there is no confusion in between the interim orders and ad interim orders because interim orders are passed and they remain operative during the pendency of the suit and/or proceeding and ad interim orders remain in force during the pendency of an application where orders are usually passed before showing cause by the opposite party in an ex parte hearing. In terms of the provision of the Civil Procedure Code it is possible to conceive another species of orders, namely, interlocutory orders and this Court after going through the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure tend to think that the provisions are incorporated under Order 39, Rule 2A, Rule 6 thereof and also the provisions covered by Order 39, Rule 8 and Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In terms of the course of experience and comprehension about the pari materia as forecast under Code of Civil Procedure, the distinction appears to be on a clear line of water-shade between the interim orders and ad-interim orders as interim orders will remain in force during the pendency of the suit or proceedings and ad interim orders will have its longevity upto a limited period till the opposite party shows cause in an ex parte hearing during the pendency of adjudication of the pending interlocutory application praying for relief by way of injunction or stay in the case of the instant Act. Here, in all the cases before this Court, ad interim orders are passed which have not been provided for under the statute, namely, the concerned Act. A controversy seems to have arisen as to whether they are capable of being passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal but as it is a creature of a particular statute, it is not expected unlike a court to be vested with inherent powers. It is also not out of context to refer to the procedure to be followed in the process of adjudication before the forum of the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the procedure has been laid down to be the procedure of confirmity to the principles of natural justice and subject to other provisions of the Act and the Rules and the Tribunal shall have the power to regulate their own procedure. The power to regulate its own procedure cannot be treated at par to that of uncanalised powers of the Tribunal and adaptation of procedure have been laid down in Rule 4 to Rule 9 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993. The aforesaid rules relate to procedure for filing application, namely, the parent application under Section 19 (1) and its presentation and scrutiny of application, place of application, contents of the aplication which must be in conformity with Rule 4 as adopted in terms of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 derived from Section 19 of the Act. It is doubtful as to whether in terms of Section 22 of the Act the process of adjudication can be guided by powers to regulate their own procedure save and except selection of the places at which they shall have their sitting excepting the procedures as laid down in the aforesaid rules of Rule 4 to Rule 9. If the guiding norm or procedure for adjudication is mandatory compliance of the principle of natural justice whether it can pass orders behind the back of the party litigant and the court will be required to scrutinise as to how far this offends against the elementary canons of the principles of natural justice. Natural justice ordinarily tends to suggest that nobody not to speak of a quasi judicial authority nor a tribunal but even an executive authority is not entitled to pass orders which are likely to be followed by pernicious implications affecting the interest of a party who has not been heard. The insistence and/or mandate as forcast under Section 22 of the Act about compliance of natural justice also cast a doubt as to whether the tribunal has a right to pass any order whether interim or ad interim without hearing and/or without affording an opportunity of hearing to the aggrieved party. The same becomes exclusively clear as Section 19 (6) refers only to interim orders of special type, namely, by way of injunction or stay but it has not included ad interim orders. Even if it be assumed that Column 7 of the form as specified under 4 Rule 4 of the connected Rules is properly filled up, the same must form a part and parcel of the composite application under Section 19 giving a detailed catalogue of 11 Columns in terms of totality. Therefore, even if a prayer is included of any type in the form under Rule 4, the same must be embodied in the composite format of the rule which has to be served by the tribunal by way of issuance of summons in terms of Section 19 (3) of the Act. As soon as there shall be service of summons in terms of mandatory requirement of Section 19 (3) of the Act, the concerned opposite party/respondent will come to know of the prayers of iterim nature or of any other type which will be manifest from the perusal of the composite application as per format. Therefore, as soon as the opposite party/respondent is served with a copy of the summons or there is effective notice of service of summons, the Tribunal can proceed on the basis that there is appearance. Accordingly, there is no scope for any doubt of any contingent event where the applicant had no scope to pray for any order under whatsoever caption without knowledge of the opposite parties. Therefore, in terms of the statute and the rules framed thereunder, it appears that at all stages contested proceeding have been envisaged and statute does not appear to have permitted any walk-over by one one of the parties so that it can march ahead over the field in the arena of litigation without the knowledge of the concerned respondent as the Tribunal is judicially empowered to affix liability which has far reaching implication. Therefore, the same has been obliterated from the entire compass of the connected statute being The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder.;